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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The thesis investigates the policy-making process underpinning the 
poverty-alleviation programmes created in Chile during the 1990s and the 
first part of the 2000s. Three programmes developed by the governing 
Concertacion Alliance during this period are selected. The un-researched 
characteristic of this subject in Chile is the main reason for choosing this 
topic.  
 
The thesis maps and explains the policy-making process of the three 
programmes, by identifying main events, actors and mechanisms behind 
the unfolding of events. Data is obtained from 32 interviews applied to key 
process actors to obtain their narratives of the processes. The Multiple 
Streams Model of the policy-making process is employed as theoretical 
framework. 
 
Results highlight that the processes occur in a highly closed fashion inside 
government. The main actors involved are the President and his ministers 
who are able to command the events that lead to the creation of a new 
programme. The political stream plays a fundamental role in the process 
as the pro-equity approach of the governing coalition creates a window of 
opportunity for the introduction of poverty-alleviation programmes. The 
problems stream is also important, thanks to the availability of poverty 
statistics that are produced every two years by the Concertacion Alliance 
governments.  
 
However, the processes differ from the Multiple Streams Model as no 
independent policy stream was found to exist. Instead, solutions are 
created by governments in a punctuated manner and during a short 
timeframe to accomplish political deadlines, when the government 
considers that the problem deserves to be addressed.  
 
The absence of a policy stream is explained by the policy monopoly that 
the government enjoys in the poverty arena, where no policy contestants 
exist. In particular, Chilean social policy experts constitute a small and 
non-articulated group of individuals usually excluded from the policy-
making process, enabling the government to ignore them. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
“At that time, the concern inside government was what to do to regain 
political capital amid an economic crisis and the government’s political 
discredit . . . the idea (of creating a poverty-alleviation programme) 
appealed as an inexpensive nation-wide programme that was easy to 
embark with, ruthlessly speaking”  
(Egaña, interview, January 2007) 
 
 
 
1.0 POLICY-MAKING IN CHILE DURING THE 1990s 
 
After sixteen years of military rule, Chile returned to democracy in 1990. A 
feeling of excitement was palpable in the country as democracy was like a 
mirage amid the harsh reality of the military regime. The phrase La alegría 
ya viene! (Happiness is about to arrive!) was the motto used by the 
democratic opposition during the 1989 elections to express this feeling. 
The opposition was grouped in the Concertacion de Partidos por la 
Democracia (Agreement of Parties for Democracy), from now on refered 
to as the Concertacion Alliance, formed by parties of centre-left views. 
 
While it may be argued that a confluence of a range of events facilitated 
the emergence of democracy in the country, such as the attrition of the 
military government, the pressure from the international community and 
the impact of a recent economic collapse, one should not ignore the 
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importance of the struggle that ordinary Chileans undertook to regain 
democracy, under the wise guidance of Concertacion Alliance politicians. 
 
With the emergence of democracy, a highly motivated political 
establishment assumed power with new ideas and proposals. They were 
the Concertacion Alliance politicians, the heroes of the fight against the 
military to establish democracy.  In his book El reencuentro de los 
democratas (the reunion of democrats) Patricio Aylwin (1988), the first 
Concertacion Alliance president, provides a detailed account of the way in 
which the Concertacion Alliance was born in the mid 1980s by uniting 
forces and adopting a concensual approach to assemble the democratic 
opposition. They did this without knowing at that time, that they were 
building the foundations of one of the most successful political alliances in 
Chilean history, at least in terms of their permanence in power1.  
 
Of significant importance in the new government’s agenda was an 
emphasis on extending social equity in the country, a goal that was at the 
heart of the Concertacion Alliance and that was pursued by all its 
successive administrations. As a centre-left political alliance, the 
Concertacion Alliance was naturally inclined to introduce equity enhancing 
policies, especially in response to the neo-liberal socioeconomic approach 
followed by the military, which considered economic growth as the single 
most important goal of the government.  
                                                 
1 The four consecutive Concertacion Alliance governments will complete twenty years in 
power by 2010. 
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The Concertacion Alliance was confronting huge social challenges, in 
addition to securing a smooth transition to democracy. The socio-
economic situation of the country was precarious and basic social services 
such as health and education were in a mediocre condition. On top of that, 
by the end of the 1990s unprecedented levels of poverty existed, with 
near 38% of the total population living under the poverty line2.  
 
As a result, addressing poverty became a fixed item in each Concertacion 
Alliance government’s agenda. A number of nation-wide programmes 
purposely designed to confront poverty were created during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, starting in 1990 under the Patricio Aylwin administration 
with Programme FOSIS, a social fund to finance projects with high social 
impact. In 1996, the Eduardo Frei second Concertacion Alliance 
government introduced the programme Chile Barrio (Chile Neighbourhood) 
to address deprivations faced by the inhabitants of poor settlements.  And 
in 2002, Ricardo Lagos, the third Concertacion Alliance president launched 
programme Chile Solidario (Chile Solidarity), an initiative defined as a 
social protection system to help extremely poor families to overcome their 
vulnerability3.  
 
                                                 
2 See: Chapter Five, Table 5.0. 
3 For simplicity along the thesis these three poverty-alleviation initiatives are referred as 
programmes. More generally they correspond to policy innovations of different nature 
according to the way in which they were defined by Chilean authorities. In effect, FOSIS 
was defined as a social fund to finances projects and programmes, Chile Barrio was 
characterized as a programme, and Chile Solidario was described as a social protection 
system. See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of each programme.  
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All these innovations were ‘flagship’ programmes of each Concertacion 
Alliance administration. From their launch, which usually occurred in the 
solemn presidential Mensaje a la Nacion (Address to the nation) ceremony, 
presidents draw attention to these programmes. In addition, presidents 
and ministers publicly accompanied the implementation and progress of 
their respective trademark programmes. The Mensaje a la Nacion 
ceremony deserves special attention. This annual presidential address to 
congress and the nation allows presidents to report their government’s 
progress during the previous year, and to look ahead and present their 
plans for the following one. More importantly, Chilean presidents use this 
opportunity to take an ace from their sleeve and ‘surprise’ the entire 
nation with some unexpected announcement. As mentioned, a poverty-
alleviation initiative often was one such unexpected announcement. After 
the Mensaje a la Nacion, it was common to see the press anxiously 
looking for the relevant ministers to explain in detail the innovations 
announced by the president.   
  
 21 
Cecilia Perez, Minister of Planning during Ricardo Lagos’ third Concertacion 
Alliance administration, provides a direct account of the interest this event 
produced (interview, January 2007): 
 
“On the 22nd of May [the President] asked the minister of 
finance, the minister of health, the budget office director 
and me to give a press conference at La Moneda4 to explain 
what the President had announced, and on the 24th of May, 
I gave a conference to NGOs”. 
 
After graduating in economics at the beginning of the 1990s, I began 
working in the Ministry of Planning of Chile (MIDEPLAN) Social Studies 
Department. My duties centred on elaborating and analysing poverty and 
income statistics from the nation-wide CASEN socioeconomic surveys 5 . 
This post as a mid-level government official gave me a privileged position 
to witness the Concertacion Alliance social policy approach, particularly the 
efforts made in the area of poverty alleviation. However, being an insider 
did not present a great advantage in understanding or obtaining even 
informal knowledge of the policy-making process in the area of poverty 
alleviation as no prior information about the poverty-alleviation 
innovations were circulated inside the ministry before their public launch. 
In particular, no deliberation or discussion between poverty experts inside 
                                                 
4
 The Palacio de La Moneda (Palace of the Coin), is the seat of the President of the 
Republic of Chile.  
5 MIDEPLAN is the institution in charge of overseeing social policy in the country. 
Appendix 2 describes the history of MIDEPLAN while Appendix 3 explains the importance 
of the CASEN surveys in Chilean social policy. 
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the ministry had taken place regarding the most appropriate approach for 
addressing the different stages of poverty alleviation.    
 
Was the policy-making process of these poverty-alleviation programmes 
reserved for top-level MIDEPLAN officials? Or was it a process driven by 
experts from other government institutions? In any case, the process 
resembled a ‘black box’ that was inaccessible not only to ordinary citizens 
but also to mid-level government officials involved in dealing with the 
issue of poverty. Identifying the actors involved in the process and the 
forces and events driving it, thereby transforming the black box into a 
transparent glass box, constituted the main motivation of the present 
research. 
 
Hand in hand with the introduction of these poverty-alleviation 
programmes, the Concertacion Alliance launched important reforms in 
other social policy areas, especially health and education - reforms that 
spanned more than one ruling Concertacion Alliance administration. For 
instance, the reform of education was officially launched by Eduardo Frei, 
the second Concertacion Alliance president, entailing important changes to 
improve the quality of public education. The reform continued as part of 
the agenda of the third Concertacion Alliance government, when 
additional measures were introduced. Some authors view the education 
reform as a process whose roots are found in the first Concertacion 
Alliance government, when a law improving teacher’s benefits was 
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introduced (Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein, 2002). A similar story can be 
found in the health sector6.  
 
While the creation of poverty-alleviation programmes was fairly smooth, 
as Chapter Five will demonstrate, these other policy innovations were 
filled with discussions, conflicts and obstacles from a variety of actors and 
events. Chapter Seven describes the conflicts between the government, 
the political opposition and labour and professional unions that occurred 
during the policy-making process of health and education reforms. An 
anecdote that reflects the intensity of these disagreements was the 
resignation of the first health minister of the Concertacion Alliance due to 
the pressure from the medical doctors’ union which forced him to leave 
soon after he was in post (Lenz, 2005:300). Why was the poverty-related 
policy area such a peaceful arena, while these other social policy sectors 
were conflictual? What features of the poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process may help to explain this difference? This dissertation aims to 
explain the way in which the poverty-alleviation process unfolded, 
therefore contributing not only to a description of the process but also to 
making sense of it by understanding its inner mechanisms and dynamics. 
 
All the questions posed in this introduction are addressed in this thesis by 
entering the inaccessible arena of the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-
making process. A previously undocumented process is researched by 
                                                 
6 Chapter Four describes in detail these reforms. 
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identifying, contacting and interviewing key actors in order to map and 
explain the process. The resulting data collected constitutes a unique 
qualitative verification of a phenomenon that escapes the reach of a 
quantitative research, due to the complexities and variety of events, actors 
and political circumstances that characterise the poverty alleviation policy-
making process in Chile. The selection of a research framework that 
considers multiple actors and forces and one which precisely specifies the 
mechanics of the process, in addition to the choice of a limited set of 
relevant cases to include in the research, enables the unravelling of the 
complexities involved in researching the poverty alleviation policy-making 
process.  
 
1.1 THE POVERTY-ALLEVIATION POLICY-MAKING PROCESS: AN 
UNRESEARCHED TOPIC IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Since the 1950s, the policy-making process has been continuously 
researched in the developed world, with the works of authors such as 
Laswell (1956), Easton (1965), Dror (1986), Lindblom (1993) and Kingdon 
(1995). These investigations, focussing mainly on the US, have considered 
the role of multiple policy actors in the process, such as heads of the state, 
the congress, interest groups, think thanks and so on. Hence, it is not a 
surprise to find that advocacy, competition and policy discussion between 
these actors has been a prominent feature of many of these studies.  
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On the contrary, in the developing world the study of the policy-making 
process has remained much more absent from the attention of 
researchers. Works such as Grindle (1980) and Grindle and Thomas (1991) 
are seminal in addressing the policy process in the developing world, 
which is radically different from the one that occurs in developed countries. 
These studies show that government policy-elites appear to be central. 
The relevance of policy advocacy from multiple actors is minimal 
compared to the overwhelming powers that governmental elites have in 
commanding and controlling the process. The president and his ministers 
emerge as top actors due to their privileged hierarchical position.  
  
In the Latin American region, the literature about the policy-making 
process focuses mainly on health, education, pensions and economic 
policies. For instance, Grindle (2002) analyses social policy innovations 
applied during the 1990s in the region. She confirms the central position 
that the executive has in a process that generally lacks the participation of 
other non-government actors. IADB (2006) studies the policy-making 
process in Latin America, with an emphasis in economic policies, such as 
tax, budget, and privatization policies. In the area of social policy, 
education reforms are also analysed.  By applying a multiple-actors game 
theory approach, the study finds that the centrality of the executive in the 
policy-making processes is attenuated by the participation of other players 
such as the legislature, political parties, interest groups or think tanks, 
which can display different levels of cooperation during the process. The 
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legislature usually acts as a veto player by blocking or amending 
government proposals. In the case of education, this blocking activity is 
performed by labour unions, which traditionally have opposed education 
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and quality of educational 
systems.  
 
Some publications have focused on specific features of policy reforms 
applied to Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, 
Kaufman and Nelson (2004) study the politics of reforms applied to 
education and health services in Latin America in the 1990s. They 
conclude that in pursuing reforms, policymakers confront the opposition of 
a variety of stakeholders such as teachers and health unions, politicians 
and private insurers and providers. As a result, reforms in these areas 
tend to be more extensive in countries where these stakeholders are 
relatively weak. Sometimes, the opposition of some of these groups  
results in the dilution of reforms or in the possibility of obtaining 
consessions (Kaufman and Nelson (2004:501). In the same vein, 
Gonzalez-Rosetti and Bossert (2000) examine health reforms applied in 
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, focusing on the strategies that policymakers 
followed to confront the obstacles that emerged when introducing reforms. 
The authors propose that the degree to which reforms are successful is 
related to the capacity of the different actors involved to influence the 
process and to the strategies that reformers use to pursue their reform 
agenda. Maceira and Murillo (2001) focus on the reaction of teachers’ and 
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doctors’ unions to social sector reforms applied in Latin America. They 
conclude that the reaction of unions to social sector reforms is determined 
by  features of health and education markets, such as their size, level of 
development and competition, and by variables associated with the 
historical evolution of unions, which influences their ability to collude and 
confront reforms.   
 
Weyland (2005, 2006) concentrates his attention on the diffusion of policy 
innovations that occured in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s, 
such as the Bolivia´s pension reform which followed the Chilean pension 
model introduced during the 1980s. The author explains political decision-
making by cognitive psycology mechanisms, where bounded rationality 
prevails. The author proposes that the difusion of policies was not the 
result of a rational selection and evaluation of relevant alternatives, but 
rather that policymakers used cognitive shortcuts which generated 
systematic distortions and deviations from the ideal-typical postulates of 
rationality. 
 
In the case of Chile, there are some studies of the policy-making process 
in the areas of pensions and economic policies. Piñera (1991) examines 
the process of introducing the pension reform applied in Chile during the 
1980s under the Pinochet regime. As minister of social security and main 
promoter of the reform, Piñera explains the difficulties and events that led 
to one of the biggest social sector reforms that occured in Chile under 
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Pinochet. Aninat et al (2006) and Montecinos (2003) concentrate on the 
legislative phase of the policy-making process when the laws required to 
implement economic policies are discussed. They confirm the role of 
congress as a ‘veto player’ that confronts the significant powers that the 
president enjoys in Chile. It is argued that this balance of power prompts 
negotiations and concessions between policy actors to approve legislation. 
 
It may be concluded that the poverty-alleviation policy-making process 
remains an unresearched topic in the Latin America region, as compared 
to the analysis of the policy-making process for pensions, health, 
education and economic policies. Hence, the present research aims to 
contribute to the literature that studies the policy-making process in Latin 
America, by concentrating on the particular features of this process in the 
case of poverty-alleviation innitiatives. 
 
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter One introduced the rationale for analysing the poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process in Chile, and the way in which the thesis is 
structured.  
 
Chapter Two provides a literature review about the policy process and 
policy-making. Basic concepts and theories of the policy process are 
introduced and explored. The main theories explaining policy-making are 
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set out in detail, outlining the advantages and disadvantages of applying 
each of them to the theoretical frameworks of the thesis. 
 
Chapter Three presents and justifies the aims of this thesis and their 
related research questions. The methodology employed is also described, 
validating the selection of a qualitative case study approach and a 
narrative interviewing technique to gather data. The selection criterion for 
the three cases to study is also presented here.  
 
Chapter Four presents the context for the thesis by describing the 
evolution of social policy in Chile, particularly the way in which pro-poor 
policies and poverty-alleviation programmes have materialised.   
 
Chapter Five addresses the first aim of the thesis by mapping the policy-
making process of each of the three poverty-alleviation programmes 
selected.  This is done by presenting descriptions of the processes 
provided by the interviewees. A detailed account of the actors and events 
involved in each process is included here, describing the temporal 
occurrence of events and the circumstances in which each relevant actor 
participated in the processes. The concluding section of this Chapter 
highlights the commonalities found between the three cases. 
 
Chapter Six addresses the second aim of the thesis by explaining the way 
in which the processes unfolded. This is accomplished by contrasting the 
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policy-making theories presented in Chapter Two with the mapping of the 
processes introduced in Chapter Five. This comparison allows for the 
selection of the most appropriate model to be used as theoretical 
framework for the thesis by identifying the advantages and limitations of 
each framework considered. Next, the predictions of the selected 
framework are contrasted in detail with the evidence provided by the 
cases, which allows finding coincidences and divergences between theory 
and data. 
 
Chapter Seven addresses the differences found between the processes 
and the predictions of the preferred explanatory framework. Relevant 
literature and the opinions of key interviewees constitute the material 
used to explain these divergences.  
 
Finally, Chapter Eight summarises the main conclusions of the thesis. The 
Chapter advances the areas for future research that can be derived from 
the thesis as well as the policy recommendations that follow the results.  
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical frameworks to study the 
Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process 
 
 
 
 “Adopting promised policies is far more important and politically beneficial 
than actually solving any problems” 
(Zahariadis, 1999) 
 
“Policy-making generally satisfies the participants and few others care” 
(Jones, 1994:218) 
 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to present main concepts, actors 
and forces related to the policy-making processes. These elements will 
help to map the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process, by 
identifying relevant actors and forces involved in the process. The 
mapping itself is provided in Chapter Five. Second, to present the main 
theories developed to study the policy-making process. This will allow 
choosing the most appropriate theory to use as theoretical framework. 
 
No theoretical framework was selected a-priori to analyse the cases. 
Instead, the process of continuously contrasting theories with data 
allowed determining which theoretical framework was most appropritate. 
Hence, data analysis has guided the selection of a particular theoretical 
framework. However, it must be recognised that the Kingdon’s (1995) 
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Multiple Streams Model of policy-making that is presented in this chapter 
has, in retrospect, ‘informed’ the entire research process. This was the 
case because among the variety of models available to use as theoretical 
frameworks, Kingdon’s model was considered a rich, clear and detailed 
one, a characteristic that made it very suitable to describe and explore the 
processes of policy-making under study.  
 
In any case, and as Sigurgeirsdottir (2005) has confirmed in a recent 
investigation of the policy-making process in Iceland and the United 
Kingdom, the complexities of the policy-making process, where intricate 
mechanisms and dynamics may be at work in different countries and 
policy areas, makes the use of many theoretical views an almost inevitable 
route to properly understand this phenomenon. Chapter Six will discuss in 
detail the applicability to the Chilean poverty-alleviation case of the 
different frameworks presented here and will conclude which one is the 
most apt for this research. 
 
This chapter starts with a section that outlines basic concepts that 
illustrates the approaches developed to analyse the policy process. The 
following section describes policy-making process actors identified by the 
literature. Then, the main theoretical frameworks developed to study the 
policy-making process are presented. The final section provides the 
conclusions of the chapter. 
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2.1 BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
2.1.1 Public policy 
 
Public policy corresponds to initiatives addressing subjects that are outside 
the sphere of private issue (Parsons, 2001). These are areas that require 
some public regulation or intervention as they affect society. 
 
An elaborated and rich definition of public policy is provided by Jenkins 
(1978) who claims that it is,  
 
“a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or 
group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the 
means of achieving them within a specified situation” (cited 
in Hill, 1997a:7). 
 
The virtue of this definition is that it includes a series of relevant features 
of public policy, i.e. that it is not one but a group of interrelated decisions, 
that they are decisions rather than actions (leaving space for the 
possibility of inactions) and that they may be under the influence of many 
different actors. 
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2.1.2 Policy process 
 
The literature on the policy process presents a rather misty description of 
this process. At times it is described as a ‘black box’ (Hill, 1997a), for 
others the policy process is mainly what decision makers do (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991). In some cases, there even exists a pessimistic view about 
the possibility of understanding a phenomenon characterized by being a 
“complexly interactive process without beginning nor end” (Lindblom, 
1993:11).  
 
The idea of the policy process as a black box comes from the systems 
approach of the policy process outlined by Easton (1965). He applies a 
biological perspective to political activity, as it may be understood as 
taking place in an environment that contains a variety of other systems, 
including social and economic ones. The political system receives inputs, 
in the form of demands and support, and the outputs are the decisions 
and policies taken by authorities (Figure 2.0).  
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Figure 2.0 
The System’s Approach of the policy process 
 
Source: Easton (1965:32). 
 
  
An interesting concept in Easton’s approach is the environment where the 
political system is located. He divides it into two parts: the intra-societal 
and the extra-societal environments. The first one includes forces related 
to the economy and social structures that belong to the same society as 
the political system. The extra-societal environment includes all those 
systems that lay outside domestic society, such as the international 
political system, the international economy and the international cultural 
system. 
 
Another illuminating element of this theory is the idea of a continuous 
feedback during the policy process. The double-sided arrow in figure 2.0 
represents this.  
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As Easton notes,  
 
“the outputs are able to modify the influences that continue 
to operate on the inputs and thereby the next round of 
inputs themselves” (Easton, 1965:32). 
 
 This idea highlights the influence of past policies in the present policy 
process. Past policies define a policy space, which limits the scope of 
present policies. There are policy traditions reflecting consensus that can 
make the development of new policy approaches difficult to achieve. 
Furthermore, there may be inherited policies and agendas that structure 
or limit present policies. Hence, the systems approach views the policy 
process ultimately as a circular process, highlighting that its apparent 
linearity is only an analytical tool (Easton, 1965:27-29). 
 
The systems approach has been subject to some criticisms. First, it may 
oversimplify reality as policy making rarely occurs in such a simple way as 
the model describes. For instance, policy-makers themselves may be the 
sources of demands, or the manufacturers of such demands. Second, it 
may overemphasise the importance of inputs and outputs in the policy 
process, giving less attention to the central political process, which 
remains a black box in terms of the inner mechanisms that drive it. And 
third, the whole system itself may be the object of political action (Hill, 
1997a:20-22). 
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In defence of Eason’s theory, it must be stated that his objective was 
mainly focused on explaining the persistence of the political system in 
relation to the environment where it happens. In other words, he explicitly 
focused his analysis on the relationship between the political system and 
the external forces that exist within the ‘environment’ (Easton, 1965).  
 
The study of the policy process involves analyzing the unfolding of events 
and decisions that may culminate in an authoritative decision. More 
precisely, when studying the policy process, attention is focused on the 
stages through which issues pass, and attempts are made to identify the 
influence of different elements on the development of the issue (Hill, 
1997a:4).  
 
A framework that has been highly influential in the analysis of the policy 
process is the Stages Approach. Outlined initially by Laswell (1956), it 
visualizes the policy process as a series of stages or phases that a 
particular government policy or programme would go through during its 
life. The stages approach describes the progressive concretisation of 
policies, from the initial stage when a problem is recognized to the final 
ones when policies are implemented and evaluated (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 
Stages Approach of the policy process 
 
Source: Adapted from Laswell (1957) and Kingdon (1995). 
 
 
The stages approach is an example of what Sutton (1999) identifies as 
‘linear models’ of the policy process, also referred to as ‘rational models’. 
Linear models assume that decisions are made in a series of sequential 
steps, starting with the identification of a problem or issue, and ending 
with a set of activities to solve or deal with it. They also assume that 
policy makers approach the issue rationally, taking into consideration each 
logical step that makes up the process, and analysing all the relevant 
information available.  
 
The main advantage of the stages approach is that it highlights important 
phases and elements of the policy process, as well as the different policy 
actors involved in each stage. As a methodological procedure it resembles 
the way in which natural sciences analyse many complex phenomena. For 
 39 
instance, in biology the different parts and systems of the body are 
studied separately, abstracting momentarily from analysing the 
connections that exist between the different systems. Sadly, social 
sciences lack the easy isolation and identification of parts found in this 
example, thus making it a more risky procedure in terms of distorting 
reality for the sake of simplifying the analysis. In any case, this approach 
has remained the preferred and most widely used in the studies of the 
policy process, representing a common language in the field. The 
justification for this procedure lies on the grounds of practicality, as it 
allows the study of a complex subject in a manageable form (Parsons, 
2001). 
 
The original Laswell’s view of the process included seven stages: 
intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination 
and appraisal. After this novel classification, different ways of separating 
the policy process have been postulated. For instance, Sutton (1999:9) 
includes the following stages: recognizing and defining the nature of the 
issue to be dealt with, identifying possible courses of action to deal with 
the issue (options analysis), weighing up the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these alternatives, choosing the option offering 
the best solution, implementing the policy and evaluation of the outcome. 
Kingdon (1995) provides another example by dividing the policy process 
into four stages: agenda setting, alternative specification, authoritative 
decision and implementation. Similarly, Parsons distinguishes between 
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problem definition, agenda setting, policy specification, decision-making, 
policy implementation and evaluation (Parsons, 2001: xvi).  
 
The literature describes the following limitations of the stages approach: 
first, it provides no causal force that governs the whole process. Instead, 
each stage may be viewed and analysed independently without reference 
to the other stages. Second, the sequence of the proposed stages is often 
inaccurate as some stages may influence and shape previous ones. For 
instance, the evaluation of existing programmes may influence the 
implementation procedures applied. Third, it assumes that stages are 
clearly demarcated and isolated from each other while in fact there may 
be feedbacks and recursive loops between various policy stages (Hill, 
1997a:24; Deleon, 1999:23; Sabatier, 1999:7). In particular, studies 
focusing their attention on one specific stage of the policy process may 
neglect from the analysis the interactions that can occur with other stages, 
as long as it is assumed that the stage under analysis is a well-bounded 
and independent part of the process. 
 
Some authors highlight that the separation between policy-making and 
policy implementation presents specific problems (Sutton, 1999:22). In 
particular, policies do often change as they go through the implementation 
process, as they move through bureaucracies to the local level where they 
are implemented. Policies may change at any point of the process when 
being subject to pressures and reactions from implementers. In particular, 
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street level bureaucracies (Lipsky, 1980) and administrative considerations 
may change policies during the implementation stage. Hence, policies may 
be ‘in the making’ even after being already implemented. Besides, the 
separation between policy-making and implementation may allow policy 
makers to avoid responsibility on the final outcomes of policies, as policy-
making can be endorsed to policy makers, while implementation may be 
assigned to administrative staff (Sutton, 1999:23). 
 
Policy process studies must be differentiated from policy content studies. 
Policy content corresponds to the substance of policy, while policy process 
refers to the unfolding of events leading to that policy. It is very likely that 
the policy content and the policy process may influence each other, as the 
particularities of a policy may affect the related policy process, and the 
features of the policy process may also shape the final policy content. 
Despite this interdependence, the prominent role of the policy process on 
policy outcomes makes it a fundamental piece of study by itself (Hill, 
1997a:5).  
 
2.1.3 Policy-making 
 
Policy-making is the moment of the policy process when policies are 
created and designed but not yet implemented nor evaluated. Policy-
making studies also divide the process into different stages. The initial 
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phase of the policy-making process has been defined as agenda-setting. 
Kingdon (1995) defines agenda as,  
 
“the list of subjects or problems to which government 
officials, and people outside of government closely 
associated with those officials, are paying some serious 
attention at any given time” (Kingdon, 1995:3). 
 
Hence, studies of agenda-setting seek to understand why the 
government’s agenda is composed as it is at any point in time, and also 
why it changes from time to time. Kingdon highlights the main questions 
that agenda-setting studies try to answer:  
 
“how do subjects come to official’s attention? How are the 
alternatives from which they choose generated? How is the 
governmental agenda set? Why does an idea’s time come 
when it does?” (Kingdon, 1995:xi). 
 
Later he adds another relevant question: “why do items that deserve 
attention never receive it?” (Kingdon, 1995:14). 
  
Alternative specification (equivalent to policy formulation) is the second 
phase of policy-making. It comes after the agenda-setting phase, when a 
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particular problem was recognized and entered the government’s agenda. 
Kingdon refers to alternative specification as,  
 
“the process of specifying alternatives [that] narrows the set 
of conceivable alternatives to the set that is seriously 
considered” (Kingdon, 1995:2). 
 
He stresses the convenience of making this distinction on the grounds that 
different actors may govern these two phases of the policy-making 
process.  In effect, he argues that the president and other top-level 
government officials are more important in setting the agenda while 
experts and career civil servants are more relevant in the process of 
generating policy alternatives.  
 
Grindle (2002) partially confirms this separation of the policy-making 
process when analysing Latin American cases. While she corroborates that 
political leaders (usually presidents and ministers) control the agenda 
setting phase, she finds that the stage of alternative specification was also 
controlled by the executive with the difference that in addition to political 
leaders, mid-level officials also participate (Grindle, 2002:103-105). As a 
result, the division of the policy-making process into different stages 
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where different actors participate may not be appropriated in the context 
of developing countries, particularly for the Latin American area.7 
 
2.2 POLICY-MAKING ACTORS 
 
Having explored the position and critiques of the main concepts related to 
the policy-making process, a review of the main policy-making actors 
contained in the literature is now presented.  
 
2.2.1 Actors inside government 
 
Clear candidates for key players in the policy-making process are actors 
inside the government. At the end of the day, the government has the 
formal decision-making authority to respond to the electorate by 
proposing, designing and implementing policies to address their needs and 
problems. This is not to say that actors inside the government are the only 
relevant policy-making actors, but that given their duties and resources 
they figure very prominently in the process. 
 
2.2.1.1 Heads of state 
 
In many countries, it is frequent to find political systems where the head 
of the state (president or prime minister according to the political system) 
                                                 
7 This consideration sustains the option of not introducing a separation of the policy-
making process into sub-stages in the present research. See Chapter Three. 
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has a great deal of power to affect and dominate the policy process. This 
is the case of most developing countries (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:59), 
and particularly the Latin American region (Mainwaring and Soberg, 1997).  
 
Among their resources to influence the policy-making process, heads of 
state have supporting staff, departments, political authority and political 
support from their party and electorate (Smith, 1999). Besides, they have 
special resources such as the prerogative to contract and remove key 
policy staff and the ability to attract public attention in order to set 
particular issues on the agenda (Kingdon, 1995:24-25). Heads of state 
pre-eminence in the policy-making process may be more relevant in the 
initial agenda-setting stage of the process compared with later stages that 
may be more under the control of middle and low ranking officials 
(Kingdon, 1995). 
 
Grindle (2002:102) provides evidence that in the Latin American region 
presidents are the main influencers of the social policy agenda-setting 
process. This result may be linked to the highly ‘presidentialistic’ political 
system that prevails in the region (Mainwaring and Soberg, 1997). In 
effect, in these countries presidents enjoy significant formal powers to 
enact new legislation by influencing the congress (Mainwaring and Soberg, 
1997:395). However, IADB (2006:57) indicates that in Latin America there 
are countries with different degrees of presidentialism, arguing that those 
countries where the president has greater constitutional and partisan 
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support are more likely to display a presidentialistic policy-making process. 
A good example of presidentialism is the Argentinean government that has 
been labelled as a case of ‘hiperpresidentialism’ (Grindle, 2000). As Grindle 
(2000:163) notes, in this country the constitution allows presidents to,  
 
“appoint cabinet and other officials without congressional 
approval, to rule by decree in a broad range of 
circumstances, and to declare states of siege under certain 
circumstances . . . the constitution also gave presidents veto 
power over legislation”. 
 
As a result, many policy innovations in Argentina, such as the 
transformations introduced by President Carlos Menem after 1989, were 
carried out mainly through presidential decrees.  
 
2.2.1.2 Mid-level government officials 
 
The group of officials appointed by the head of the state such as ministers, 
under-ministers, heads of departments, and so on, may also play a 
relevant role in policy-making, affecting the process by raising items from 
their own agencies or by generating policy alternatives to fulfil the 
president’s interests (Kingdon, 1995:29).  They may hold the same type of 
resources as heads of state but at a lower scale, such as political authority 
and resources linked to their related office, particularly the assistance of 
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civil servant. Their power may be significantly enhanced if they have the 
support of the head of the state (Smith, 1999:35) and if they have 
knowledge and access to policy networks (Smith, 1999:32). Besides, if 
appointed government officials are experts in their fields, if they have 
good managerial skills, and if they are good in advocating government’s 
policies it will be more likely that they will influence the characteristics and 
outcomes of policies (IADB, 2006:65). 
 
Given their transitory character, mid-level officials may be particularly 
motivated to raise some issue to the government policy agenda to ‘make 
their mark’ or to gain political prestige that may be valuable in their future 
career (Kingdon, 1995:30). Besides, it may also lead them to accelerate 
the policy-making process to arrive to a new programme while they are 
still in office. As a result, the turnover of ministers and vice-ministers may 
result in a changing ministerial agenda as a new set of policy proposals is 
raised at the beginning of each new ministerial administration. This 
situation may be more likely to occur when ministers and their related 
staff can act in relative isolation from the rest of the administration and 
other political forces (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:30-32; Sutton, 1999:26-
27). 
 
The relevance of ministers during the policy-process is confirmed by 
Kingdom (1995), in his study of US health and transportation policies. 
According to him, their participation in the process is related mainly to 
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generating policy alternatives to fulfil the priorities of the president.  In 
Latin America, Grindle (2000) studied cases of democratizing reforms 
applied in some countries during the 90s where she finds that teams of 
individuals appointed by the president were, in the main, responsible for 
designing reforms and their related institutional setting. These appointees 
were given ample space “to explore ideas for political reform and build 
consensus around them” (Grindle, 2000:205). However, she stresses that 
while these teams were central in designing the reforms, the backing of 
political leaders was fundamental for the materialization of the reforms. 
 
Regarding the transitory character of appointed officials, IADB (2006:62) 
shows that in Latin American countries cabinet stability tends to be low. 
This study presents data indicating that during the 1990s, 22% of 
ministers from 12 Latin American countries remained in their posts for less 
than six months, while 75% stayed for less than two years, still a short 
period considering that for these countries the presidential term lasted 
between four and six years. As a result, it is argued that ministers in the 
region are likely to have a short term view and that policies will vary 
frequently. In any case, the data presented in this investigation shows a 
high variation in cabinet stability across the region (IADB, 2006:62).  For 
example, the average number of ministers who served in a given ministry 
between 1988 and 2000 in Ecuador was near 8, while in Uruguay this 
number was close to 3 (IADB, 2006:63).   
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2.2.1.3 Career civil servants 
 
Career civil servants may play a relevant role in the policy-making process, 
although less important than the role played by ministers and other 
political appointees. Their main resources they draw upon to influence the 
policy-making process are linked to their permanence, knowledge, control 
over information, availability of time and access to networks of experts 
(Smith, 1999:32). Their longevity and expertise make them valuable for 
higher-level policy-making actors at the moment of designing, 
implementing and evaluating policies. Hence, they may be more 
significant in the process of alternative specification and in the final steps 
of the policy process than in the initial stage of agenda-setting (Kingdon, 
1995:31). Kingdon points out that, 
 
“it is quite common for the higher-level appointees to define 
an agenda item and then to solicit the advice of careerists in 
drafting the proposals” (Kingdon, 1995:32).  
 
However, it is possible that civil servants may also play a significant role in 
the agenda-setting process if they can influence higher-ranking political 
appointees, a situation that is described as the ‘capture’ of political 
appointees by civil servants (Kingdon, 1995:33).  
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A ‘meritocratic’ bureaucracy, characterized by having high autonomy and 
capacity is expected to have a stronger participation in the policy-making 
process, compared to less autonomous or capable bureaucracies (IADB, 
2006:71). In this last case, civil servants will be more susceptible to be 
captured by politicians and interest groups to fulfil their particular interests. 
IADB (2006) provides data to measure the level of professionalism and 
independence of bureaucracies across Latin America showing a mixed 
scenario. Particularly, three groups of countries exist in terms of the 
development of their bureaucracies. The first and most important one is 
composed by countries where bureaucracies show low levels of 
development and professionalism, including Panama, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, The Dominican Republic, 
Paraguay and Bolivia. The second group is formed by countries presenting 
bureaucracies with an intermediate level of development, including 
Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina and Costa Rica. The 
third group corresponds to countries with well developed and professional 
bureaucracies, formed only by Brazil and Chile. 
 
2.2.2 Members of Congress 
 
Top members of Congress may also play a relevant role in the policy-
making process (Kingdon, 1995:34). In addition to their role as makers of 
the legislation required to introduce policy changes, they can attract 
significant media attention and use it as a vehicle to influence the policy 
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process. Their participation in the promotion of new policies may serve to 
satisfy the expectations of their constituents and to raise their reputation 
as key actors in specific policy issues.  
 
In the Latin American context, the legislature shows a limited role in the 
policy-making process of social policies, which tends to be entirely under 
the control of the executive (Grindle, 2002:103). However, congress 
members participate in the final decision stage of the policy-making 
process by approving or rejecting policy reforms (acting as veto players), 
and by introducing changes to modify the final form of policies (Grindle, 
2002:106; IADB, 2006:42-43). 
  
IADB (2006) presents data about the importance of Congress in the 
policy-making process in Latin America, showing a diverse scenario across 
countries. For instance, the rate of approval in congress of executive 
legislation initiatives varies from a low 41% in Costa Rica to a 96% in 
Mexico (IADB, 2006:43). These differences are explained by the different 
balance of power between the president and congress that constitutions 
provide in different countries. IADB (2006:54) suggests that a congress 
composed by experienced legislators, organized around committees to 
perform their duties and well supported by staff will be more likely to 
perform a constructive and pro-active role in the policy-making process. 
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Gershberg (1999) studied decentralizing education reforms introduced in 
Mexico and Nicaragua during the 1980s and 1990s. He mentions that 
some governments start reforms with the creation of the required 
legislation setting, as was the case in Mexico. In contrast, Nicaragua 
implemented a ministry-led non-legislative reform, where the government 
created and implemented the reform without pursuing any legislation. He 
concludes that both strategies may be successful in introducing 
educational reforms, although each one may have pitfalls and advantages. 
In particular, when the government starts the reform by obtaining 
legislation, the reform tends to be implemented at a slower pace. However, 
having the legislation approved from the beginning makes unlikely that 
the reform will be abandoned later.  On the other hand, a reform carried 
out without involving congress to accomplish legislation has the advantage 
of being faster to implement but at the same time, more exposed to the 
risk of being abandoned in the future. He concludes that,  
 
“the right recipe for reform in most countries is likely to be a 
combination of both strategies, even if one or the other 
dominates” (Gershberg, 1999:77). 
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2.2.3 Interest groups 
 
Groups related to different sectors such as business and industry, 
professional and labour unions and social movements can influence the 
policy-making process. Their role may differ according to the importance 
of each group in a specific sector and their activity may affect different 
moments of the policy process, such as agenda-setting, the process of 
selecting policy alternatives and implementation. Furthermore, their role 
may be positive, in terms of proposing new policies, or negative, such as 
when they block or veto specific public policies. It has been suggested 
that most interest group’s activities in the policy-making process are 
related to this negative role (Kingdon, 1995). 
 
Grindle (2000) shows that pressure groups have only a limited role in the 
policy-making process in the Latin American region. She confirms that, 
while mobilized groups were present during democratizing reforms applied 
in some Latin American countries (Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina) 
during the 1990s, their pressure did not explains the introduction of these 
reforms. 
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Instead, she notes that, 
 
“the reform agenda is best explained as the result of elite 
projects, in which the elites were called together –in each 
case by political leaders- to make recommendations about 
how best to respond to problems of governance” (Grindle, 
2000:202). 
 
Contrary to the previous study, IADB (2006) presents evidence indicating 
that different pressure groups may have influenced the policy-making 
process in the Latin American region. Regarding the participation of 
business interests in the process, IADB (2006:92-97) states that it may 
vary considerably by country, policy arena and over time. In general terms, 
they will be more willing to participate if a policy is perceived as costly or 
damaging to the business sector, and if these costs are immediate and 
certain. Besides, business organisations will be more inclined to participate 
in the process if a policy affects business interests in the short time, such 
as a proposal to change the regulatory framework of a sector. On the 
contrary, business will be more reluctant to participate in the process if 
policies have a broad scope, such as changes in tax policies affecting 
different types of businesses.  
 
This study also indicates that the level of involvement of business-related 
interest groups in policy-making in Latin America varies in relation to the 
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form in which business participate in the process, such as interactions 
between business associations and politicians, lobbying, election and 
campaign contributions, use of personal networks and corruption. 
Guatemala is mentioned as the Latin American country where business 
interests have the greatest engagement in the policy-making process in 
the region (IADB, 2006:97). In this country, the business sector is highly 
organized compared to other groups, such as labour unions, peasant and 
indigenous movements, as well as the state, which allows business 
interests to have an uncontested influence in the policy-making process. 
 
Social movements have increased their political influence in Latin America 
since the 1990s, playing an important role in the policy-making process of 
different policies (IADB, 2006: 112). This strength has been explained by 
the mixed effect of weak states, weak democratic systems, and a lack of a 
strong national identity in some Latin American countries. If social 
movements pose specific demands and display a proactive and 
constructive role they can put a subject into the government’s agenda. 
This was the case of the anti-crime social pressure group in Argentina, 
which started mobilizing and protesting after the kidnap and murder of a 
child, forcing president Kirshner to reform the anti-crime code (IADB, 
2006:118). Evidence on the impact of unstructured and reactive 
movements on the policy-making process is less clear, as these types of 
movements have contributed to policy instability and occasionally to the 
forced resignation of presidents (IADB, 2006:113-114). 
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In relation to the influence of labour unions on the policy making process, 
IADB (2006:112) mentions that they will be relevant in the policy-making 
process if labour-based parties are in government, if they are public sector 
workers, if they have the ability to protest or disrupt labour relations and if 
they are able to create alliances with consumers or international groups. 
This study indicates that in Latin America, labour unions’ actions have 
been focused on blocking reforms with high costs for labour union 
members, such as when the risk of job losses is present. However, in 
some examples labour unions have accepted these costs in exchange for 
compensations, as when the Argentinean government compensated 
workers of privatized firms with shares of these firms, or when the 
Mexican government provided teachers with salary benefits to materialize 
a decentralizing reform affecting them (IADB, 2006:110). The 
confrontation of public sector workers to reforms has been particularly 
relevant in Latin America since the 90s. For instance, the Costa Rican 
Electricity Institute failed to be privatized as a result of the mobilization 
and opposition of organized public sector workers, after a bill authorizing 
the privatization was passed by Congress. 
 
The previous considerations present contrasting evidence about the levels 
of participation of social movements in the Latin American policy-making 
process. Chapter Five will clarify their relevance during the poverty-
alleviation policy-making process that occurred in Chile during the 1990s.  
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2.2.4 International organisations 
 
International organisations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, USAID and 
other multilateral agencies proved very relevant in the policy-making 
process in developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991; Grindle, 2002). According to Grindle and Thomas (1991) 
international institutions were fundamental during the 1980s, as their 
participation was tied to the survival of the current governments. In many 
cases these institutions promoted reform packages as a condition to the 
provision of financial assistance to government that were in a very delicate 
financial situation (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:168). For instance, these 
authors provide the example of Gambia that applied macroeconomic 
reforms in 1985 under the pressure of the IMF and other donors to modify 
existing economic policies. In this case, the government paid close 
attention to the opinion of international organisations mainly to secure its 
political survival (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:168). In other cases, such as 
in Indonesia at the beginning of the 1980s, international organisations 
prevented (unintentionally) the adoption of a particular policy reform. 
Here, the publication of a World Bank study just when the government 
was planning to introduce a new policy that was congruent with the World 
Bank’s views stopped the government from doing it to avoid giving the 
impression that it was responding to outside pressure (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991:170). 
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Grindle (2002) confirms that international organisations were important 
actors in the Latin American policy-making process during the 1990s. 
However, she mentions that in this period their influence was limited to 
particular policy arenas such as pension’s reforms. Besides, she observes 
that during the 1990s international organisations frequently assisted 
design teams in charge of introducing social policy reforms (Grindle, 
2002:104). IADB (2006:120) suggests that international organisations 
have acted as knowledge mediators in Latin America by transferring 
experiences that they have acquired in other countries and by contributing 
to generate capacities for policy analysis, diagnosis and dialogue. 
 
2.2.5 Policy experts 
 
Another relevant group of actors in the policy-making process are 
academics, researchers, consultants, professionals and other experts, 
usually located in academic institutions or think tanks, involved in the 
generation, dissemination and evaluation of policy ideas (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999:119). It has been suggested that they tend to be 
more relevant in the process of alternative specification than in the 
agenda-setting phase, which is more likely to be under the control of 
politicians (Kingdon, 1995:55).  
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Experts may have a higher effect in the policy-making process if they are 
aware of the interests of politicians and the government. This ‘attuning’ 
process may be optimised if experts are inside government, or if they 
have a carer where they mix academic activities with government 
responsibilities (Kingdon, 1995:56). 
 
In the Latin American context, Grindle (2002) finds that the design of 
policies is under the control of design teams formed by experts from the 
government. She stresses that,  
 
“most social sector reform proposals were generated by 
small groups of policy planners that met, debated, designed 
and introduced new initiatives with relatively little public 
discussion or involvement” (Grindle, 2002:104). 
 
IADB (2006:119) argues that in most Latin American countries the limited 
development of bureaucracies has weakened the institutionalization of 
knowledge in governments. As a result, the executive has delegated 
analytical functions to technocrats that have shielded the process from the 
broader public, thus weakening the legitimacy of policies, contributing to 
separate the technical domain from the political arena. In parallel to this 
weakness, new knowledge actors have recently emerged in the region, 
such as legislative advisory units, think tanks, research units from NGO’s, 
and so on. Of particular relevance appears to be the role that legislative 
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advisory units can play in the policy-making process, as they have 
contributed to create a more rigorous discussion of laws in congress, to 
enrich the debate between the executive and the legislative powers and to 
prompt the media to offer a more technically informed coverage of the 
legislative process (IADB, 2006:120).  
 
2.2.6 Policy networks and communities 
 
Other policy-making potential actors are policy communities and policy 
networks. Sutton (1999:7) defines them as,  
 
“groups of individuals and organisations who share similar 
belief systems, codes of conduct and established patterns of 
behaviour”. 
 
Policy communities are characterized by being closed and insulated, 
presenting restrictive membership and by being highly connected to the 
policy-making process.  
 
Policy communities vary according to a series of variables, including the 
number of participants, their type of interests, the frequency of 
interactions, the degree of consensus and the type and distribution of 
resources and power of the participants (Smith, 1997:80). Interest groups 
in the private sector, government actors and experts from universities or 
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think tanks may compose them. Members show strong links, autonomy 
and a mutually benefiting relationship that may represent an ‘iron triangle’ 
(Kingdon, 1997:33; Smith, 1997:79; Sutton, 1999:12). In addition, they 
show restricted access with entry criteria such as expert knowledge or 
occupancy of a senior position in a relevant organization (Smith, 1997:80).  
 
Policy communities may neglect the interests of significant social groups 
who lack the resources needed to access the policy community. This may 
be especially relevant in developing countries where governments usually 
respond to the groups that are most closely tied to it or to those whose 
support is essential. Besides, even if the poor or the excluded are able to 
voice their needs, government officials may find little personal or political 
benefit by attending and responding to them (Grindle, 1980). For 
instance, Temple and Temple (1980) find that in developing countries low-
income groups of the population cannot access government housing 
programmes due to their inability to finance the houses, repay the loans 
or because they lack political resources. Hence, the government housing 
policies end up benefiting only middle and high-income groups. Temple 
and Temple (1980) conclude that in developing countries the poor lack 
effective channels to affect the formulation and implementation of housing 
policies, while individuals of higher income have a disproportionate 
capacity to influence them. 
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2.2.7 The media 
 
Another potential policy-making actor identified in the literature is the 
media. It may have a similar role to Easton’s (1965) ‘gatekeepers’ but in 
the opposite direction, by creating or amplifying issues and social 
problems thus contributing to the acceleration of the policy-making 
process (Parsons, 2001:107; IADB, 2006:99).  Sometimes problems are 
monopolized by particular groups such as professionals and experts inside 
and outside government, keeping the issue ‘submerged’ and away from 
public opinion. In this sense, the media may be regarded as playing a 
positive role in the policy-making process as it may increase the visibility 
of problems that require government’s attention. On the negative side, the 
media may be functional to the interests of the dominant groups in society, 
adopting their own set of values and bringing to the attention of the public 
only those problems that are in line with these groups’ agenda. 
 
2.2.8 Public opinion 
 
It is likely that policy-makers consider public opinion during the policy-
making process. The public mood and views may have both a positive and 
negative influence in the emergence of specific agenda issues, as they 
may direct the government toward or away from addressing them. In this 
sense, public policy may be ultimately regarded as the response of public 
opinion (Parsons, 2001:110). For example, Grindle cites the cases of some 
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Latin American countries such as Argentina, Venezuela and Bolivia, where 
a widespread negative public opinion existed about the condition of the 
educational and health systems during the 1990s. As a result, there was 
no public support to labour unions’ resistance to the introduction of health 
and education reforms in these countries during the 1990s (Grindle, 
2002:94). 
 
However, public opinion may have only a limited role in the policy-making 
process as it can be relevant only in relation to visible issues that are part 
of the public domain. Besides, its influence may be limited to the 
consideration of an issue in the agenda and not to the discussion of 
specific policy alternatives to address it (Kingdon, 1995:66).  
 
Apart from the possibility of public opinion affecting the government’s 
agenda, it is possible that public opinion may become influenced by the 
agenda of top government officials that may be interested in gaining 
public support for a specific course of action. Furthermore, a similar 
relationship of double causality between public opinion and the media may 
exist, where both actors may influence each other on different issues and 
occasions (Parsons, 2001:113).  
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2.2.9 Institutions 
 
Institutions are mentioned by the literature as a very general element 
influencing policy-making. The term is used in an open sense without a 
particular definition, often visualized as ‘organized contexts’. They add 
complexity to the economic and social ‘environment’ where policies are 
formed, shaping this setting and leading to a particular dynamic of the 
policy-making process. These contexts include established norms, 
constitutions, values, relationships, power structures and standard 
operating procedures (Hill, 1997a:86). 
 
An approach that highlights the importance of institutions in the policy-
making process is the ‘state-centred’ model that focuses on the role that 
state institutions play in the process (Sutton, 1999:26). This view argues 
that the state, or institutions inside it, can be relatively insulated from 
social or economic forces thus being able to manage the policy-making 
process autonomously. As a result, this approach contradicts views of the 
state as an actor reproducing society’s forces, and diminishes the 
significance of institutions outside the state in the policy-making process. 
 
At the end of the day, the importance of institutions in the policy-making 
process is contingent upon the social, economic and political conditions of 
a specific country. In particular, in the case of developing countries, 
evidence demonstrates that policy elites inside the government have 
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considerable power to control the policy-making process (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991; Grindle, 2002). As an example, Grindle mentions the case 
of Bolivia during the 1980s, when institutions facilitated the introduction of 
reforms by the government. Bolivia was able to create effective governing 
pacts among diverse political parties and across different administrations, 
which provided a political institutional setting that was critical to facilitate 
the introduction of education and pension reforms in the country (Grindle, 
2002:97). 
 
2.3 POLICY-MAKING THEORIES 
 
Here, five theoretical frameworks are analysed: the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, the Punctuated-Equilibrium Framework, the Multiple Streams 
Model, the Government’s Policy-Elites Approach and the Transaction Cost 
Approach.  The first three have been described as among the most 
promising theoretical frameworks developed to study the policy-making 
process (Sabatier, 1999:7-12). The Government’s Policy-Elites Framework 
has been proposed to explain the policy-making process in developing 
countries (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). The Transaction Cost Approach has 
been applied to study the policy-making process in Latin American 
countries, with an emphasis on economic policies (IADB, 2006). 
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2.3.1 Advocacy Coalition framework 
 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that the policy process may be 
understood in the context of policy networks and communities. Inside 
these networks different policy sub-systems exist, composed by all actors 
involved in the discussion, generation, dissemination and evaluation of 
particular policies. These actors include pressure groups, bureaucracy, 
politicians, academics, think-tanks, researchers, journalist, etc. They are 
related to different coalitions according to their particular beliefs and 
resources. These coalitions are describes as ‘advocacy coalitions’ as they 
compete to influence the policy-making process. Advocacy coalitions are 
defined as,  
 
“people from various governmental and private organisations 
that both (1) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and 
(2) engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity 
over time” (Sabatier, 1999:120). 
 
The theory explains policy change as a result of two different elements. 
First, policy-oriented learning that allows an increased understanding of a 
problem and the factors that affect it (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1999:123). According to these authors, policy-oriented learning is a long-
term process, as alteration of thoughts and behaviours results from 
experience and/or the availability of new information related to policies. 
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Second, changes in relevant socio-economic conditions, public opinion or 
in the governing coalition. These changes generate policy changes by 
modifying the resources available to the different coalitions within policy 
subsystems. A turnover in government’s personnel may also change the 
resources of the different coalitions. Figure 2.2 presents the basic 
structure of the framework. 
 
Figure 2.2 
The Advocacy Coalition framework of policy change 
 
Source: Adapted from Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993:18) 
  
 
The framework includes two sets of exogenous variables that differ in 
their level of stability over time. These variables represent the constraints 
and resources of actors, and in this sense they affect actor’s behaviours 
(stable parameters) or constitute a prerequisite for policy change (external 
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events) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:120). Actors belong to a 
number of advocacy coalitions. Each coalition has certain policy beliefs 
and resources that they use to affect government institutions to grasp 
their policy objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:122). Conflicts 
between coalitions are mediated by another type of actors, the ‘policy 
brokers’. Thanks to their mediating role a decision is obtained regarding a 
particular governmental programme. 
 
The existence of a mature policy sub-system is a necessary condition for 
this model to be applicable to any particular case. The authors highlight 
that a long period of time is required for policy sub-systems to reach 
maturity and being able to produce meaningful policy analysis and 
advocacy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:136). This requirement, as 
well as the need for a minimum number of policy sub-systems and 
advocacy coalitions, may limit the applicability of this theory to less 
developed nations. In particular, the framework may not be applicable in 
countries where advocacy coalitions are not present or where decision-
making is not pluralistic but of a more closed nature. Hence, countries 
characterized by a centralized political system, both in territorial and 
administrative terms, are less suitable for the application of this model 
(Parsons, 2001:201). The main features of the Chilean poverty-alleviation 
policy sub-system which may validate or invalidate the use of this model 
as theoretical framework for the research are discussed in Chapter Six. 
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2.3.2 Punctuated-Equilibrium framework 
 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) develop the punctuated-equilibrium 
framework to study the policy-making process in the United States. They 
detect that in this case the policy process is characterized by long periods 
of stability, with policies changing only marginally or incrementally. During 
these moments a wide agreement exists regarding a particular policy 
issue, which allows the core content of policies to remain unchanged. 
They also find that from time to time, large  policy changes occur. Hence, 
policy change happens in a punctuated way, triggering also changes in 
institutions.  
 
The punctuated-equilibrium model explains this pattern by focusing on the 
role of a) policy subsystems, b) issue definition and image and c) political 
institutions. Most of the time, the policy process is under the monopoly of 
a particular policy subsystem or issue network. It controls a particular 
policy area and avoids the introduction of policy changes by keeping the 
issue submerged and away from the general public and from macro-
politics actors (the presidency and the congress). As one of the authors 
explains,  
 
“so long as general attention is low in a policy area, the area 
tends to be dominated by experts and directly affected 
groups” (Jones, 1994:26). 
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These issue networks are embedded in institutions that support this phase 
of stability. Periods of stability are reinforced by the existence of a general 
agreement between experts regarding the image and definition of the 
issue.  
 
The break up of equilibrium and the emergence of sudden policy changes 
are related to modifications in the definition and image of the issue 
introduced by competing policy subsystems. External policy entrepreneurs 
or other actors challenge the prevailing policy monopoly by introducing 
new understandings of the nature and image of the issue. Hence, by re-
defining an issue they destabilize the previous equilibrium. This issue 
redefinition has the potential to attract attention and mobilize previously 
disinterested individuals (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Changes in 
policy image play a critical role in the expansion of an issue from the 
limited scope of a policy subsystem to a broader audience, allowing the 
development of policy discussion at the macro level. Without a change in 
issue image, the issue will hardly be considered as part of the government 
agenda. In Jones’ words,  
 
“when attention is broadened, almost invariably through 
issue redefinition, the macro political institution intervenes in 
subsystem politics, fundamentally altering them” (Jones, 
1994:26). 
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Figure 2.3 summarizes the basic elements of the punctuated equilibrium 
model. 
 
Figure 2.3 
The Punctuated Equilibrium framework 
 
   Source: Author’s interpretation based on: Baumgartner and Jones (1993). 
 
 
More recently, the authors have refined the model (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2002).  They have reinterpreted the driving forces of the model as 
negative and positive feedback systems. Negative feedback helps to 
explain the equilibrium phases where no major policy change occurs. A 
negative feedback system includes a homeostatic process or a self-
correcting mechanism that allows equilibrium, and that in the case of 
institutional behaviour corresponds to the existence of diminishing returns 
Major policy changes, 
Disequilibrium, competition,
Policy monopoly challenged
By new actors
Marginal, incremental policy
Changes, equilibrium dominated by one 
policy network, agreements,
No significant discussions
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and incremental decision-making, as policymakers are focused on 
stabilizing policy outcomes (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002:8). 
 
A policy scenario where negative feedback prevails results in the 
predominance of ‘iron triangles’, ‘systems of limited participation’ or ‘policy 
monopolies’ that obtain their power from the autonomy that they enjoy in 
relation to the broader political system (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2002:11).  
 
A stable institutional venue of policy-making involved in a policy that 
displays a positive image generates stable policy outcomes (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 2002:12). If the policy image remains unchanged then there 
are no reasons to change the existing policy. Besides, if institutional 
structures supporting this policy are well defined then a status quo is likely 
to exist. As the authors state,  
 
“powerful government institutions operating with autonomy 
and according to standard operating procedures that limit 
participation only to those granted authority can be further 
sources of negative feedback” (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2002:13). 
 
Disequilibrium and a punctuated policy change are explained by positive 
feedback. It corresponds to a self-reinforcing process that accentuates 
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rather than counterbalances a trend. In the case of politics, the authors 
postulate that participants display ‘serial information processes’, as they 
pay attention to a limited set of issues at any given moment. In their 
words,  
 
“in most complex decision making settings, there are many 
more dimensions of choice than people can pay attention to 
at any given time . . . when faced with a complex decision 
that may have many underlying dimensions, people focus on 
one or just a few dimensions in making their choice . . . if at 
some later point, new dimensions of the issue are shown to 
be important, then people may shift their attention towards 
that dimension of the issue” (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2002:15).  
 
Hence, a sudden redefinition or new image of the issue triggers a change 
of attention towards this new dimension leading to a disequilibrium stage 
where policy (and its related policy monopoly and institutional setting) 
must change to respond to the new problem image. 
 
The punctuated equilibrium model presents some limitations. First, it 
assumes the existence of competition between different policy-makers, 
policy entrepreneurs and other actors interested in a particular policy 
arena. To achieve policy change, these actors push for a particular issue 
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definition according to their interests, and try to enlarge or limit the scope 
of the debate to include or exclude groups that may be in favour or 
against their position. Hence, advocacy and policy competition between 
different interest groups is key in the dynamics of this model. This 
assumption may be appropriate for the United States but not necessarily 
for other less developed countries. It is an open question to be confirmed 
in Chapter Five if the policy-making process of poverty-alleviation policies 
in Chile does display such policy competition and advocacy. Second, as the 
authors recognize, the model cannot predict the timing of the 
punctuations, as the changes in issue image and perception are 
unpredictable. Hence, they recognize that,  
 
“punctuated-equilibrium theory predicts a form of system 
level stability, but it will not help us to make specific 
predictions for particular policy issues” (True, Jones and 
Baumgartner, 1999:111-112). 
 
Notwithstanding, this is not a limitation for the applicability of this model 
to the present research as it is focused on explaining the processes rather 
than on developing predictions about it.  
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2.3.3 Multiple-Streams model 
 
Kingdon (1995) develops the multiple streams model to explain the policy-
making process of health and transportation policies in the United States. 
He describes this process as the result of the interaction of forces and 
actors belonging to three different ‘streams’: problems, policies and 
politics. These streams operate independently except when a ‘window of 
opportunity’ allows an interception of the three streams. During these 
episodes ‘policy entrepreneurs’ have an active role advocating for the 
introduction of a new policy and, if they are successful, an item can reach 
the top of the decision agenda and a policy change may occur. 
 
The model is inspired on the ‘garbage can’ model of organizational 
behaviour, proposed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). They stress the 
anarchical nature of organisations, which they term ‘organized anarchies’. 
This view is based on the notion that people address some issue only 
when a particular combination of problems, solutions and participants 
make it possible. As Parsons (2001:302) stresses,  
 
“what the garbage can idea graphically suggests is that 
issues, problems and solutions are messy, untidy sorts of 
things, whose mode of identification by policy-makers will 
depend on the time it was picked up, and the availability of 
cans to put them in”. 
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As mentioned, Kingdon identifies three independent streams flowing 
through the policy-making process: problems, policies and politics streams. 
The problems stream is composed by those issues on which policy-makers 
fix their attention. Problems may come to their attention by the use of 
indicators, through feedback from existing programs and from the 
emergence of a crisis. Indicators allow policy-makers to assess the 
magnitude of problems and to be aware of changes in their condition. The 
visibility of a problem makes it a recognizable and focusing phenomenon 
to the government and to the public.  Kingdon highlights the importance 
of studies and indicators in the policy-making process by mentioning that,  
 
“problems come to the attention of governmental decision 
makers not through some sort of political pressure or 
perceptual slight of hand but because some more or less 
systematic indicator simply shows that there is a problem 
out there” (Kingdon, 1995:90).  
 
Feedback from the operation of existing programmes such as systematic 
monitoring, complaints, and bureaucratic experience allows policy-makers 
to discover if a programme is not working properly or some unanticipated 
consequences of a programme (Kingdon, 1995:100). According to Kingdon, 
this feedback is not a homogeneous phenomenon, but a diverse channel 
of information. He states that in some cases the feedback arrives through 
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systematic monitoring while in others it appears via more informal 
channels such as citizen’s complaints or congressmen awareness. 
Bureaucrats themselves may provide this feedback as long as they are 
aware of the administrations of programmes,  
 
“quite often, feedback comes to governmental officials more 
informally . . . complaints and casework lead to awareness of 
problems” (Kingdon, 1995:101). 
 
A crisis acts as a powerful focusing event that calls policy-makers’ 
attention to address a particular problem. Kingdon (1995:95) finds that 
the occurrence of a crisis is a fundamental focusing event in the 
transportation area, while no similar result is observed in the health 
sector. As a result, he argues that a crisis is more relevant the less visible 
is the policy domain, as in the US health has a greater public visibility than 
transportation. Besides, he claims that a crisis may be more relevant in 
policy areas where it may affect more people simultaneously, as when a 
catastrophe occurs in transportation. 
 
The policies stream is conceptualised as a ‘primeval soup’ where policy-
related ideas float, evolve and recombine. Actors such as bureaucrats, 
think tanks and researchers generate ideas. They form policy communities 
of individuals with common concerns and with frequent interactions.  
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Policy communities are defined as,  
 
“networks that include bureaucrats, congressional staff 
members, academics, and researchers in think tanks who 
share a common concern in a single policy area” (Zahariadis, 
1999:76).  
 
Ideas that present technical feasibility, value acceptability, tolerable costs, 
anticipated public acquiescence and good receptivity from elected decision 
makers will be more acceptable and will receive more attention (Kingdon, 
1995:131). In any case, the most acceptable ideas and policy proposals 
will result from the recombination of previously existing elements, as they 
have been going through a long process of consideration and discussion 
inside the policy community (Kingdon, 1995:141).  
 
The politics stream is related to electoral, partisan or pressure group 
elements. In particular, the model focuses its attention in the national 
mood, organized political forces and government-related events. The 
national mood corresponds to common lines of thinking among wide 
sectors of the population. It can produce a higher agenda status for some 
item thus making viable particular policy proposals. Organized political 
forces, such as interest group pressure, political mobilization and the 
behaviour of political elites provide support for policy-makers to move in 
some specific direction. These political forces can also prevent policy 
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changes, as they may involve a clientele for existing programmes. Main 
government-related elements affecting the politics stream are changes in 
administration or changes in the priorities of existing officials. A turnover 
of administration allows changing major government participants and 
bringing in their new priorities (Kingdon, 1995:153). While these elements 
highlight the relevance of prominent actors in the policy process, the 
driving force of change may be of a more structural nature, as changes in 
national mood may be behind changes in administration. 
 
Central elements in the dynamic of the model are policy windows. They 
are episodes that provide the opportunity for a specific policy to emerge. 
In other words, according to the multiple streams model, no new policy 
will be created unless a policy window is already open. In Kingdon words 
a policy window,  
 
“is an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their 
pet solutions or to push attention to their special problem” 
(Kingdon, 1995:165). 
 
This opening may be predictable, as when a programme needs to be 
renewed, or unpredictable, triggered by compelling problems or by a crisis. 
According to Kingdon, a window opening will result from one of the 
following events: a change in the political streams, such as a change of 
administration or in the national mood, or by changes in the problems 
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stream, if a new problem captures the attention of government officials 
(Kingdon, 1995:168). He highlights that policy windows are brief by 
nature, as they stay open for short periods of time and that they are 
sporadic, as they occur only from time to time (Kingdon, 1995:166). 
 
In Kingdon’s opinion, a window closes if participants feel that a problem 
has been addressed or some action taken; if participants fail to take some 
action as when a bill addressing a problem is rejected in congress; if the 
event that opened the window passes from the scene as when a crisis 
recedes; if the personnel that opened a window when they arrived leave 
their posts and finally, if there is no available alternative to address a 
problem (Kingdon, 1995:169). 
 
The theory explains that the occurrence of a policy window is necessary 
but not sufficient for a new policy to emerge. The additional requirement 
is that the three streams come together, a process labelled as streams 
coupling.  According to the model, if any stream is missing then the 
chances for a particular issue to be considered in the government’s 
agenda are diminished.  For instance, a lack of interest from the 
government, the absence of a crisis or a pressing problem, or the 
unavailability of feasible solutions to address the problem may all explain 
the absence of a policy initiative to address a particular subject, despite 
the existence of a policy window. According to Kingdon,  
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“proposals, alternatives, and solutions float . . . in and near 
government, searching for problems to which to become 
attached, or political events that increase their likelihood of 
adoption” (Kingdon, 1995:172).   
 
Besides, he concludes that,  
 
“the probability of an item rising on the decision agenda is 
dramatically increased if all three streams are joined [but] if 
one of the three elements is missing . . . then the subject’s 
place on the decision agenda is fleeting” (Kingdon, 
1995:178).  
 
The likelihood for the occurrence of a streams coupling is increased if an 
actor recognizes the existence of a policy window and pushes a particular 
policy alternative. These actors are defined as policy entrepreneurs whose 
main feature is that they are willing to invest personal resources, such as 
time and money to promote a policy, usually their preferred or ‘pet’ policy 
alternative. Policy entrepreneurs may be located in a variety of arenas, 
such as the government, the congress, universities, think tanks, etc. as 
their placement is irrelevant for their entrepreneurial activities (Kingdon, 
1995:180). What really matters is the energy that they devote to move a 
subject up on the agenda. This energy depends on their resources, which 
include their expertise, their formal position in a relevant organization, 
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their political connections or negotiating skills and their persistence 
(Kingdon, 1995:181). This persistence is reflected in their willingness to 
invest large quantities of personal resources to achieve their goals. 
  
As with any theoretical view, the multiple streams approach has been 
subjected to criticisms. For instance, it has been mentioned that the 
streams may not be independent but interrelated. Also, that the 
generation of policy alternatives may not involve a process of gradual 
policy development but that an entirely new proposal may also emerge. 
Besides, it has been argued that in some cases policy windows may not be 
temporary but permanent, as some issues may be continuously activated. 
In relation to this last point, Zahariadis poses the following questions: if 
certain windows are not fleeting but permanently open, what is the effect 
on coupling over time? Do these permanent policy windows lead to 
greater partisan conflict, more symbolic action, or more problem solving? 
(Zahariadis, 1999:83-84). Finally, it has been mentioned that the model is 
a ‘heuristic’ device, i.e., a lens that can help to describe and explain how 
and why policies are made, but not to predict and forecast future policies 
(Zahariadis, 1999:81-87). In any case, the model has demonstrated to be 
highly useful to analyze the policy-making process in different countries 
(Zahariadis, 1995, 2003, 2005).  
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As Sabatier states,  
 
“although the multiple-streams framework is not always as 
clear and internally consistent as one might like, it appears 
to be applicable to a wide variety of policy arenas” (Sabatier, 
1999:9).  
 
This fact represents a possibility for its applicability to the present 
research. Chapter Six will elucidate if this framework is the most 
appropriate one to employ as a theoretical framework.  
 
2.3.4 Government’s Policy-Elites approach 
 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) have formulated the policy-elites approach to 
study the policy-making process in developing countries. They analyse 
twelve cases of policy change that occurred during the 1980s in a number 
of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and Asia. The approach 
aims to address general features of the policy process in the developing 
world (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:10). Besides, case studies cover a 
variety of policy arenas, such as macroeconomic policies (devaluation, 
structural adjustment), agrarian reform, primary health care, public water 
supply, etc.  
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The common feature of the cases is that all constitute reforms, defined as,  
 
“deliberate efforts on the part of government to redress 
perceived errors in prior and existing policy and institutional 
arrangements” (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:4). 
 
The framework is inspired in state-centred models of policy choice 
(Allison, 1971; Sutton, 1999). The authors argue that in third world 
countries it is frequent that state-related actors and institutions act in 
relative isolation from the social context and therefore are able to 
generate policies autonomously (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:32). In 
particular, the model states that government’s policy-elites are able to 
initiate reforms by placing issues on the government’s agenda. Their 
activities are partially constrained by political, economic and historical 
contexts, an idea that resembles the ‘environment’ from Easton’s systems 
approach. Hence, the model considers policy-elites inside government as 
the only actor involved in policy-making, with a set of contexts and 
constraints having an indirect effect in the process by limiting policy-elite’s 
room for manoeuvre.  
 
Government’s policy-elites bring their personal perceptions, commitments 
and resources to the policy process. Individuals’ values, experiences, 
political skills and training may be decisive in the policy-making process. 
The hierarchical position and power available to them is also a key 
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element in the development of a policy reform. Besides, their political and 
institutional commitments and loyalties may also shape how they perceive 
particular issues (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:36-37). 
 
Contexts constraining policy-elites are classified as societal, historical, 
international, economic and administrative (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:37-
40). These contexts shape the perceptions, options and actions of policy-
elites. Societal pressures and organized interests are viewed as 
mechanisms through which society penetrates the state and shapes the 
activities of policy-elites. Historical contexts, such as the legacy of 
colonialisms, wars, revolutions, coups and economic depressions, limit the 
set of policies that policy-elites consider to be appropriate. International 
contexts, such as dependency relationships with international and 
multilateral institutions, also condition the policy agenda in a particular 
way. Government’s administrative capacity confines the set of policy 
options that elites consider, as the limitations of the administrative system 
may restrict the introduction and implementation of particular policy 
reforms.  
 
The government’s policy-elites model distinguishes between a crisis-ridden 
and a politics-as-usual policy change. Under a crisis, the stakes involved in 
the change are high, the decision makers participating are those 
occupying the higher posts inside government, the changes to be 
introduced to existing policies may be major, and the reform may be 
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treated as urgent (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:76). The authors argue that 
when policy-elites perceive a situation as a crisis an opportunity exists for 
the introduction of significant changes in public policy, or using Kingdon’s 
terminology, a window of opportunity opens. Under these circumstances, 
policy-elites can overcome society’s forces and the power and interest of 
dominant groups to introduce significant policy reforms. Besides, when 
introducing a crisis-ridden reform, policy-elites focus their attention on 
macro political issues, such as national welfare, political stability and 
political support.  
 
On the contrary, when no perceived crisis exists and the government acts 
in a politics-as-usual manner, there is less impetus for reforms. Elites tend 
to concentrate more on micro political considerations, such as bureaucratic 
and clientelistic relationships, without affecting major societal interests. In 
these cases, changes tend to be incremental, as opposed to the 
introduction of significant policy innovations. Problems addressed tend to 
be chosen rather than being pressing ones, as elites have the chance to 
decide on taking up an issue or not (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:86). 
Hence, it may be argued that the model supports the idea that in 
developing countries, when there is no crisis affecting a particular issue, a 
policy window may remain open for a significant time for policy-makers to 
introduce a new policy.  
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The authors refer the case of Colombia, which undertook a reform in its 
planning policy under politics-as-usual circumstances. They note that,  
 
“[policy-makers] strategy clearly depended on the availability 
of time and their own capacity to select appropriate 
moments for pushing for reform or lowering its salience” 
(Grindle and Thomas 1991:89).  
 
The government’s policy-elites model is subject to some criticisms. In 
particular, it may be argued that it lacks a causal mechanism to explain 
policy change. Instead, it focuses on mapping the characteristics of policy-
elites and the contexts or environment where they operate. This limitation 
is partly recognized by the authors, who mention that,  
 
“the framework we have developed is principally analytic. It 
is an effort to map out a process and to identify critical 
factors or junctures that influence the outcome of reform 
initiatives . . . [the framework] is potentially a map of the 
boundaries of policy space and the actions that can fruitfully 
be undertaken to expand the societal and bureaucratic 
tolerance for change” (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:193).  
 
As a result, it may be argued that while being a very accurate framework 
to identify some central actors and forces that affect policy-making in 
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developing countries, such as government’s policy-elites confronting a 
crisis, the model lacks a precise description of the mechanisms behind the 
dynamics of the process. This proposition will be further sustained in 
Chapter Six, when the processes studied in the research are explained. 
 
2.3.5 Transaction Cost approach 
 
A framework that has been applied recently to analyze the policy-making 
process in Latin America is the transaction cost approach developed by 
Spiller and Tomassi (2003) who were interested in developing a model 
able to explain the quality of public policies. The model emphasizes,  
 
“the degree to which political institutions induce 
policymaking games leading to more or less cooperative 
inter-temporal political transactions” (Spiller, Stein and 
Tomassi, 2003:12).  
 
Figure 2.4 presents the main parts of the model. 
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Figure 2.4 
The Transaction Cost approach 
 
Source: Spiller and Tomassi (2003:3). 
 
 
Main model elements are transaction cost analysis and game theory. 
According to the authors, public policies are the outcome of intertemporal 
political transactions among political actors (Spiller, Stein and Tomassi, 
2003:13). Transaction cost analysis is based on transaction cost 
economics, where different attributes that affect the cost of an economic 
exchange are assessed. These attributes may be related to a variety of 
considerations such as the frequency with which similar transactions occur 
or the complexity of the transaction. The authors argue that the cost of 
transactions that happen among politicians during the policy-making 
process are affected by elements such as the number and cohesiveness of 
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relevant political actors, the duration of the policy exchange and the inter-
temporal pattern of payoffs to different actors (Spiller, Stein and Tomassi, 
2003:14). 
 
Game theory was first introduced by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) to 
study optimal strategies of players that seek to maximize their payoffs in a 
setting of interdependence between strategies.  Spiller and Tomassi (2003) 
apply this theory to policy-making by characterizing the policy-making 
process as a game of intertemporal cooperation. They state that when 
developing a policy, policymakers may opt between developing a policy 
that responds to the common interest or to take an ‘individual’ policy 
action (Spiller and Tomassi, 2003:15). They state that arriving at a policy 
that results from cooperation between players will depend on 
characteristics of the institutional environment, such as the availability of 
enforcing mechanisms and the degree of observability and verifiability of 
the various actions and payoffs. When an institution that enforces political 
contracts is absent or weak, or if player’s actions are hard to observe and 
verify, then a ‘bad transaction environment’ exist, and poor quality policies 
are likely to be generated (Spiller and Tomassi, 2003:17). 
 
The authors identify different features of political institutions that are 
conducive to more or less cooperation during the policy-making process. 
They conclude that political cooperation is more likely if the short run 
payoffs from non-cooperation are low, if the number of political actors is 
 91 
small, if these actors have strong inter-temporal linkages, if policy and 
political moves are widely observable, if good delegation and enforcement 
technologies are available (such as autonomous institutions) and if key 
political exchanges take place in arenas where cooperation is easies to 
occur (such as formal and transparent settings) (Spiller and Tomassi, 
2003:20).   
 
The transaction cost approach has been useful to understand general 
features of the policy-making process that occurs in different Latin 
American countries (AIDB, 2006). This exercise has allowed obtaining 
general ‘messages’ about policy-making in Latin America, such as the 
relevance of the policy-making process in the quality of public policies, the 
complexity of policy-making which invalidates a simplistic approach to 
study the process, the importance of political actors that are able to 
cooperate over time to have good quality public policies, and the fact that 
processes and policies are more effective if political parties are 
institutionalized and programmatic, if legislatures have sound policy-
making capabilities, if judiciaries are independent and if bureaucracies are 
strong (IADB, 2006:9).  
 
Aninat et al (2006) apply the transaction cost model to analyze the policy-
making process in Chile. The authors analyse the legislative process of 
four economic-related policies (legislative approval of access to the 
Mercosur treaty; legislation on price bands for traditional agriculture; the 
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legislation process to privatize water works; and the budget process)8. The 
authors highlight the particularities of the Chilean political system, such as 
a powerful executive, the existence of two long lived coalitions (the 
Concertacion and the Alianza) and the electoral system that tends to 
perpetuate the life of the two coalitions as it prevents individual parties to 
unilaterally leave its alliance (Aninat et al, 2006:6). Under this scenario, 
the high power that the Chilean executive enjoys is balanced by a series 
of ‘veto players’, particularly the legislative institutions, providing a system 
of checks and balances that generates good policies in areas of relative 
consensus. As the authors highlight,  
 
“the combined effect of a de facto agenda setting President 
who has effective negotiating tools but is confronted with 
several checks and balances produces a policymaking 
process in which legislation is not easily approved” (Aninat et 
al, 2006:35-36).  
 
Different types of economic policies such as macroeconomic, monetary 
and trade policies are presented as examples of good quality policies, 
thanks to their stable policymaking process and the successful results 
obtained (Aninat et al, 2006:8-12). 
                                                 
8 Chilean legislation requires that most economic innovations should be a matter of law. 
In this respect the budget policy-making process, referred by the authors as one of the 
most successful areas of policy-making in Chile is a good example as each year the 
executive needs to discuss the budget law with the Congress’ Special Budget Committee. 
While it is recognized that the executive has strong powers to define the budget, it is also 
acknowledged that the approval of Congress provides a balance to these powers (Aninat 
et al, 2006:52-60).  
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While the model has allowed analysing the policy-making process of 
economic policies in Chile, it may be stated that it may be less applicable 
to study the policy-making process of policies where the variety of players 
that the transaction cost model assumes is missing. In effect, the creators 
of the model presume that policy arenas are populated by politicians who 
are able to debate about a particular policy issue in legislatures or in less 
formal arenas, “the model we sketched assumes that policies are always 
collective choices” (Spiller and Tomassi, 2003:288). Hence, if a particular 
policy-making process is not the result of collective choices taken 
strategically during the legislative policy-making ‘game’, then it will not be 
properly explained by using the transaction costs model. Chapter Six 
discusses the applicability of this model to explain the particular case of 
the poverty-alleviation policy-making process. 
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2.4 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This Chapter has presented the main concepts, actors and theoretical 
views relevant to the policy-making process. In particular, a group of 
theoretical frameworks that study the policy-making process was 
presented in detail. The section that revised these frameworks 
demonstrated that they differ significantly in a variety of elements, such 
as the main forces that drive the process, the number and type of actors 
who participate, the degree of competition and advocacy that prevails, 
and so on.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the literature about the policy-making 
process that exists in Chile and Latin America has focused mainly on 
health, education, social security and economic policies, while little 
research exists on the poverty alleviation policy-making process. 
  
Given this lack of relevant literature, it is considered inadequate for the 
present research to select a particular theoretical framework before 
gathering and analysing the research data, as no evidence exists about 
the features of this subject in the case of Chile. On the contrary, it is 
concluded that the most appropriate way to accomplish the research is by 
adopting a grounded approach, where theory is contrasted with data to 
select the most appropriate theoretical framework to employ.  
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Accordingly, the theoretical framework that will be used in the research 
will be selected in Chapter Six, after contrasting the mapping of the 
processes that are presented in Chapter Five with the theoretical 
frameworks included here.  
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Chapter Three 
Research Aims and Method 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter presents the thesis objectives and the methodological 
approach. It starts by introducing the aims of the thesis and the related 
research questions. Next, the method employed is presented clarifying its 
advantages and limitations in relation to alternative methods. In particular, 
this section supports the use of a case study qualitative approach and of a 
narrative interviewing technique to gather data. The following section 
presents the main contributions and limitations of the research. The final 
section provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
 
3.1 AIMS AND RELATED QUESTIONS 
 
Aim 1: To map the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process 
 
The research studies the policy-making process of three poverty-
alleviation programmes created in Chile during the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s. As explained in Chapter One, this is a subject 
scarcely researched in developing countries, with Chile being no exception. 
In effect, up to this date no research has addressed this issue in Chile. 
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The study seeks to fill this literature gap by describing and understanding 
the poverty-alleviation policy-making process in Chile.  
 
This first aim involves identifying and mapping all events and actors 
influencing the policy-making process of the Chilean poverty-alleviation 
programmes under study. Describing the process is considered an 
important goal on its own, given the lack of documentation that exists in 
this area of Chilean social policy.  
 
Aim 1 related questions: 
 
1.1) What are the main events that constitute the poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process? 
Sub-questions: 
1.1.1) What are the events that constitute the episodes under study? 
1.1.2) What is the temporal sequence of the events linked to the episodes 
under study? 
 
1.2) Who are the main actors participating in the poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process? 
Sub-questions: 
1.2.1) What was their specific role in the process? 
1.2.2) At what stage of the policy-making process did they participate?  
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Aim 2: To explain the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process, assessing the relative relevance of events and actors 
involved, and defining the causal relationships between them. 
 
This is an explanatory aim that seeks to go one step further from the 
mapping of the process to understand the causal relationships between 
the events and actors already identified. It requires identifying the 
channels through which actors and events influenced the policy-making 
process.  
 
The data collected will be contrasted with the theoretical frameworks 
reviewed in the literature to identify which one fits best. This procedure 
will allow grounding the theoretical framework on the data gathered for 
the research, which is considered necessary given the un-researched 
character of the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process. 
 
Aim 2 related questions: 
 
2.1) What is the relative relevance of the different events and actors 
identified in the mapping? 
2.2) What are the channels by which events and actors influenced the 
process? 
2.3) What are the main discrepancies that exist between the Chilean 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process and the theoretical framework 
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most appropriate for understanding the process and explaining the 
discrepancies? 
 
3.2 METHOD 
 
3.2.1 Qualitative approach 
 
The research employs a qualitative approach. According to Strauss and 
Corbin (1998:10) a qualitative research is, “any type of research that 
produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means 
of quantification”. The approach employs nonmathematical interpretative 
methods to analyse different types of data, such as interviews, 
observations, texts, records and images.  
 
The rationale for using this approach is dictated by practical considerations. 
In effect, the only option to gather data to study the subject is by 
interviewing relevant process actors 9 . This results from the lack of 
documentation and data addressing the policy-making process that exist 
in Chile, making unfeasible the use of a quantitative method of research. 
The lack of documentation is noticeable when reviewing the relevant 
literature for the Latin American region.  
                                                 
9 Section 3.2.3.1 in this Chapter describes the specific interviewing technique employed. 
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For instance, when presenting a framework and methodology to research 
public management in Latin America, Barzelay et al (2003:35) note that,  
 
“public management reforms are not usually well-
documented experiences . . . [besides] the bibliography of 
public management reforms in Latin America is unstructured, 
frequently insufficient, laudatory, superficial and 
judgmental”.                                 
 
This data limitation turns out to be an advantage for the present research. 
In effect, the policy-making process presents characteristics that make a 
qualitative methodology an ideal technique to study this phenomenon. In 
fact, key elements of the process such as the process actor’s behaviours, 
preferences and values may be captured only by a qualitative method 
based on interviews. As Hakim confirms, a qualitative approach  
 
“is concerned with individuals own accounts of their 
attitudes, motivations and behaviour. It offers richly 
descriptive reports of individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, 
beliefs, views and feelings, the meaning and interpretations 
given to events and things, as well as their behaviour” 
(Hakim, 2000:34).  
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Additionally, the method allows considering the holistic nature of the 
policy-making process and all the complexities that it involves. The 
literature addressing the policy-making process characterizes it as a highly 
complex and unclear phenomenon (Hill, 1997a; John, 2000; Parsons, 
2001). It includes many informal and subjective aspects, linked to the 
interaction of different actors in the process. Accordingly, a qualitative 
method allows discovering the various elements and considerations 
influencing the process, and not only those that can be measured or 
systematized in a quantitative manner. 
 
3.2.2 Case study  
 
The research uses a case study approach. This method analyses a 
phenomenon by focusing on a limited number of episodes of interest, 
bounded by place and time, which constitute comparable observations of 
the same general phenomenon (Ragin, 1992a:1-5). For example, and as 
explained later in this chapter, the present research analyses the policy-
making process of Chilean poverty-alleviation policies by focusing on three 
specific cases that occurred in the country during the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s and that share a set of characteristics of interest. 
 
Case studies present a number of advantages when compared to other 
methods of qualitative research. According to Yin (2003), while case 
studies may be of an exploratory, descriptive or explanatory nature, they 
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are more appropriate to answer how and why research questions, i.e. 
questions that seek to explain a certain phenomenon. This is sustained 
because this type of research is more suitable to determine the links and 
causal relationships that exist in a particular phenomenon. On the 
contrary, surveys and archival analysis are qualitative research strategies 
more apt to describe a phenomenon. Moreover, case studies are 
appropriate to research situations where no control exists over the events 
under study as opposed to a research strategy based on experiments. 
Besides, case studies are applicable when contemporary events are 
studied, i.e. when direct observations of events or interviews with 
participants are feasible (Yin, 2003:8). Other research strategies such as 
archival analysis or historical analysis are more apt to study a non-
contemporary phenomenon. In addition, case studies allow considering all 
the variables that influence a certain phenomenon, including contextual 
elements as well as subjective factors linked to the motivations and 
perceptions of individuals (Ragin, 1987). As Yin states,  
 
“the case study method allows investigators to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events –
such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial 
processes, neighbourhood change, international relations, 
and the maturation of industries” (Yin, 2003:13).  
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In this sense, a case study permits investigating a phenomenon without 
divorcing it from its context, as occurs when an experimental approach is 
employed. 
 
Case studies are not free from certain limitations. Particularly, the method 
is not appropriate to generalize results to populations or universes (Yin, 
2003:10). More than a limitation this feature constitutes a 
misunderstanding of the method. Effectively, like experiments, case 
studies are empirical enquires that help confirm theoretical propositions 
rather than population features. As a result, a case study research can 
contribute to theoretical developments since existing theories are verified 
or new ones are developed to incorporate the research findings. 
 
3.2.2.1 Case definition 
 
To clarify the boundaries and content of policy-making cases, the 
definition of a policy-making case provided by Barzelay et al (2003) will be 
employed. They state that,  
 
“cases refer to experiences in which events involve policy 
making that could lead to changes in public management 
policies. Normally, a case refers to a network of events (or 
an episode) within a limited period” (Barzelay et al, 
2003:23).  
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Thus, in the present research a case corresponds to all the events related 
to the policy-making process of a poverty-alleviation programme. The 
outcome or result of the cases (Ragin, 1987; Barzelay et al, 2003) 
corresponds to the implementation of these programmes. 
 
 As anticipated in Chapter Two, the entire policy-making process is 
investigated without introducing a clear-cut demarcation between the 
agenda-setting and the alternative specification phases proposed by 
Kingdon (1995), as evidence from Latin American countries suggests that 
similar actors may be at work in both sub-phases of the process (Grindle, 
2002:101-103) .  
 
3.2.2.2 Cases selection  
 
Having decided to use a case study approach it is necessary to decide 
about the number of cases to study, a process defined a casing strategy 
(Ragin, 1992b). While a single-case study may allow discovering the 
underlying mechanisms that explain the phenomenon under study, a 
multiple-case approach has the advantage that it permits finding common 
narratives across many cases. From this the investigator can sustain the 
idea that the cases are displaying a universal-narrative (Abbott, 1992) 
reflecting theoretical elements of general applicability. 
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Case study experts agree that, ultimately, cases are selected and studied 
according to their theoretical relevance and to the degree in which their 
findings can be generalized to theory (Ragin, 1992b; Yin, 2003:38). This 
view excludes the notion that cases should be selected to obtain a 
representative set of observations. Instead, the researcher focuses on 
particular cases because they are decisive for theoretical development 
(Ragin, 1992b)10. 
 
Following this view, the present research studies the policy-making 
process of poverty-alleviation programmes by focusing on three policy 
innovations introduced in Chile under the Concertacion Alliance series of 
governments. They are Programme FOSIS, Programme Chile Barrio, and 
Programme Chile Solidario11.  
 
The rational for selecting these cases comes from the following 
considerations: 
 They are the main ‘flagship’ programmes in the poverty-alleviation 
agenda of each of the three Concertacion administrations that led 
the country after the military regime. In particular, these 
programmes were considered ‘pet’ programmes of the different 
Concertacion Presidents.  
                                                 
10 It is acknowledged that this procedure implies a degree of arbitrariness in the same 
way as the choice of “p<.05” as a significance level is an arbitrary decision (Yin, 
2003:51). 
11 A description of each programme is presented in this Chapter. 
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 Each of them embody the new social policy principles introduced by 
the Concertacion governing alliance, such as addressing poverty 
using a multi-dimensional approach and emphasizing participation 
by encouraging beneficiaries to have an active role in the search for 
solutions to their problems12, 
 They are big-scale, nation wide programmes directed to the poor. 
 
These three conditions constitute the casing strategy for the research. In 
effect, these are the only Chilean poverty-alleviation programmes fulfilling 
them. Other poverty-alleviation programmes created in this period were 
not preferred programmes of the president, and/or did not embody the 
Concertacion social policy principles, and/or were of small or medium 
scale13.  
 
The opinion of key interviewees was fundamental to support the selection 
of these programmes as case studies, particularly to confirm their 
prominence as ‘flagship’ poverty-alleviation programmes of the 
Concertacion Alliance era (Calderon, interview, August 2002). This fact is 
also sustained by relevant literature. Raczynski and Serrano (2005) include 
these three programmes in their recount of emblematic innovations 
introduced by the Concertacion Alliance 14. Programme FOSIS is also listed 
                                                 
12 Chapter Four explains in more detail these principles.
 
13 See Chapter Four.  
14 In addition to the three programmes selected for the research, these authors include in 
this category programme Chile Joven (Young Chile) and programme Mujeres Jefas de 
Hogar (Women Heads of Household), both created under the Patricio Aylwin second 
Concertacion Alliance administration and directed to youngsters and women respectively. 
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by Graham (1994) as a significant poverty-related innovation of the 
Concertacion Alliance. Besides, International organisations frequently 
include programme Chile Solidario among the significant innovations 
introduced in Latin America to address extreme poverty (ECLAC, 2005). 
Additionally, Concertacion Alliance presidents highlighted these 
programmes in different discourses along their presidencies (Aylwin, 1990, 
1991, 1992; Frei, 1997, 1998, 1999; Lagos, 2002, 2003, 2004).  
 
The programmes selected cover the three Concertacion Alliance 
governments that have governed the country after the military regime. 
This fact allows comparing the policy-making process across different 
government and political styles, particularly in relation to the influence of 
top-level government actors in the three processes.  
 
Figure 3.0 displays the years and administration in which the policy-
making process of the three programmes evolved.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
They also incorporate programme Origenes (Origins), introduced under the Lagos 
administration and directed to Chilean indigenous ethnic minorities, which in 2003 
represented 5.4% of total population. 
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Figure 3.0 
Programmes’ policy process according to year and President 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
 
3.2.2.3 Description of cases  
 
 
Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversion Social (FOSIS) (Solidarity and 
Social Investment Fund) 
 
Programme FOSIS finances plans, programs, projects and special activities 
that contribute to alleviate poverty. These actions should contribute to 
increase income levels, to improve the quality of life or to strengthen the 
capacities and skills of the poor population.  
 
Chile Barrio
FOSIS
Policy-Making phase Implementation phase
Frei
Administration
Aylwin
Administration
Lagos
Administration
Chile Solidario
Concertacion alliance governmentsMilitary regime
1989 1990 1996 1997 2001 2002
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FOSIS distributes resources by creating funds linked to a particular line of 
projects to which interested group can apply. Funds are allocated in all 
regions of the country. Once the territories and amounts to be invested 
are agreed with local authorities, a Territorial Work Group is constituted to 
implement the fund. The municipality representatives, other public 
agencies and community organisations participate in this group. 
Population living in targeted areas is informed about the opportunities 
they have to apply for funds to finance their projects and initiatives and 
about the amount of funds that can be accessed. A special program team 
accompanies them during the application phase. The process considers a 
period of time to review the projects allowing the participation of 
beneficiaries. The final selection of projects is carried out by the Municipal 
Advisory Board, which makes this decision during a public session. 
 
The fund was created in 1990. The first years of implementation allowed 
FOSIS to consolidate its methodology to allocate funds. In 1994 the fund 
started financing a line of projects with a clear focus on increasing the 
productivity levels of small firms in rural areas. In the social development 
area, the fund developed a line of projects that were self-managed by 
organized groups of poor communities. Hence, by 1995 the fund was 
financing two types of projects: those directed to generate productive 
development in the poor population and those with the goal of deepening 
social promotion and integration in these groups. By 2000 in conjunction 
with MIDEPLAN, the fund started developing a methodology to address 
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the problems of families living in extreme poverty. In 2002 the 
methodology materialized in programme Puente, which by May 2002 was 
integrated to programme Chile Solidario, to become the entrance door to 
the system of benefits and monetary transfers that the state directs to the 
extremely poor.  At present (2009) FOSIS devotes a significant part of its 
resources to implement programme Puente, which covers the entire 
country. 
 
Chile Barrio (Chile Neighbourhood) 
  
The Chile Barrio programme aims to address the problems affecting the 
population living in all campamentos (shanty towns) that existed in Chile 
by 1996. A survey applied by that time identified a total of 972 
campamentos in the country, with a population of near 500,000 
individuals. 
 
The programme provides physical and human capital to inhabitants of 
campamentos. On the one hand, it provides houses, basic public 
infrastructure and services, such as electricity, drinking water, sewerage 
and street pavements. On the other hand, the programme provides 
educational alternatives for campamentos inhabitants, such as courses to 
complete formal education and training opportunities to help then obtain a 
job or create their own small business.  
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The programme is a joint effort of a set of different government 
institutions working under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing. 
Participant institutions are the National Goods Ministry, the Ministry of 
Planning, the Regional Development Agency (SUBDERE), the Solidarity 
and Social Investment Fund (FOSIS) and the National Employment Service 
(SENCE). Besides, the programme works with the municipalities where 
campamentos are located as well as with regional governments.  
 
The programme promotes the participation of beneficiaries during the 
implementation of the programme. Beneficiaries can participate in the 
design of their houses and of the neighbourhood’s basic infrastructure. 
Besides, they must contribute with saving to obtain their basic house, 
which is supplemented with funds from the municipality and the 
government.  In some cases, the programme considers the use of the 
local labour force to build basic infrastructure.  
 
The programme was created in 1997. It started working as a pilot 
programme by covering 20 campamentos. In 1998 the programme begun 
working in full scale by incorporating 120 extra campamentos distributed 
along the country. By 2004, 57% of the 972 campamentos initially 
surveyed had been covered by the programme (Saborido, 2005:23). 
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Chile Solidario (Chile Solidarity) 
 
Chile Solidario aims to support all families that live in extreme poverty in 
the country.  In 2002, 225,000 families were in this condition, which were 
expected to be covered by the programme by the end of 2005. 
 
The programme is managed by the Ministry of Planning, through as 
special executive secretary, which coordinates the actions of the existing 
safety net at the national and local level. The programme provides multi-
dimensional support to families as well as a preferential access to social 
benefits.  
 
Beneficiary families are selected according to their Ficha CAS score, which 
ranks families according to their levels of deprivation. Once identified, 
families are invited to participate in the programme. This feature 
represents a sharp difference with respect to the previous programmes to 
address extreme poverty, as the government takes the initiative and 
invites the family to participate in the programme while prior programmes 
require beneficiary families to take the initiative and apply for programmes.  
 
A distinctive characteristic of the programme is the provision of 
psychosocial assistance, through programme Puente, which is managed by 
FOSIS. At this stage, beneficiary families firm a ‘contract’ with the 
government, represented by the Apoyo Familiar (Family Supporter). The 
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Apoyo Familiar is a professional that accompanies the family during two 
years providing support and tools to overcome their poverty. Besides, the 
programme provides a cash transfers to families as a stimulus for their 
participation in the programme. After the two years, families leave the 
programme and continue receiving a cash bonus for three years. 
 
The contract establishes that the family should assume an active role to 
overcome its problems. In particular, the family should be proactive to 
access the government social safety nets, taking advantage of the 
government programmes available. The Apoyo familiar is helpful in this 
aim by facilitating information about all the government benefits available 
to them in the areas of health, education, housing and social security.  
 
 
The programme started its implementation in 2002. By July 2006 230,000 
families were invited to participate, with 93% of them accepting the 
invitation. Besides, by that date 93,000 families had completed two years 
in the programme (Baeza, 2006). By the end of 2006 the programme 
expected to have 268,000 families incorporated, as well as 7,000 
homeless individuals participating in the programme. 
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3.2.3 Data elicitation   
 
3.2.3.1 Narrative interviewing  
 
Research data was obtained from interviews applied to process actors. 
Specifically, 32 interviews were applied during three fieldwork periods  in 
2002, 2003 and 2006 15. 
 
In particular, data was gathered using a narrative interviewing procedure 
(Dexter, 1970; Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000). This approach 
corresponds to a semi-structured, in-depth interview where interviewees 
provide a free recollection of how events developed, with minimum 
interference from the interviewer. As Jovchelovitch and Bauer note,  
 
“by telling, people recall what has happened, put experience 
into sequence, find possible explanations for it, and play 
with the chain of events that shape individual and social 
life . . . the narration reconstructs actions and context in the 
most adequate way: it reveals place, time, motivation and 
the actor’s symbolic system of orientations” (Jovchelovitch 
and Bauer, 2000:58).  
 
                                                 
15Appendix 1 lists the interviewees. All interviewees were asked permission to use their 
names when presenting their opinions in this thesis. When this permission was not 
granted their views were cited under anonymity. 
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The narrative interviewing technique presents particular researching 
advantages. It allows interviewees to narrate the events according to their 
own perspective, minimizing potential interferences from the interviewer 
as he/she adopts a listening attitude while the interviewee ‘story-tells’ the 
process. This approach avoids a question-response type of interview 
where the interviewer may influence the interviewee by selecting topics, 
ordering questions and wording question in a particular manner 
(Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000:61). In addition, the method provides a 
basic structure to compare across individuals, thus facilitating the analysis 
of the cases (May, 2001:93). 
 
Despite the previous strengths, narrative interviewing presents some 
weaknesses. It has been mentioned that, despite the minimum 
interference of the interviewer, some expectations from the interviewee 
may bias the narration. In effect, it is likely that the interviewee may 
present the narration in a strategic way to please the interviewer or to be 
consistent with a specific political view, particularly if the narrator is a 
politician (Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000:65). 
 
Another potential problem of this technique is that it is unlikely that the 
interviewer may be able to induce the interviewee to freely narrate all 
relevant events. As a result, the interviewer is recommended to apply 
some questioning to elicit extra information from the interviewee 
(Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000:67). Consequently, narrative interviewing 
 116 
is best described as a semi-structured type of interview, where the 
interviewee narrates a story and the interviewer applies some 
standardized questions if necessary to complete the story and to compare 
narrations across different persons16. 
 
3.2.3.2 Description of fieldworks  
 
Fieldwork 1  
 
Fieldwork 1 was carried out at the end of the first year of the research, 
between August and September 2002 in Santiago and Concepcion, the 
capital and the second largest city of Chile, respectively.  
 
Main goals of this fieldwork were to explore on terrain the feasibility of the 
investigation, to analyze the suitability of the cases selected initially for the 
study, to identify the actors (individuals, institutions, etc.) that were 
relevant in the policy-making process of the programmes, and to elaborate 
an initial map of the events linked to the policy-making process of the 
programmes. 
 
To achieve these goals, a total of 13 interviews were applied to different 
actors related to the Chilean social policy policy-making process. As a first 
step to accomplish these interviews, e-mails were sent to previously 
                                                 
16 Appendix 2 presents the questionnaires applied. 
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known informants to arrange meetings in Santiago. This process allowed 
contacting key informants whose help resulted crucial to start the 
interviewing process. They provided initial descriptions of process’ events 
and identified process’ actors to interview. The majority of interviewees 
were public servants, which was a natural consequence of the aims of 
fieldwork 1, where an initial description of the policy-making process of 
the programmes was pursued. 
 
The Ministry of Planning of Chile (MIDEPLAN) provided support during 
fieldwork 1. Office space and a computer were supplied to accomplish the 
fieldwork. Besides, MIDEPLAN’s institutional links with some of the 
programmes under study allowed an expedite access to many relevant 
process actors. Interviews were recorded and most of them were 
personally transcribed during fieldwork 1.  
 
Fieldwork 2  
                               
The second and main fieldwork of the investigation was carried out 
between May and September 2003 in Santiago.  
 
This fieldwork was planned to gather the majority of the data for the 
research.  A total of 15 interviews were applied to different process actors 
from a varied spectrum of sectors. This allowed obtaining a more 
complete and balanced description of the processes than the one obtained 
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during fieldwork 1 which was attained mainly from public servants. 
Instead, fieldwork 2 included interviews to public servants such as ex-
ministers, heads of departments and career public servants, but also to 
NGO-related actors, and experts from the academic sector.  
 
Again, significant logistic support was provided by MIDEPLAN, including 
computer and office space. This facilitated the transcription and analysis 
of interviews. Previous contacts with MIDEPLAN officials made during 
fieldwork 1 were helpful to identify further process actors.  Interviews 
were recorded and all of them were personally transcribed during 
fieldwork. 
 
Fieldwork 3 
 
Fieldwork 3 was accomplished during the final phase of the research 
between December 2006 and January 2007. It was carried out to 
elucidate questions that emerged after mapping and explaining the 
processes, and particularly to help explain the lack of certain theoretical 
aspects that were absent from case studies. Four interviewees were 
selected according to their potential to fulfil the aims of the fieldwork. All 
interviews were recorded and personally transcribed.  
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3.2.3.3 Interview process features 
 
Some features of the interview process are described here. They relate to 
the type of interviewees selected, those that were easier to access, the 
kind of information that was possible to obtain and the type of programme 
that was easier to research. 
 
Most interviewees were public servants and Concertacion Alliance related 
politicians17. Only a few were actors from NGOs or linked to the right wing 
opposition. This profile of interviewees was a consequence of the type of 
process under analysis, as the poverty-alleviation policy-making process 
occurred inside the government in a very closed and isolated way, mainly 
under the control of top level government officials and civil servants18. 
Hence, the process of selecting people who participated in the poverty-
alleviation policy-making process or who had a good understanding of it 
resulted in a group of interviewees who were  partial to the position of 
government related actors.  
 
In any case, this set of interviewees was appropriate in terms of fulfulling 
the first aims of the research, as they were able to provide the information 
necessary to map the processes. Furthermore,  the information gathered 
from non-government interviewess tended to be more general that the 
one obtained from government related interviewees. 
                                                 
17
 See Appendix 1. 
18
 See Chapter Five. 
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In general terms, mid-rank officials resulted easier to access and to 
interview than top-rank officials. They presented a less restricted agenda 
and were more willing to provide detailed information about the processes. 
On the other hand, top officials such as ministers, tended to supply 
information about the broad policy-making process, usually related more 
to the political sphere of the process than to technical issues. Hence, the 
information obtained from public officers varied according to their position 
inside government. 
 
As a general trend, the interviewing process was easier the older the 
programme being addressed. Particularly, a greater number of individuals 
were willing to speak about the policy process of older programmes, and 
those interviewees addressing older programmes were willing to provide 
more information. To explain this result, it may be argued that if the 
policy-making process of a programme is more distant in time, it is less 
probable that process participants are still politically linked to the 
programme. Second, recently created programmes are more present in 
public opinion and debates. Consequently, interviewees involved in recent 
policy-making processes may feel more exposed if any particular 
information about the process is leaked to the public.    
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3.2.3.4 Documents  
 
Although there are no documents or studies on the Chilean poverty-
alleviation policy-making process, a limited set of documents describing 
the programmes’ contents are available. Some of them transcribe 
presidents’ discourses where the rationale for creating these programmes 
is presented, while others evaluate the programmes under study. All these 
documents were consulted to supplement the information gathered from 
interviews. 
 
3.2.4 Data analysis   
 
All the interviews were recorded and transcribed by the author. This 
process led to data familiarisation, helping ultimately to analyze and 
understand the cases (May, 2001:106).  
 
The approach employed to analyze the data was to build a single history 
from the diverse narrations obtained from interviews. This involved, first, 
a detailed analysis of each interview, identifying the elements of the case 
to which it referred and the subjects that it covered. Next, all the 
interviews addressing the same case were contrasted, to find 
commonalities and triangulate information provided by different actors. 
This process enabled a description and understanding of the processes 
that was considered accurate and convincing. 
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Finally, a narrative of each policy-making process was constructed, 
including all relevant events and actors, as well as the contextual elements 
that interviewees mentioned as relevant in the process 19 . These final 
narrations were presented to key interviewees to check the plausibility of 
the processes’ mapping. 
 
3.2.5 Considerations related to being an insider   
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, at the beginning of the 1990s I started 
working at the Ministry of Planning of Chile (MIDEPLAN) analysing poverty 
and income statistics. This civil servant post allowed me to witness the 
efforts made by the Concertacion Alliance in the area of poverty-alleviation 
during the 1990s.  
 
It may be argued that being an insider presented methodological 
advantages and disadvantages for the research. A direct and preeminent 
advantage was that as an insider I was able to identify and access 
relevant process actors who provided the research data. It is likely that a 
non-government researcher may have found more difficult to collect a 
similar data set, and ultimatelly to accomplish the research.  
 
                                                 
19 Chapter Five presents these narratives. 
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A methodological disadvantage of being an insider resides in the risk of 
introducing a bias into the research, either in favour or against 
government depending on my personal views. 
 
To control for this potential bias I contrasted the results of the research 
with the opinions of a group of interviewees and experts. In particular, 
during fieldwork 3 I presented the research findings to 4 interviewees and 
discussed these results with them. These interviewees represent a 
balanced group in terms of their affiliation to government, academia and  
NGOs20.   
 
All these interviewees considered that the research findings were 
reasonable as they showed results that corresponded to their 
understanding of the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process. As 
an example, Chapter Seven presents the opinion of Cecilia Perez, the 
minister of MIDEPLAN during the policy-making process of one of the 
research cases. Her views provide strong confirmation that the poverty-
alleviation policy-making process was a secretive process monopolized by 
government politician and experts, with no participation of external 
actors21.  
 
In summary,  being a civil servant at an institution linked to the research 
topic was an advantage for the research, as it helped accomplish the goals 
                                                 
20
 See appendix 1. 
21
 See Chapter Seven, section 7.1.4. 
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of the research. Furthermore, the risk of introducing a personal bias into 
the research was controled by contrasting the results obtained with the 
opinions of a relevant group of government and non-government actors 
and policy experts. 
 
3.3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
3.3.1 Contributions 
 
1) To contribute to fill a gap in Chilean literature  
 
As already mentioned, one aim of the study is to contribute to fill a gap in 
Chilean literature. As highlighted in Chapter One, the study of the policy-
making process is less frequent in developing countries (Mooij and de Vos, 
2003). In effect, most of the literature about the policy process has 
focused on the experience of developed countries and the US in particular 
(Lindblom, 1993; Kingdon, 1995;  Hill, 1997; Sabatier, 1999; Parsons, 
2001). As a result, the present research contributes to increase the 
understanding of the policy-making process in the particular setting of a 
developing or ‘emerging’ country. In the case of Chile, social policy studies 
tend to concentrate on the policy content leaving unexplored the policy 
process (MIDEPLAN 1991, 1992, 2004).  As a result, the understanding of 
the poverty-alleviation policy-making process in the Chilean case will 
contribute to have a clearer understanding of why and how poverty-
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alleviation policies are as they are, as well as to illuminate the policy 
process in other developing countries where the same type of policy 
formation structures could be present.   
 
2) To provide theoretical developments related to the policy-
making process in developing countries   
 
By adopting and contrasting theories about policy-making the research 
provides theoretical developments related to the policy-making process in 
developing countries.  On the one hand, by explaining the particularities of 
the poverty alleviation policy-making process in Chile, the study allows 
rejecting the applicability to the Chilean case of theories created to explain 
the process that occurs in develop countries. On the other hand, by 
finding differences between the Chilean cases under study and the 
selected theoretical framework, and by posing tentative explanations to 
these differences, the research improves the applicability of this 
framework to developing (or emerging) countries. 
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3.3.2 Limitations 
 
1) The method employed is not appropriate to generalize to 
populations 
 
As already mentioned, the method employed to research the Chilean 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process is not appropriate to generalize 
to populations. In this sense, the research is not trying to be 
representative of a particular population, such as all social policy 
processes occurring in Chile or in Latin America, but to confirm theoretical 
propositions linked to the research framework and to check if these 
propositions are applicable for the particular case of Chilean anti-poverty 
policy. 
 
2) The research does not explores the entire policy process 
 
It is important to stress that the scope of the present research is the initial 
phase of the policy process, leaving unexplored the implementation stage. 
While the rationale to focus only on policy-making has already been 
established –a lack of research on this area in the country-, it must be 
recognized that this option may limit the understanding of the 
phenomenon under study as a whole. In effect, some literature (Sutton, 
1999) as well as the opinions of a number of interviewees highlights the 
continuity of the policy process, where no clear boundaries exist between 
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different phases of the process and where no definitive linear order exists 
between the stages in which the process is divided. For instance, it may 
occur that policies continue to change significantly during the 
implementation stage. As a result, a full understanding of the Chilean 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process requires complementing the 
findings of the present research with evidence and studies about the 
implementation stage of the process. 
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present Chapter has explained the methodology employed in the 
research. The lack of documentation or data sets about the poverty-
alleviation policy-making process prevented the use of a quantitative 
methodology and led to the selection of  a qualitative approach. In effect, 
the only available sources of information about the way in which the 
processes evolved were the opinions of individuals that participated 
directly in the processes, or who where able to have a good understanding 
of the processes thanks to their proximity to policy makers.  
 
The Chapter also emphasized that using a qualitative approach may be 
viewed as an advantage for the research, given that this methodological 
approach has been praised for capturing the complexity and contextual 
elements of an intricate phenomenon like the policy-making process.  
 
In adition, it may be argued that a qualitative description of the Chilean 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process may provide a novel view of an 
area of Chilean social policy that has been widely regarded as a successful 
one, thanks to the analysis of the quantitative outcomes of policies in 
terms of poverty reduction. As Chapters Five, Six and Seven will explain, 
while the poverty-alleviation policy outcomes in Chile have been 
satisfactory, the process to arrive to these outcomes appears less 
acceptable in terms of the openness of the process, the levels of 
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participation of non-government actors, and the degree to which technical 
considerations were included in the process, compared to political 
elements. 
 
The Chapter argued that having a set of interviewees composed mainly by 
government related actors was a necessary result of the type of policy-
making process researched, namely a government dominated one. As a 
qualitative research where data was gathered from interviewee accounts, 
having the proper set of interviewees was crucial. They needed to provide 
data about an undocumented process which most of the times occured 
inside ministries in a way that resembled the “black box” of policy-making. 
The process of selecting interviewees led to a group of people belonging  
mainly to some of the three Concertacion Alliance governments, either top 
level political appointees or mid level civil servants. They were able to 
provide the core of the data employed in the research, i.e. detailed 
accounts of the three cases under analysis. Non-governmental 
interviewees, such as NGO executives or social policy experts linked to the 
political opposition, tended to provide more general opinions about these 
processes or to confirm particular elements of the processes.  
 
The Chapter argued that being an insider, as a civil servant working at the 
Ministry of Planning, was beneficial for the research as it helped to carry 
out the research. It was also explained that the risk of introducing a bias 
linked to my personal views as a member of the governing Concertacion 
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Alliance, was minimized by contrasting the research findings with the 
opinions of government and non-governmental policy process actors and 
policy experts. 
 
As explained in the Chapter, a case study-based research requires 
selecting and focusing on a number of cases of interest that represent 
comparable observations of the same phenomenon. In other words, by 
using a case study approach the research applies a “vertical view” of the 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process, rather than a “horizontal” one,  
where an emphasis is given to the process in which the different events 
interconnect. Chapter Four provides an account of the evolution of social 
policy and poverty-alleviation policies in Chile, in order to have a better 
view of the context in which the cases selected were created.  
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Chapter Four 
The evolution of social policy  
and poverty-alleviation policies in Chile  
 
 
 
The [Chilean Welfare State] system was established in a rather 
uncoordinated fashion after decades of bargaining between certain groups 
of organized workers and the state”  
(Graham, 1994:27) 
 
 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2000 Ricardo Lagos, the third president of the Concertacion Alliance 
described the wide-reaching achievements of the Alliance during the 
1990s by saying that,  
 
“during the 1990s we made the historic step from 
authoritarianism to democracy. In addition, we doubled the 
size of our economy, creating more jobs than ever in our 
history for a ten-year period, we expanded communications, 
democratized municipalities, improved wages, applied a 
deep reform to education, confronted the truth in human 
rights violations, built houses and parks, and transformed 
the infrastructure of the country, with new highways, ports 
and airports” (Lagos, 2000:3). 
 
Two years later, when launching the Chile Solidario programme he said,  
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“in 1990 almost 40% of Chileans, of Chilean families, were 
living in poverty. In 2000 this proportion dropped to 20.6%. 
Chile has halved poverty in just 10 years. No other Latin 
American country can show such an advance in recent 
history . . .” (Lagos, 2002:29). 
 
There exists a wide consensus between local and international experts 
that Chile showed outstanding socio-economic results during the 1990s, 
when compared to the outcomes of other Latin American countries. The 
Concertacion Alliance goal of reaching economic growth while improving 
equity was materialized, particularly in terms of the fast reduction in 
poverty that was achieved, contrasting with the meagre result that most 
Latin American countries showed during this decade. For instance, in its 
executive summary, World Bank (2000) states that,  
 
“Chile remains as one of the outstanding countries in Latin 
America in terms of its record in reducing poverty. A 
combination of strong [economic] growth and well directed 
social programs have combined to reduce the poverty rate in 
half during a period of just eleven years”.  
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Likewise, De Ferranti et al (1994:15) state that,  
 
“Chile is the best example in the [Latin American] region of 
a case in which the combination of programmatic parties 
and bureaucratic competency helped support important 
shifts to a more effective and redistributive state following 
the transition to democracy”.  
 
The present Chapter will show that the previous achievements resulted 
from a long process of social policy evolution that spans many decades 
and that involved a series of democratic and non-democratic 
governments. To better understand this development the present Chapter 
provides an historic recount of the origin and evolution of social policy in 
Chile, highlighting the way in which poverty has appeared in different 
government’s agenda as an issue that deserves attention and a policy 
response. 
 
By doing this, the chapter contextualizes Chapter Five, where the policy 
making processes of the three poverty-alleviation programmes selected 
are described. It will be demonstrated that these programmes were part 
of the Concertacion Alliance governments broader agenda for the social 
policy area, and that they represented particular cases of a group of 
innovations and reforms introduced into social policy after 1990. Hand in 
hand with the goal of addressing poverty, the Concertacion Alliance 
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governments seek to strengthen the traditional social sectors, such as 
health and education, areas that resulted seriously affected under the 
military regime. 
 
The chapter highlights how Chilean social policy has emerged and evolved 
under the constraints that were imposed on the social policy programmes 
and institutions created by previous administrations. This situation has 
occurred even with completely opposed governments in terms of their 
ideology, a fact that supports the view that Chilean social policy 
institutions are highly resilient and persistent and that the environment 
where social policy occurs limits the space for new developments to 
happen, a characteristic that is consistent with the system’s approach of 
the policy process (Easton, 1965)22. 
 
Besides, as already mentioned in Chapter One, it will be emphasized that 
the process of change that occurred in the poverty-alleviation policy area 
differed from what happened in other social sectors, mainly health and 
education, where big reform were introduced instead of incremental 
changes, as was the case in the poverty area. 
 
The Chapter starts by tracing back the origins of social policy in the 
country. Then, it highlights the way in which a welfare state system was 
created, and particularly the circumstances under which pro-poor policies 
                                                 
22 See: Chapter Two, section 2.1.2. 
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appeared. Next, the social policy approach of the military regime is 
described. The following section presents the Concertacion Alliance social 
policy approach, describing the social policy innovations that occurred 
under the three Concertacion Alliance administrations. The final section 
provides the main conclusions of the Chapter. 
   
4.1 THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN CHILE 
 
There is agreement that the first social policy governmental initiatives 
were implemented in the country during the 1920s (Hakim and Solimano, 
1978; Foxley, Aninat and Arellano, 1980; Graham, 1994). In 1924 the 
Leyes Sociales (Social Laws) to improve the social conditions of workers, 
were proposed by the Jorge Alessandri’s right-wing government and 
approved by Congress. These laws created a basic social security system 
in the country, which included pensions, medical services, unemployment 
and disability insurance and family allowances (Hakim and Solimano, 
1978:21). In addition, a number of institutions related to these laws were 
created, such as the Cajas de Prevision (Pensions Offices). 
 
By introducing these policies, Alessandri was responding to pressure from  
asalariados (wage-earner workers) to improve their working conditions 
(Foxley, Aninat and Arellano, 1980:19).  In effect, at the beginning of the 
1920s a wave of labour strikes and violent street protests made evident 
the power of labour unions and forced the government to respond to their 
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demands (Arellano, 1988:23). Furthermore, the concept of cuestion social 
(social issues) appeared for the first time in the government’s agenda, 
reflecting a change in the government’s view of its social responsibilities, 
from a purely charity-motivated policy to a social justice role (Arellano, 
1988:28).  
 
The fact that initial social policies responded to the demands of workers 
resulted in a social policy framework that benefited mainly middle income 
groups of the population, and a small fraction of all workers (Foxley, 
Aninat and Arellano, 1980:19). They were organized workers, mainly 
white-collar employees. In contrast, the poor, formed principally by rural 
peasants, the unemployed and informal and unorganized workers 
remained outside the social system of benefits due to their lack of political 
representation (Hakim and Solimano, 1978:21). 
 
4.2 THE 1920-1964 PERIOD: THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSOLIDATION OF A WELFARE STATE IN CHILE 
 
The Chilean welfare state system that started developing in the 1920s, 
consolidated in the 1950s and 1960s. The first social policy measures of 
the 1920s represented the initial steps in a continuous process of 
expansion of public participation in social issues that included social 
security, health, education and housing (Hakim and Solimano, 1978:21; 
Raczinsky, 2000). During this period new institutions were created, such 
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as the Caja de Habitacion Popular (Popular Housing Office) (in 1936) to 
help workers to build their houses; the Servicio Nacional de Salud 
(National Health Service), created in 1952 to provide health attention to 
workers, mothers and children, and the Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar 
(National Union to Help Students), created in 1953 to provide food and 
studying materials to low-income students (Arellano, 1988:32). Other 
measures implemented during these years included minimum wage 
policies and subsidies to essential goods (Foxley, Aninat and Arellano, 
1980:20).  
 
Between the 1920s and the 1960s public social spending showed a 
continuous growth, allowing significant percentages of the population to 
receive primary education and health services. This growth was financed 
by increases in tax rates, which represented an expansion in the size and 
relevance of the public sector in the economy. Social welfare spending 
grew faster than national income, representing near 15% of GDP by 1955 
(Table 4.0). 
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Table 4.0 
Chile: Public social expenditure, 1925-1972 
 (Selected years) 
Year Billion  Chilean 
pesos (of 1981) 
% GDP  
1925 3.1 2.1 
1935 12.3 5.2 
1945 23.3 8.0 
1955 55.1 14.9 
1961 85.4 17.0 
1970 206.9 19.9 
1972 226.2 25.8 
       Source: Arellano (1988:33). 
 
This increase in public involvement in social issues responded to a rapid 
expansion in middle-income groups, which demanded more social benefits 
from the state (Arellano, 1988:35). They were mainly urban industrial 
workers, organized in labour unions that received reasonable salaries and 
social benefit thanks to their political influence (Hakim and Solimano, 
1978:21). 
 
However, authors agree that, by focusing in the middle-income groups of 
the population, the welfare system that emerged in Chile was excluding 
the poor. For instance, Hakim and Solimano, (1978:21,23) note that,  
 
“social security covered only 70% of the economically active 
population with most of the excluded belonging to lower-
income strata-rural workers, recent migrants to cities, 
persons without a stable job or working in marginal jobs 
where social security as well as minimum wages could be 
avoided . . . one can conclude that the government-provided 
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social services tended to reinforce and perpetuate, rather 
than alleviate, inequalities among different socioeconomic 
groups in Chile”. 
 
4.3 1964: THE INTRODUCTION OF A REDISTRIBUTIVE VIEW TO 
FAVOUR THE POOR 
 
1964 marks a turning point in Chilean social policy as a clear emphasis in 
redistributive policies arrived when Eduardo Frei Montalva, a Christian 
Democrat, assumed power. It may be stated that for the first time the 
government developed policies that did not respond to organized 
pressures, but that explicitly tried to include the entire population, 
particularly aimed at those living in poverty who lacked any political 
representation or organized power to put forward their demands. In his 
discourses, Frei Montalva put the overcoming of social exclusion and 
injustice as central objectives of his government (Boeninger, 1998:125).  
 
Important reforms were introduced in the agricultural, educational, labour 
and housing areas following a gradualist approach intended to avoid the 
emergence of social tensions (Boeninger, 1998:127). Frei Montalva’s goal 
was to incorporate peasants and the urban poor into the health, housing 
and education systems. His policies included a land reform to address the 
high level of land concentration existing in Chile. This concentration placed 
landless wage labourers and tenant farmers at the bottom of the 
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socioeconomic scale. The land reform redistributed 15% of agricultural 
land and benefited mainly tenant farmers, while the living conditions of 
landless workers remained practically unchanged (Hakim and Solimano, 
1978:20). 
 
During Frei Montalva’s administration, social expenditure continued to 
grow steadily, with a 125% increase in real terms during the second half 
of the 1960s (Foxley, Aninat and Arellano, 1980:23). As a result, Chile 
showed significant socio-economic advances by the end of the 1960s. For 
instance, near 90% of all children between 7 and 14 years old were 
enrolled in school and 38% of those between fifteen and eighteen years 
old were enrolled in secondary education. The illiteracy rate dropped to 15% 
of the population (Hakim and Solimano, 1978:23).  Besides, 80% of all 
births received professional help and a similar percentage of children 
under six years of age took part in the preventive health check ups that 
the public health system provided (Raczinsky, 2000:122). As a result, by 
1970 the level of social development in Chile was considered one of the 
highest among Latin American countries (Ffrench-Davis, 2002:187). 
 
The arrival of socialist president Salvador Allende to power in 1970 
accentuated the redistributive emphasis that Frei Montalva started. His 
government programme was focussed on developing a socialist system in 
Chile, by putting assets under state control to create a governmental 
economic area. Between 1970 and 1973 the government-controlled 
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economic sector reached near 70% of all industrial capital (Arellano, 
1980:44).  Allende also expanded Frei’s land reform by deepening the 
redistribution of agricultural land. As a result, by the beginning of 1973 
near 60% of all agricultural land had been redistributed (Boeninger, 
1998:174). The redistributive policy package included also a strong 
increase in nominal wages and the establishment of prices control of basic 
goods.  
 
Social spending grew strongly, representing near 25% of GDP by 1972 
(See Table 4.0). This allowed the governments to extend housing, food, 
educational and health assistance (Cardoso and Helwege, 1995:211; 
Martinez and Palacios, 1996).   
 
4.4 THE MILITARY REGIME NEO-LIBERAL APPROACH 
 
The fall of Allende in 1973 in a coup d’etat led by general Augusto 
Pinochet, apart from representing an end to a long tradition of democracy 
in the country, was the conclusion of a five-decades period of continuous 
expansion of the state’s involvement in social issues, and the beginning of 
what has been labelled as a ‘state’s retreat’ from the economic and social 
policy arenas (Arellano, 1980:45). 
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Allende’s policies directed to strengthen the state’s role in the economy 
were almost entirely reversed 23 .  For instance, most previously 
nationalized firms and assets were devolved to their previous owners. In 
the case of land reform, the military returned one third of the expropriated 
land to previous owners, and privately auctioned another third (Cardoso 
and Helwege, 1995:262). 
 
This new agenda was introduced in a swift and expedite way thanks to a 
strong repression of labour unions, and to the abolition of any political 
parties and of any form of democratic deliberation in the country 
(Boeninger, 1998:268). By 1977, most of the left wing political 
representatives were exiled and the social movements as well as the 
Christian Democrat and Social Democrat political parties, were effectively 
silenced (Boeninger, 1998:270).  
 
The military regime’s economic approach was neo-liberal, promoting a 
free market economy and reducing the size and scope of the state 
(Raczinsky, 2000:122). New economic policies introduced included the 
elimination of price controls and the lessening of trade barriers to open 
the economy to international trade. Capital movements were also 
liberalized. The state was viewed as an inefficient actor, especially in its 
redistributive role, while economic growth was considered the main tool to 
achieve development and improve individual’s quality of life.  Hence, the 
                                                 
23 One notable exception was the copper industry nationalized by Allende, which Pinochet 
decided to keep under state’s control.  
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state’s role was considered subsidiary to the market, limiting its influence 
to those areas where private actors were unwilling or unable to 
participate.  
  
New principles were introduced into social policy. These principles 
included: to decentralize the provision of social transfers and health and 
education services to the municipality level; to privatize all or some parts 
of the delivery process of social services, such as financing or production; 
to subsidize the demand for social services, instead of providing transfers 
directly; to target social benefits to the poor and extremely poor, while 
asking middle and high-income groups to pay for the social benefits that 
they received; and to introduce market mechanisms into the education, 
health, social security and housing public systems (Martinez and Palacios, 
1996).   
 
To materialize these new principles, sharp reforms were applied into 
different social areas. In 1981, an education reform decentralized the 
management of public schools to the Municipality level. Funds were 
transferred to schools via a per-student voucher instead of a budget 
allocation. Families were able to use the school voucher in Municipal 
schools and in Escuelas Particulares Subvencionadas (Subsidized Private 
Schools), privately managed schools that were allowed to top-up the 
voucher. The reform was aimed to improve the quality of education under 
the assumption that a decentralized management would deliver higher 
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quality standards. Also, it was considered that allowing parents to decide 
where to enrol their children would improve quality via markets 
mechanisms. At the end of the day, the success of the reform in achieving 
its goals was dubious as no clear improvement in the quality of public 
education was evident, while an increase in the inequality of the 
educational system occurred, with municipal schools performing much 
bellow private schools (MIDEPLAN, 1996:114).   
 
In the area of health, the military introduced a reform in 1979, applying 
principles similar to those of the educational reform. The National Health 
System was decentralized into 26 independent and autonomous services, 
while the Ministry of Health maintained the responsibility of overseeing 
and regulating the system. In 1981, another reform that encompassed the 
pensions and health systems obliged workers to pay 7% of their salary to 
finance health. The reform allowed workers to choose between the public 
health system or the newly created Instituciones de Salud Previsional 
(ISAPRES) (Private Institutions of Health Insurance), by deciding where to 
deposit their health contribution. At the end of the day, ISAPRES focused 
their business mainly to high-income individuals, while middle-to-low-
income families remained in the public system (MIDEPLAN, 1996:146).  
 
The military policy approach applied to the housing sector included the 
provision of basic housing ‘solutions’ that were focused on the poor. These 
were public developments of serviced plots of land or basic houses or flats. 
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Besides, a set of housing subsidies was provided to middle-income families. 
Another reform deregulated the use of land in the country, leaving its 
allocation to market forces. Besides, the limits of urban areas were 
abolished. The result was an expansion of big cities as well as the 
development of ghettoes of poor citizens in the outskirts of cities where 
the cost of land was lower and most public basic housing projects were 
allocated (MIDEPLAN, 1996:166-168). 
 
Probably the widest social reform launched by the military was the 
pension’s reform, introduced in 1981. The existing state-controlled pay-as-
you-go system was replaced by an individual capitalization fund system, 
where workers saved part of their wages for retirement. A fixed and 
mandatory contribution for retirement equivalent to 10% of gross wages 
was established. To manage these funds the reform created the privately 
run Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) (Pension Funds 
Administrators). The system allowed individuals to choose the AFP where 
to deposit their savings. The role of the state was limited to oversee the 
system, and to finance the pensions of those workers with insufficient 
savings to cover a minimum pension set by law. Besides, the state 
continued paying the pensions of those individuals that retired under the 
old system. Resources related to this last point plus the funds required to 
finance the minimum pension amounted to a substantial part of the state’s 
total expenditure in social areas, representing near 50% of total public 
social expenditure by 1989 (MIDEPLAN, 1996:206). 
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In addition to these reforms, a group of subsidies directed specifically to 
the poor was created, representing an effort to focus social transfers to 
the least well off. Programmes were means tested monetary transfers 
linked to particular household or individual characteristics such as 
unemployment, number of children, the existence of elders, disabled and 
pregnant women. Municipalities allocated these subsidies at the local level 
by using a standardized national screening instrument to select and target 
beneficiaries, called Ficha CAS (Social Stratification Card) that surveyed 
households to identify their socioeconomic condition.  
 
These subsidies included the Pensiones Asistenciales (PASIS) (Assistance 
Pensions), created in 1975 as a monetary transfer directed to the elderly 
and the disabled living in poverty and who were not receiving a pension. 
The Subsidio Unico Familiar (SUF) (Family Subsidy), was created in 1981 
as a monetary transfer to poor families according to the number of 
children under the age of five living in the household. In addition, the 
military created in 1975 the Programa de Empleo Minimo (PEM) (Minimum 
Employment Programme), to provide basic jobs to the unemployed. Jobs 
provided were low-skill activities, such as streets and parks cleaning. In 
1982, a similar programme was introduced, the Programa de Ocupacion 
para Jefes de Hogar (POJH) (Employment Programmes for Heads of 
Households). These two programmes were emergency employment 
responses to the acute levels of unemployment that existed during periods 
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of economic crisis (1975-76 and 1982-83). For instance, in 1982, amid the 
debt crisis that affected Latin America, the PEM programmes provided jobs 
to 336,000 individuals, equivalent to 9.2 percent of the Chilean labour 
force (Graham, 1994:34). 
 
Graham (1994:52) analyzes these monetary transfers for the poor created 
by the military. She concludes that these instruments had mixed results 
as,  
 
“on the one hand, they provided for the basic needs of 
Chile’s poorest people during a severe economic crisis . . . 
[while] on the other hand . . . those who entered the 
government’s programmes became an underclass of sort, 
since they grew heavily dependent on government 
subsidies”. 
 
During its 16 years in power, the regime reduced social expenditure in per 
capita terms, while as a percentage of GDP it remained almost unchanged 
compared to the levels that existed in 1973 (Graham, 1994:28). This is 
explained by the regime’s principle of reducing the role of the state in the 
economy, which at the end of the day requires reducing or freezing the 
size of the state as a percentage of GDP. Besides, after the 1982 
economic crisis, public expenditure was reduced to balance the fiscal 
budget. This decrease deteriorated public services, particularly, health and 
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education. The long-term effect of this deterioration was a strong 
discontent among the beneficiaries of these systems, mainly poor and 
middle-income families, as well as among workers of these sectors. 
 
In any case, despite all the efforts of the military to reduce the role of the 
state in social policy, by 1989 social policy was still being provided and 
financed mainly by the state. By that date, about 60% of total population 
received health care in the public system and 90% of registered students 
in elementary schools received state subsidies or attended a public school 
(Raczinsky, 2000:126). Hence, despite being in power for sixteen years 
and being able to freely impose its policies (thanks to its non-democratic 
mandate), the military government was unable to completely modify a 
social policy system that had been developing in Chile during most part of 
the 20th century.  
 
As a result, by the end of the military administration in 1989, the social 
policy system prevailing in Chile corresponded to the sum of a welfare 
state universal public system, and of a privately run social system focused 
mainly on the upper-level income groups of the population. The system 
resulted from the accumulation of successive programmes and institutions, 
and their embedded theoretical approaches, developed by different 
governments. 
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4.5 THE CONCERTACION ALLIANCE SOCIAL POLICY APPROACH 
 
4.5.1 The Patricio Aylwin government 
 
With the return of democracy to the country in 1990, the centre-left 
Concertacion Alliance assumed power highlighting the ineludibly 
responsibilities that the state has in a country like Chile.   
 
Contrary to the military view that economic growth was the main tool to 
achieve development and to overcome poverty, the Concertacion Alliance 
viewed growth as a necessary but not sufficient condition for development. 
They considered that the state should have an active role in social policy 
issues. This role was regarded especially important given the deterioration 
of the social scenario during the previous government. The Concertacion 
Alliance summarized this fact by stating that the military policies created a 
‘social debt’ that required being urgently addressed (Calderon, Etchegaray, 
interviews, September 2003). 
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According to the Concertacion Alliance government programme:  
 
“long-lasting social welfare for all society sectors can only be 
secured by a sustained and continuous process of economic 
growth…[while] a stable democracy requires securing 
equality of access to opportunities and to the benefits of 
development” (Concertacion Alliance Government 
Programme, cited in Boeninger, 1998:357). 
 
Hence, the main principle followed by the Patricio Aylwin’s first 
Concertacion Alliance government was to achieve ‘growth with equity’, 
where both economic growth and social equity were considered desirable 
goals for the government. In his first Mensaje a la Nacion (Message to the 
Nation) 24, president Aylwin presented his agenda, which included,  
 
“promoting social justice, correcting the deep inequalities 
and insufficiencies affecting many Chileans [and] stimulating 
economic growth, development and modernization in the 
country” (Boeninger, 1998:388) 25. 
 
In particular, the social policy principles outlined by the Concertacion 
Alliance included that social policy should promote solidarity and equity, 
                                                 
24 Every 21st of May the Chilean president presents an account of last year’s government 
achievements and also announces the plans for the following year.  
25 Other goals in the Aylwin’s government agenda were: achieving truth and justice in 
human rights issues, democratizing institutions, and repositioning Chile in the 
international community (Boeninger, 1998:388). 
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stressing the nation’s responsibility to eradicate social disadvantage; that 
social policy should be integral, meaning that it should act over all the 
areas that may help improve population’s quality of life; that social policy 
should promote participation and self-help approaches, as opposed to the 
non-participatory and paternalistic approach applied by the military; that 
social policy should be efficient, focusing programmes to those individuals 
in the most precarious conditions; and that social policy should promote 
social investment, to help those living in poverty with a potential to self-
develop and achieve social and economic inclusion, rather than providing 
only palliative solutions (Martinez and Palacios, 1996:14). 
 
The Aylwin administration main social policy focus was to recover all social 
areas from the miserable state in which they were put by the previous 
military regime.  Hence, the main focus of the Aylwin administration in the 
social policy area was to obtain and allocate funds to reverse the 
deterioration in the social sectors, mainly health and education, and to 
increase the levels of minimum wages, pensions and the government’s 
monetary transfers, all key variables to the wellbeing of the poorest 
population. 
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Etchegaray (interview, September 2003) comments on the significant 
challenges Aylwin’s government was confronting:  
 
“a rumour was circulating that as soon as Aylwin took office 
as President on March 11th in Valparaiso, violence would 
spread in Santiago as [poor] people would start occupying 
land to build houses. At the beginning of the 1990s,  public 
policy had a lot to do with taking charge of an explosive 
issue with transparent, fair, focused, and participatory public 
policies”.  
 
To finance his governmental programme in a sustainable and responsible 
manner, Aylwin successfully promoted a tax reform. It was approved in 
Congress thanks to an agreement with the centre-right Renovacion 
Nacional (National Renovation) political party. The reform corrected the 
military low-taxe policy by raising the value added tax as well as those 
taxes affecting firms, which by the end of the military administration were 
practically null (Boeninger, 1998:479).  
 
Thanks to the tax reform and to the vigorous economic growth that the 
country experienced, the government collected significant additional funds 
that allowed expanding social expenditure (Table 4.1). This was one of the 
first Concertacion Alliance actions in social policy which aimed to alleviate 
the financially asphyxiated social sectors. For instance, financial 
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augmentation in the health sector reached 77% in real terms between 
1990 and 1995, funds that were directed mainly to finance increases in 
wages of health workers and to boost investments in areas that were 
showing critically low levels by 1990 (MIDEPLAN, 1996:147). The funds 
from the tax reform also allowed the government to raise significantly the 
values of the minimum wage and of the minimum pension. Table 4.1 
shows that the policy of increasing the budgets of the social sectors was a 
constant throughout the 1990s, happening consistently during the three 
Concertacion Alliance governments. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Chile: Real public social expenditure by sector, 1987-2000 
(Base 1990= 100) 
Year Health Housing 
Social  
Security 
Education 
Monetary  
Transfers 
Other* Total 
1987 92.5 80.3 93.1 106.3 111.4 183.6 98.6 
1988 104.2 105.2 95.5 105.5 111.5 141.2 100.9 
1989 104.8 100.1 98.2 104.6 99.2 105.1 100.9 
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1991 117.8 111.4 104.0 113.4 109.1 115.8 109.2 
1992 137.7 124.2 110.3 130.4 111.2 138.9 120.6 
1993 154.3 136.3 119.5 141.6 116.6 169.2 132.2 
1994 170.1 142.7 123.6 154.4 118.8 184.6 140.3 
1995 177.3 149.1 131.1 172.5 128.4 211.5 150.4 
1996 192.6 166.7 141.2 194.8 139.4 239.0 165.0 
1997 204.1 157.8 147.7 214.6 151.6 253.8 174.2 
1998 220.8 162.6 156.6 239.0 172.8 259.4 187.4 
1999 227.6 160.1 172.9 255.6 177.3 323.2 202.0 
2000 246.6 152.9 181.5 277.2 185.8 355.9 214.3 
Source: Own elaboration from Ministerio de Hacienda (2000). 
 
 
 154 
In addition to these increases in social expenditure, Aylwin introduced 
innovations into the education, health, housing and poverty-alleviation 
areas, as well as creating new social policy institutions.  
 
In education, the Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad y Equidad de la 
Educacion (MECE) (Programme for Improving the Quality and Equity of 
Education) was created. It involved a significant amount of resources to 
improve the quality of pre-basic and basic education, to increase the 
coverage of pre-basic education and to improve the ministry of education 
management capacity (Aylwin, 1992:59). A scholarships programme for 
higher education was also introduced. Another innovation in the education 
area was the creation of the P-900 programme, designed to improve the 
quality of the education provided by the 900 schools showing the worst 
educational results. The Estatuto Docente (Teacher’s Law) was ratified, 
establishing a centralized bargaining procedure between teachers and the 
government as well as a common structure of wages for teachers 
(Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein, 2002:289). 
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The condition of the health sector by the end of the military period was 
particularly dramatic. As Eduardo Frei mentioned in one of his discourses, 
 
“we inherited a public health sector that was agonizing in its 
capacity to deliver health services, dismantled in terms of 
human resources, and collapsed in the areas of 
infrastructure and equipments” (Frei, 1998:XV).  
 
To deal with these problems, President Aylwin increased the health budget 
in order to repair infrastructure. Besides, new health personnel was hired, 
their wages increased and the gratuity of some basic health services was 
expanded, including child preventive health check-ups and food 
programmes for low-income families. (Aylwin, 1992:58; MIDEPLAN, 
1996:152). 
 
New programmes were created in the housing sector to reduce the 
allegamiento (sharing houses) problem that affected the poor population, 
and to address the deterioration in the existing stock of houses (Boeninger, 
1998:472). These were the Vivienda Progresiva (Progressive House) 
programme and the Programa para el Mejoramiento y Ampliacion de 
Viviendas (Programme to Improve and Enlarge Houses). These new 
programmes were introduced while keeping unchanged the group of 
housing programmes and subsidies created by the military. Besides, the 
increased budget for housing allowed the Aylwin’s government to provide 
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an annual average of 90,000 houses between 1990 and 1992, doubling 
the average production reached in previous years (Aylwin, 1992:62). 
 
In the poverty-alleviation area, Aylwin introduced the FOSIS programme 
at the beginning of his administration, one of the three programmes 
analyzed in this thesis26 . This programme coexisted with the group of 
monetary transfer to the poor created by the military, whose real value 
was raised significantly thanks to the extra funds that the tax reform 
provided.  
 
Aylwin also created a group of new institutions related to social policy. 
This was the case of the Agencia de Cooperación Internacional (AGCI) 
(Agency for International Cooperation), to obtain and channel funds from 
international cooperation to social policy projects; the Instituto Nacional 
de la Juventud (INJUV) (National Institute for Youngsters), and the 
Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM) (National Service for Women). 
Besides, the existing Oficina de Planificacion (ODEPLAN) (Planning Office) 
was raised to a ministerial status, becoming the Ministerio de Planificacion 
(MIDEPLAN) (Ministry of Planning)27. 
 
4.5.2 The Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle government 
 
                                                 
26
 Programme FOSIS is described in detail in Chapter Three. 
27 A history of MIDEPLAN is presented in the present Chapter. 
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The Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle second Concertacion Alliance government 
that came to power in 1994 continued many of the social policy 
orientations and actions that Aylwin introduced, but clarified that their 
priorities in social policy were the improvement of the educational system 
and the complete eradication of extreme poverty form the country (Frei, 
1996:XXVI, XXXV). 
 
In the area of education, Frei expanded the MECE programme created by 
Aylwin. To the original programme that covered pre-basic and basic 
education, the MECE-Rural programme was added, focusing on benefiting 
schools in rural areas, as well as the MECE-Media, to improve secondary 
education by providing resources for libraries, texts, infrastructure and 
computational resources to schools (Frei, 1997:VIII). More importantly, in 
1996 Frei presented his reform of education, comprising a group of 
educational innovations. It included the following elements: a significant 
increase in resources, focusing on investing in infrastructure and providing 
studying materials; a curricular change, to actualize the content and 
educational approach of primary and secondary education; an 
improvement in teacher’s working conditions and training opportunities, 
including an increase in wages for those teachers at the bottom of the 
salary scale; and an increase in the length of the school day, from half day 
to a full day of schooling (Frei, 1999:XVIII-XXII).  
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In health, Frei started implementing in 1996 the Plan de Reforma del 
Sector Público de Salud (Reform Plan for the Public Health Sector), to 
respond to the demographic, social and epidemiological changes that the 
population was showing. The reform was directed to improve the quality 
of health services and to reduce waiting lists in hospitals by improving 
management and by decentralizing decisions (Frei, 1996:XXVIII, XXXIII). 
Health infrastructure and equipments were also improved. 
 
In housing, the Frei administration continued expanding the number of 
houses publicly produced or subsidized, arriving to an average of 128,000 
houses produced yearly (Frei, 1997:XVII). In addition, the size of basic 
houses was increased, from 38 to 42 squared meters. 
 
In the poverty-alleviation arena, Frei introduced the ambitious Plan 
Nacional de Superación de la Pobreza (National Plan to Overcome Poverty) 
at the beginning of his administration. Frei described the goals of this 
programme as,  
 
“to achieve an integral action of the public sector, 
incorporating the private sector into this duty; to target 
actions towards the most lagged areas and needed 
individuals; and to secure the effective participation of 
affected individuals” (Frei, 1995:XVII).  
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This was a short lived programme, a situation that is described and 
explained in more detail in Chapter Five.  
 
In line with Aylwin’s poverty-alleviation approach, Frei continued to 
support the existing monetary transfers to the poor, but introducing a few 
changes. In particular, the SUF monetary transfer was expanded to 
benefit youngsters between 15 and 18 years old from poor families, 
conditional to their attending school. 
 
Perhaps the most significant innovation introduced by Frei into the area of 
poverty was the Chile Barrio (Chile Neighbourhood) programme, one of 
the three cases studied in this thesis. The programme’s goal was to 
improve the life conditions of the inhabitants of the 972 campamentos 
(shantytowns) that existed in Chile by 1996. Chapter Three describes this 
programme. 
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4.5.3 The Ricardo Lagos government 
 
The third Concertacion Alliance administration was elected in 2000 with  
Ricardo Lagos taking power. In his first message to the nation, he defined 
his government as el gobierno de las reformas (the government of 
reforms) (Lagos, 2000:4), stating that his aim was to introduce reforms 
into social, political, economic and cultural policies. In the social area, his 
focus was to bring about deep reform in the health system (Lagos, 
2000:14). 
 
The reform of the health system materialized in the AUGE programme, 
aimed to establish universal access to health treatments for a group of 
illnesses with high prevalence among the population. In Lagos’s words,  
 
“we aspire to an efficient and fair [health] system, in such a 
way that nobody requiring health assistance will not receive 
it, and carried out with the dignity that every human being 
deserves” (Lagos, 2001:13).  
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One year later he added that,  
 
“for the government, health is a right of all persons and to secure 
this right it is not enough just to declare it but to establish explicit 
guarantees related to the access, opportunity, quality and 
financial protection” (Lagos, 2002:25).  
 
For the group of illnesses covered, the programme defined the type of 
treatments as well as the maximum waiting time, in order to guarantee 
minimum quality standards. All individuals, regardless of their economic 
condition and health system had the right to receive these treatments. 
Since 2002, when it started operating, the AUGE programme continuously 
expanded the number of pathologies with guaranteed treatment, from 3 in 
2002 to 25 in 2005. The goal was to cover progressively the 56 
pathologies most prevalent in Chilean population.  
 
In the area of education, Lagos deepened the reform that Frei started. He 
continued expanding the full day of schooling. He also increased the 
coverage of pre-school education and facilitated the access to higher 
education by creating and expanding scholarships and loans. Besides, in 
2003 the Lagos administration made secondary education mandatory and 
free for all Chileans bellow 21 years old. The goal was to ensure that all 
Chilean students had a minimum of 12 years of education. 
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In housing, Lagos created a new programmed directed to the poorest 
population called Vivienda Social Dinámica sin Deuda (Social Dynamic 
House Without Debt). The programme provided a modest housing solution 
designed to be enlarged easily, which required a reduced level of savings 
from beneficiaries and did not involve a mortgage (Lagos, 2001:18).  
 
In the poverty-alleviation area the most important innovation of the Lagos’ 
government was the Chile Solidario (Chile Solidarity) programme, 
introduced in 2002. As explained in Chapter Three, the programme was 
directed to the extremely poor population, providing an innovative 
approach to address their problems. For instance, it established a contract 
between a representative of the programme and the beneficiary family, to 
secure that the benefits that the programme provides (a monetary 
transfer and a special status to access social services) were matched with 
actions that the family must accomplish to overcome its poverty condition. 
This element tried to stimulate beneficiaries’ pro-activity to solve their 
problems. By 2003, the programme had incorporated 55,000 families of 
the 220,000 that were living in extreme poverty in Chile, according to the 
2000 CASEN socio-economic survey (Lagos, 2003).  
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Besides, in the poverty alleviation area, Lagos continued strengthening the 
Chile Barrio programme, created by Frei, to fulfill the goal of benefiting all 
shantytowns in the country (Lagos, 2001:19)28.  
 
Finally, regarding social security, all the three Concertacion Alliance 
governments maintained, almost unchanged, the pensions system 
inherited from the military (Acuña and Iglesias, 2001:451). Some minor 
corrections were introduced to increase the transparency of the pensions 
system, to increase its coverage among the working population, to reduce 
the costs of the system and to increase the investment alternatives of the 
AFP (MIDEPLAN, 1996:208). 
 
4.6 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MINISTRY OF PLANNING 
(MIDEPLAN)  
 
As already mentioned, immediately after arriving to power the Aylwin’s 
first Concertacion Alliance government created MIDEPLAN, a ministry with 
the specific duty of coordinating the efforts to alleviate poverty in the 
country (Ministerio del Interior, 1990). However, as Chapter Five will show, 
MIDEPLAN never played a central role in the policy making process of any 
of the poverty-alleviation programmes studied. In particular, Chapter Five 
will demonstrate that the Chile Barrio process was conducted by the 
                                                 
28 By 2003, the Chile Barrio programme had covered near half of the 972 shantytowns 
that existed in Chile by 1996 (Lagos, 2003). 
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Ministry of Housing, while the Chile Solidario process was carried out by 
the Ministry of Finance. The FOSIS policy-making process constitutes a 
special case as it was carried out before the arrival of the first 
Concertacion government  by a group of experts preparing the first 
Concertacion Alliance government programme. Hence, the aim of the 
present section is to explain this institutional failure by revising the history 
and evolution of MIDEPLAN. 
 
The origin of MIDEPLAN goes back to 1967 when the Oficina de 
Planificacion Nacional (ODEPLAN) (National Planning Office) was created 
under the Christian Democrat Frei-Montalva government. The creation of 
ODEPLAN reflected Frei Montalva’s emphasis on improving social 
development in the country through a process of Revolucion en Libertad 
(Revolution in Freedom), trying to achieve economic progress and higher 
levels of social equity while avoiding generating conflicts and 
confrontations in the country. ODEPLAN advised the president on issues 
such as planning the development process of the country, projecting 
economic and social development in the medium and long terms and 
helping with the preparation of a Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (National 
Plan for Development).  
 
Between 1973 and 1989 under the military regime, ODEPLAN played a 
very significant role inside government, particularly in terms of the social 
policy approach applied by the military. Thanks to its direct dependency to 
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the president, ODEPLAN became a powerful government institution with a 
political weight well above that of most ministries.  
 
Besides, the post of head of the office was occupied by a series of highly 
influential economists trained at the University of Chicago, the so-called 
‘Chicago boys’ (Valdes, 1995; Boeninger, 1998). Among these economists, 
Miguel Kast played an influential role in the social policy approach applied 
by the military government. When assuming as head of ODEPLAN in 1978, 
he introduced a pro-poor emphasis in the neo-liberal socio-economic 
approach of the military, promoting the targeting of social transfers 
towards the least well off. Besides, he pursued the goal of achieving 
efficiency in social policy by creating instruments to evaluate and allocate 
social transfers. As part of this strategy, he introduced the idea of 
providing demand subsidies and social transfers to arrive directly to the 
more needed. This proposal translated in the creation of housing and 
education subsidies, as well as a set of monetary transfers to the poor 
(Matte, 2003).  
 
Significant elements of this policy approach remained under the 
Concertacion Alliance governments, particularly the set of social transfers 
and subsidies directed to the poor, and the principle that economic growth 
and the eradication of poverty are complementary goals.  Hence, during 
the Kast era, ODEPLAN was a key actor in the development of the social 
policy approach applied by the military regime. 
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In 1990, with the arrival of democracy, the Concertacion Alliance decided 
to transform ODEPLAN into the Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperacion 
(MIDEPLAN) (Ministry of Planning and Cooperation), to raise its status to a 
ministerial one. According to the law that created it, main duties of the 
ministry included to assist the president in the design and implementation 
of policies and programmes for national development and to coordinate 
the different public initiatives aimed to eradicate poverty (Molina, 
2003:12). Besides, MIDEPLAN was also given the responsibility of 
overseeing a series of newly created institutions, linked to new target 
groups of the government. These institutions included the Fondo de 
Solidaridad e Inversion Social (FOSIS) (Solidarity and Social Investment 
Fund), the Agencia de Cooperacion Internacional (AGCI) (International 
Cooperation Agency), the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM) 
(National Women’s Service), the Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (INJ) 
(National Institute for Youngsters), the Corporacion Nacional de Desarrollo 
Indigena (CONADIS) (National Corporation for Indigenous Development), 
and the Fondo Nacional de la Discapacidad (FONADIS) (National Fund for 
the Disabled). According to some experts, this new responsibility 
overstretched MIDEPLAN’s duties thus limiting its capacity to coordinate 
social policy (Molina, 2003:13). 
 
In 1994 under the Frei administration, a Comite Interministerial Social 
(CIS) (Inter-Ministerial Social Committee) was created to coordinate the 
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efforts to address poverty, implicitly substituting MIDEPLAN in this role.  It 
has been argued that the creation of the CIS responded to the perception 
of the Frei administration that MIDEPLAN was not fulfilling its duty of 
coordinating poverty-alleviation programmes (Hardy, 2001:10). Hardy 
explains this failure from a series of factors, including the historic weight 
and autonomy of traditional social ministries such as health, education, 
housing and labour, making them hard to coordinate. In addition, the 
overwhelming powers of the Ministry of Finance to influence other 
ministries’ duties through its budgetary command leaved MIDEPLAN as a 
secondary coordinating actor. In any case, after just two years of work, 
the CIS became integrated by lower ranking government officials, 
reflecting president Frei’s disappointment with the results obtained (Molina, 
2003:15).  
 
Near the end of his mandate, President Frei announced his decision of 
closing MIDEPLAN, due to his discontent with the whole idea of trying to 
overcome poverty by having a social authority to coordinate social efforts 
(Molina, 2003:15). Concurring with Hardy’s view, Molina concludes that 
while MIDEPLAN was clearly committed to fulfil its function of coordinating 
poverty-alleviation programmes, it lacked the political power and 
instruments required to achieve this goal. In his words,  
 
“the ministers that MIDEPLAN’s minister was trying to coordinate 
didn’t saw any direct advantage of this exercise for their 
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particular ministerial duties. On the contrary, they perceived that 
this coordination was limiting their powers and pressuring their 
already overcharged agendas” (Molina, 2003:19). 
 
Molina, who occupied the post of MIDEPLAN’s minister under the Aylwin 
presidency, recognizes that the Chilean government lacks a social 
authority with the influence and resources required to design, evaluate 
and coordinate social policies, as well as a proper social development plan. 
He concludes that the Chilean government requires a social authority to 
improve the integration and coordination of social policies, particularly in 
the area of poverty alleviation (Molina, 2003:20).   
 
Hardy (2001) underlines that the creation of this type of social authority 
requires a decisive political support, given the resistances that this 
decision is likely to produce, specially among the institutions that 
nowadays concentrate a great deal of power inside the government, such 
as the ministry of finance and its related budget office. According to her 
view, any institution aimed to coordinate the efforts to improve social 
equity and to alleviate poverty will encounter the resistance of traditional 
social ministries already controlling significant resources. This is 
particularly the case for the ministry of finance, given its dominant 
position as economic authority inside government, and its budgetary 
control that allow it to define the priorities and orientations of the different 
social policy ministries (Hardy, 2001:9). 
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Under the Ricardo Lagos third Concertacion Alliance government, 
MIDEPLAN was given the significant duty of managing the newly created 
Chile Solidario programme. The law creating Chile Solidario assigned 
MIDEPLAN the duties of administrating, coordinating, supervising and 
evaluating the programme.. The relevance that the Lagos government 
gave to the Chile Solidario programme produced a significant change in 
MIDEPLAN’s status inside government. Chile Solidario was one of the star 
social programmes of the Lagos administration, receiving significant 
political and financial support from the government. In this sense, it may 
be argued that the Chile Solidario programme contributed to ‘resurrect’ a 
ministry that was showing a very low profile inside government during the 
Frei administration. It is worth noticing that improving MIDEPLAN’s 
position inside government was one of the goals of the creators of the 
Chile Solidario programme (Crispi, interview, September 2002). They 
considered that giving MIDEPLAN the role of managing Chile Solidario 
would help this institution to re-position itself inside government.  
 
In synthesis, as an office depending directly to the president, MIDEPLAN 
reached a powerful status during the military regime, in term of its ability 
to influence social policy. Later, in an attempt to raise its position inside 
government, the Concertacion Alliance gave MIDEPLAN a ministerial status. 
Hand in hand with this new status came the ambitious goal of 
coordinating all the government efforts to alleviate poverty in the country. 
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Experts agree that MIDEPLAN was unable to fulfil this goal, mainly as a 
result of the institutional rigidities inside the Chilean government. Hence, a 
feeling of failure developed among the political community in relation to 
MIDEPLAN’s performance, to a point in which even the existence of the 
ministry was questioned. Later, under the third Concertacion Alliance 
government, MIDEPLAN repositioned itself as the managing institution of 
the promising new Chile Solidario poverty-alleviation programme, thus 
improving its damaged image inside government. However, MIDEPLAN’s 
original social authority role as well as its duty of coordinating all the 
government’s poverty-alleviation efforts is part of the Chilean government 
pending agenda. 
 
4.7 THE CASEN SURVEY: A KEY INSTRUMENT IN THE CHILEAN 
POVERTY-ALLEVIATION POLICY 
 
Chapter Five will show that the CASEN survey played a significant role in 
the policy-making process of the three poverty-alleviation programmes 
under study by prompting governmental authorities to address the 
problem of poverty. Given this relevance, the circumstances under which 
the CASEN survey was created as well as its evolution are presented here. 
 
Before 1987, the exact dimension and characteristics of poverty in Chile 
were only partially known, due to the lack of suitable socio-economic 
surveys in the country. In effect, reliable statistics about the level and 
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characteristics of poverty in Chile were very scarce. At the national level, 
the only data allowing an approximation to the problem were the national 
census of population and housing, applied each ten years. With these 
data, independent experts constructed the Mapas de la Extrema Pobreza 
(Extreme Poverty Maps) (Katz and Molina, 1975; Mujica and Rojas, 1986). 
However, these data had the problem of being available only each ten 
years when the census was applied, as well as the limitation of allowing 
estimating poverty only from the housing conditions of the population, 
thus providing a partial vision of the problem. 
 
This situation changed radically with the creation of the CASEN survey. As 
a well-designed socio-economic survey, it allowed measuring and 
characterizing poverty in the country, leading to a better understanding 
and to greater visibility of this phenomenon.  
 
The CASEN was created in 1985 by the military regime to focus social 
transfers and benefits towards the least well-off population. Interestingly, 
measuring poverty was not in the minds of the military when they created 
the CASEN. Instead, they were looking for an instrument to target and 
monitor social expenditure, a consequence of the social policy approach 
applied by the military. In this approach, the state committed to help only 
those individuals at the bottom of the income scale, making necessary to 
continually verify the targeting level of social transfers.  
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The need to monitor social expenditure was also related to the military 
policy of de-centralizing the allocation of social programmes and benefits 
at the Municipality level. In effect, under the regime, municipalities 
assumed the implementation of primary health and school education as 
well as the allocation of a group of social transfers directed to the poor 
and unemployed. To target these transfers, Municipalities employed a 
socio-economic stratification survey, called the Ficha CAS, created in 1980. 
Each municipality applied the CAS to those families asking for social 
benefits. The CAS collected data related to the housing and demographic 
characteristics of the family, from which a score was constructed giving 
the highest score to the most deprived families. 
 
Hence, while each Municipality was focusing social benefits towards the 
poorest families, no information was available at the central governmental 
level about the targeting level of social expenditure at the national level. 
Besides, the fact that the CAS was not applied to all the country’s 
population but only to the beneficiaries of transfers prevented the use of 
CAS statistics to evaluate the targeting of social expenditure among all the 
population. 
 
The economic recession that affected the country in 1982 further 
increased the need to target social expenditures towards the poorest 
groups. The crisis tensioned the regime’s safety net system as 
unemployment and poverty reached unprecedented levels. In addition, the 
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need to generate fiscal surpluses to pay the inflated foreign debt led 
economic authorities to reduce or freeze social budgets, limiting the 
supply of social transfers. Hence, after the recession it became imperative 
to secure the targeting of social expenditure, allocating the increasingly 
scare resources only to those individuals in the worst conditions. 
 
As a result, in 1985 officials at the Oficina de Planificacion Nacional 
(ODEPLAN) (National Planning Office), in charge of overseeing social 
policy in the country together with experts from the Universidad de Chile 
(University of Chile) designed and applied the first CASEN survey to asses 
the targeting level of social expenditures29 . Results of this first survey 
were published in 1986 (Haindl and Weber, 1986). The CASEN was 
applied again in 1987, with the same aim of measuring the targeting level 
of social expenditures (Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval, 1988). 
 
While the military regime omitted the estimation of poverty incidence in its 
analysis of the CASEN, independent experts obtained the 1985 database 
and estimated the incidence of poverty in the country. They found that 45% 
of total population was poor in 1985 (Torche, 1987). This dramatic figure 
was highly relevant in the heated political discussions that surrounded the 
1988 ‘yes-no’ referendum to decide about the continuation of Pinochet in 
                                                 
29 The original survey design has remained mostly unchanged in subsequent versions of 
the survey. In general terms, the survey uses a probabilistic sampling method to 
represent the entire population of the country. It identifies all types of incomes that 
households receive, including the value of all state transfers. Additionally, the survey 
identifies the demographic, health, education, housing, and employment characteristics 
of households’ members.  For a detailed description of the survey (in Spanish) see: 
www.mideplan.cl  
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power for another ten years 30 . Besides, it supported the social equity 
concerns of the Concertacion Alliance and questioned the degree in which 
the military socio-economic policy was benefiting the least well-off 
population. 
 
With the arrival of the Concertacion Alliance in 1990, the focus of 
attention of the CASEN survey shifted markedly towards measuring and 
characterizing poverty. The Alliance introduced a new socio-economic 
approach, aiming to continue stimulating economic growth but at the 
same time pursuing more social justice and equity. Given the extension of 
the problem, alleviation poverty was considered a fundamental goal of this 
new approach. As a result, from its original emphasis on monitoring the 
targeting level of social expenditures the CASEN focus was shifted to 
measuring the levels of poverty and extreme poverty in the country, as 
well as to identify the main characteristics of these groups.  
 
The Concertacion Alliance decided to apply the CASEN survey each two 
years31 to obtain a clear view of the evolution of poverty and extreme 
poverty, thus applying it in 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003 and 
2006. Numerous publications measuring and characterizing poverty were 
produced by MIDEPLAN during the 1990s. The degree of targeting of 
social expenditure was also analyzed but without the high emphasis that 
the military gave to this issue. 
                                                 
30 See Chapter Five. 
31 Each three years, after 2000. 
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The design and implementation of all the CASEN surveys has been carried 
out by a group of government and non-government institutions following 
technical criteria, thus lowering the chance of any political utilization of the 
survey. The process has been managed by MIDEPLAN and includes the 
participation of national and international experts from government, 
academic and international institutions (Gatica, Irarrazaval, Oyarzun, 
interviews September 2003). Thanks to its indisputable technical character, 
the CASEN presents a high level of legitimacy both inside and outside the 
country. 
 
In summary, during its almost twenty years of existence the CASEN 
survey has been a key instrument to dimension and characterize the 
problem of poverty in Chile. It is interesting to note that measuring 
poverty was not the original objective of the survey as only with the 
arrival of the Concertacion Alliance, with its emphasis on improving social 
equity, the focus shifted towards this aim. The need to develop a 
technically solid instrument translated into the development of a 
partnership between government agencies and academic and specialized 
institutions to design and apply the CASEN. This technical character has 
contributed to the high levels of credibility and validity that the CASEN has 
enjoyed.
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4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Chilean social policy system originated in the 1920s and consolidated 
during the 1960s. Its origin and evolution during this phase has been 
explained by the reaction of different governments to the pressure of 
organized workers. A redistributive focus that included the poor appeared 
for the first time in Chilean social policy by the mid 60s and intensified by 
the beginning of the 1970s, with the arrival to power of centre and left 
wing governments. 
 
The increasing relevance of the public sector in social policy was put to an 
end in 1973 with the non-democratic arrival to power of the military. 
During its 16 years in power, the military tried to reduce the influence of 
the state in social policy, while stimulating the participation of private 
actors and market forces in this sector. The available literature 
demonstrates that these efforts were only partially successful, as the 
majority of Chilean population, mostly middle-to-low income families, 
continued to depend on the social services and programmes provided by 
the state. This result sustains the view that in the case of Chile, social 
policy programmes and institutions tend to transcend governments, 
despite the particular ideological views of each administration. It is likely 
that pre-existing programmes limit and condition government’s room for 
manoeuvre to modify the system, in a similar way to what has been 
defined as the environment where the policy process evolves. 
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The scenario under the Concertacion Alliance series of three democratic 
governments that followed the military regime also confirms the existence 
of this conditioning environment. During the 1990s, the Concertacion 
Alliance introduced a group of social policy reforms to correct the 
problems that the system was showing, mainly by strengthening the role 
of the public sector in social policy. This was made while maintaining 
almost unchanged the core of the social policy reforms introduced by the 
military. In effect, the health and education reforms were built upon the 
existing systems rather than departing completely from them. These two 
reforms were long lasting processes, which spanned more than one 
government and that involved significant discussions in Congress32. 
 
In the word of Dante Contreras (interview, December 2006), a Chilean 
social policy and economics expert: 
  
“policies that targeted [social] expenditure [toward the poor] 
did not differ from those implemented by the military 
government, the techniques were the same. What they did 
was provide more resources to existing programmes and 
also create new programmes, but all these new programmes 
employed the same targeting strategy”. 
 
                                                 
32 See Chapter Seven. 
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The chapter showed that the three poverty alleviation programmes whose 
policy-making process is analysed in this thesis were particular cases of 
the wider social policy agenda of the Concertacion Alliance. They were 
created at the same time when the health and education reform were 
introduced, as well as when other innovations were implemented in the 
housing area. 
 
It is important to note that these three programmes co-existed with the 
poverty-alleviation programmes introduced by the military regime. This is 
the case of monetary transfers directed to the poor, such as the SUF and 
PASIS transfers. In this sense, the poverty-alleviation area resembles what 
happened in other social policy sectors as the innovations introduced were 
built upon the prevailing system. 
 
As explained in this Chapter, the Allende government tried to benefit the 
most vulnerable segments of the population by creating a socialist state in 
the country. It may be stated that by pursuing this goal, Allende was 
trying to address the fundamentals of social inequality in Chile by 
modifying the distribution of income. It was also explained that the 
Pinochet regime reversed all Allende´s policies in this area.  
 
With the return of democracy, the Concertacion Alliance highlighted the 
goal of overcomming poverty in its agenda, an issue that may be viewed 
as less controvertial than the ones addressed by Allende. 
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Some authors contend that governments may prefer to put forward 
politically non-controversial rather than contentious policies, as different 
patterns of costs and benefits are obtained depending on the type of 
policy pursued (Kaufman and Nelson, 2004). In particular, policies may 
vary according to the extent, speed and transparency of benefits to users; 
the costs imposed on vested sector interests and the perceived financial 
and other costs or benefits for agencies and interests outside the sector, 
including ministries of finance and political parties or leaders (Kaufman 
and Nelson, 2004: 477). 
 
Hence, It is possible that Concertacion Alliance politicians decided to 
address poverty as it was a goal shared by all sectors of the country, thus 
representing a non-controversial way of addressing the huge social 
problems that the country was confronting at that time33.  Furthermore, as 
Chapter Seven will explain, Concertación Alliance politicians considered 
that the return to democracy was at risk given the reluctance of the 
military to release power and the potential eruption of repressed popular 
movements that risked destabilizing the fragile democracy. In any case, 
and as the present Chapter explained, during the 1980s and 1990s 
poverty was a severe problem in the country, which on its own justifies 
the emphasis that the Concertacion Alliance gave to this issue in its 
agenda.  
                                                 
33 See: Chapter Seven, section 7.1.3. 
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Chapter Five 
Mapping the policy-making process of 
Chilean poverty-alleviation programmes 
 
 
“The way policy-making happens is less than ideal. Sometimes political 
timeframes force you. There are technical and political views that often do 
not coincide; but anyway, looking backwards I am reasonably satisfied” 
(Crispi, interview, September 2002, speaking about the Chile Solidario 
policy-making process) 
 
 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter addresses the first aim of the thesis, i.e. to map the policy-
making process of Chilean poverty-alleviation programmes. Answers are 
provided to the related research questions: what are the main events 
influencing these processes? And, who are the main actors involved? 
Hence, the chapter is fundamentally descriptive leaving the explanation of 
the processes to Chapters 6 and 7 that address the second aim of the 
thesis. 
 
This first aim has been justified by the lack of information about this topic. 
It has been highlighted that there is no literature which addresses the 
Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process and that only a few 
recent studies dealing with the policy-making process in Latin America are 
available (particularly Grindle, 2002 and IADB, 2006).   
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In what follows, narratives of the three cases under study are presented in 
a chronological order, starting with programme FOSIS, then programme 
Chile Barrio and finally programme Chile Solidario 34 . Narratives are 
supported by contextual considerations that help understand why events 
unfolded in a particular manner.  
 
To structure, order and present in a comprehensive way the ‘network of 
events’ that constitute each case, the scheme proposed by Barzelay (2001) 
is employed. This scheme has been applied by Barzelay et al (2003) to 
analyse policy change in Latin American countries, by Corbett (2002) to 
study the European higher education policy process and by 
Sigurgeirsdottir (2005) to study health policy in Iceland and the UK. 
 
The scheme constitutes a ‘narrative structure’ that arranges case events 
according to their causal direction and to their temporal sequence. Figure 
5.0 presents the basic scheme. In general terms, it identifies a main 
‘episode’ that is being analyzed and the events influencing it. The ‘episode’ 
is defined as the “set of events directly and intimately related to the 
process of substantive and analytic interest” (Barzelay et al, 2003:24). 
Therefore, in the present research an ‘episode’ corresponds to the group 
of events more directly linked to the policy-making process of a particular 
poverty-alleviation programme. 
 
                                                 
34 See Chapter Three: Figure 3.0. 
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Figure 5.0 
Narrative structure 
 
  Source: Barzelay et al (2003).  
 
 
As mentioned, events are separated according to their occurrence in time. 
Specifically, they are defined as prior and later events if they occur before 
or after the episode, respectively. Besides, events concurrent to the 
episode are defined as contemporaneous events if they affect the episode 
or as related events if they are affected by the episode (Barzelay et al, 
2003:24).  
 
At the beginning of each narration, a figure with the narrative scheme is 
presented. In this figure each event is coded to facilitate linking it to the 
narration as well as to support the explanation of the processes that is 
accomplished in Chapter Six. Codes indicate the programme to which each 
event is related (FO for FOSIS, CB for Chile Barrio and CS for Chile 
Solidario) and the type of event according to the narrative structure 
already described (PE for Prior Event, CE for Contemporaneous Event, EE 
Prior 
events 
(PE)
Contemporaneous 
events (CE)
The Episode (EE)
Related events (RE)
Later 
events 
(LE)
Time
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for an Episodic Event, RE for Related Event, and LE for Later Event). For 
instance, FO-EE2 corresponds to the second episodic event of the FOSIS 
programme. 
 
To construct this chapter, most information was obtained from interviews 
that were carried out in three different periods of fieldworks in Chile35. 
Interviewees were selected according to their knowledge of the policy-
making processes under study. The majority of them were public servants 
occupying different posts inside the Chilean governments during the years 
in which the policy-making processes occurred. In addition, a number of 
relevant independent social policy experts and NGOs representatives were 
also interviewed36.  
 
 
                                                 
35
 See Appendix 4. 
36 See Appendix 5.  
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5.1 FOSIS PROGRAMME POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
 
 
Figure 5.1 
FOSIS policy-making process 
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5.1.1 An economic recession affected Chile in 1982 (FO-PE1) 
 
The 1980s has been labelled as a lost decade in Chile, as many social and 
economic dimensions showed no improvement during this period. This 
resulted mainly from a deep economic recession that affected the country 
in 1982-1983, linked to the debt crisis that struck the world in 1981. In 
1982-1983 the country’s GDP declined by 17.2%, unemployment reached 
an unprecedented 26.4%, and real wages dropped by 10.9% (Boeninger, 
1998:293).  
 
Policies applied by the military to adjust and balance the economy also 
contributed to the deterioration of the county’s socio-economic condition. 
In 1985 the government started applying a package of economic policies 
designed to confront the crisis, including strong fiscal adjustment 
measures where social budgets and real wages were cut or fixed in real 
terms. The package was successful in balancing the economy and 
recovering economic growth but at a high social cost in terms of 
unemployment, poverty levels, and real wages. 
 
5.1.2 Poverty incidence increased to unprecedented levels in 
Chile during the second half of the 1980s (FO-PE2) 
 
A study carried out by experts representing centre-right views showed 
that by 1987, poverty incidence in Chile reached 45% of the population, 
equivalent to near 5 million individuals (Torche, 1987). This poverty level 
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was entirely un-anticipated and well above all available historic poverty 
figures 37.  
 
As a result of the deteriorating socioeconomic scenario in the country, 
public opinion about the policy approach applied by the military 
government worsened sharply, a fact that contributed to the Concertacion 
Alliance victory in the 1989 elections. 
 
5.1.3 Social funds were created in Latin America during the 
1980s to address the social costs of recessions (FO-PE3) 
  
During the 1980s, some Latin American countries, particularly Bolivia and 
Guatemala, created social funds to address the social costs generated by 
the debt crisis that affected the region and by the stringent adjustment 
policies that international financial institutions were promoting in debtor 
countries. The most dramatic costs of this scenario were acute levels of 
unemployment and poverty. Social funds were created to address these 
issues while bypassing traditional state institutions, such as ministries, to 
avoid the corruption and financial leakages that pervaded many Latin 
American governments (Fernandez, Flaño, interviews, August 2003).  
                                                 
37 Up to 1987 poverty data was scarce in Chile, and methodologies applied to measure it 
were hardly comparable. In 1987 the military government created the Encuesta de 
Caracterizacion Socio-Economica Nacional (CASEN) (National Socio-Economic Survey), to 
assess the degree of targeting of social policy by measuring the distribution of social 
expenditure among population with different income levels. These data, while not 
originally designed to measure poverty, provided all the information required to 
determine the levels of poverty in the country. The Concertacion Alliance continued 
applying the CASEN surveys each two years. See Appendix 3. 
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In Nicolas Flaño’s words (interview, August 2003): 
 
“[Social Funds] were created as non-institutional responses, 
separate from traditional social ministries . . .  not designed 
to attack the structural causes of poverty but rather to 
alleviate emergency situations . . . they are a direct, non-
bureaucratic way of reaching people, with flexibility in 
program implementation, etc.” 
 
International organisations supported and promoted the development of 
social funds in Latin America. In particular, the World Bank viewed them 
as agile and flexible tools to channel external funds to this region while 
having reasonable control over the final use of the funds. The United 
Nations’ Programa de Empleo para America Latina y el Caribe (PREALC)  
(Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean) was also 
involved in the design and implementation of social funds in the region. 
Clearly, Latin America was in desperate need for help to alleviate the 
social cost originating from the crisis and the related fiscal adjustment 
policies that the World Bank itself was promoting (Flaño, interview, August 
2003). 
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5.1.4 Chilean experts (Garcia and Flaño) contributed to the 
creation of social funds in Latin America (FO-PE4) 
 
During the 1980s, two Chilean experts linked to the Concertacion Alliance 
participated in the creation and implementation of the Bolivian and 
Guatemalan social funds. One was Alvaro Garcia, a young economist 
member of the Socialist party that was working for PREALC. Garcia 
participated in the development of the Bolivian social fund that was 
created in 1986. This was a pro-labour social fund, which responded to 
the Bolivian economic crisis of the 1980s (Garcia, interview, September 
2003). The other Chilean expert was Nicolas Flaño, member of the 
Christian-Democrat party and also working at PREALC. He participated in 
1986 and 1987 in the development of the Bolivian social fund and 
between 1987 and 1989 in the implementation of the Guatemalan social 
fund. This fund was initially conceived as a small programme to finance 
productive projects becoming later a full-scale social fund (Flaño, interview, 
August 2003). Hence, these two experts obtained first-hand knowledge of 
social funds and their design and implementation processes. 
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5.1.5 Chile returned to democracy and the Concertacion Alliance 
assumed power (FO-CE1) 
 
1989 saw the culmination of a series of events that led to the arrival of 
democracy in Chile thus preventing general Pinochet’s ambition of 
continuing in power for another ten years. It has been argued that the 
economic crisis that affected the country in 1982-1983 was the first 
element in this chain of events (Boeninger, 1998:298). The crisis created 
social unrest and allowed the opposition to put forward the idea that only 
under democracy all citizens will achieve a better life.  
 
It may be argued that the struggle against the military government helped 
opposition parties with different ideological postures to unite and establish 
a consensual approach to recover democracy in the country. A process of 
agreement started to develop among the political opposition during the 
1980s, led by the Christian-Democrat and the Socialist parties. They were 
following a peaceful and negotiated road to arrive to democracy, 
distancing from the more confrontational approach of the Communist 
party. Both parties united in base organisations such as labour and 
professional unions to respond to the repression of civil organisations by 
the military (Boeninger, 1998:299).  
 
In 1988, Pinochet put forward a ‘yes-no’ referendum to decide on his 
continuation in power for another ten years (the yes option), or to go for 
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democratic elections in 1989. Under these circumstances the opposition to 
the regime developed a political agreement aimed at free elections (the no 
option) called the Concertacion de Partidos por el No (Agreement of 
parties for the No), where the Christian-Democrat and Socialist parties 
joined forces. The spokesperson of this group of parties was Patricio 
Aylwin, by that time president of the Christian-Democrat Party. After a 
very dramatic day of referendum, with the ghost of a possible fraud in the 
minds of the opposition, the military government recognized the victory of 
the ‘no’ option, with 54.7% of total preferences.  
 
The victory of the ‘no’ cleared the way to free presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 1989. It also encouraged opposition politicians 
to view the return of democracy as a likely outcome. Soon after the 
victory of the ‘no’, the Concertacion de Partidos por el No decided to 
change its name to the Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia 
(Agreement of Parties for Democracy) (from now on the Concertacion 
Alliance) to create a political base for the upcoming presidential campaign 
and the future democratic government. The Concertacion Alliance decided 
to present a single candidate for the future elections and Patricio Aylwin 
emerged as the natural choice, given the authority and leadership that he 
displayed as spokesperson of the Alliance.  
 
On December 14th 1989, Patricio Aylwin won the presidential elections 
with 55.2% of all votes and in March 11th, 1990 he entered La Moneda, 
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the Chilean presidential palace, as the new democratically elected 
president. 
 
5.1.6 An equity-enhancing socio-economic approach was 
introduced by the Concertacion Alliance (FO-EE1) 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Concertacion Alliance considered that 
the state should have an active role in social policy, contrary to the 
military opinion of minimizing the participation of the state in the economy 
and in the social sectors.  
 
This Concertacion approach was named ‘growth with equity’, to highlight 
that the new democratic government was interested in pursuing both 
economic growth and social equity in the country. Social equity required 
necessarily improving the life conditions of the least well-off population, 
particularly the unemployed, the extremely poor and the poor. 
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The opinions of two Concertación Alliance social policy experts illustrate 
this point: 
 
“the idea was to confront the problems inherited from the 
military government in terms of poverty and the deficits in 
education, housing, health, etc. that were generated by the 
policy of (social expenditure) adjustment” (Flaño, interview, 
August 2003). 
 
“my impression is that [the Concertacion Alliance] realized 
that the policy tools applied during the military government 
did not address all the problems faced by the extremely 
poor, nor did they fit the new approach the Concertacion 
Alliance wanted to apply, therefore requiring the creation of 
a new set of instruments” (Egaña, interview, January 2007). 
 
Among its new social policy principles, the Concertacion Alliance promoted 
programmes that encouraged the participation of beneficiaries, and that 
contributed to a long term solution of poverty, in contrast with the social 
policy approach adopted by the military38. 
   
                                                 
38 See: Chapter Four. 
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5.1.7 A consensual policy-making style characterized the 
Concertacion Alliance (FO-EE2) 
 
In the months previous to the 1989 elections, politicians linked to the 
military regime argued that the fact that the Concertacion Alliance was a 
coalition of political parties with different ideological postures would 
inevitably lead to a lack of governance in the country, if they were elected 
(Boeninger, 1998:356). The fact that the Concertacion Alliance was 
formed by seventeen political movements led by the Christian-Democrat 
party, the Socialist party and the centre-left Partido por la Democracia 
(PPD) (Pro-Democracy Party) made this a genuine risk.  
 
To confront this risk the Concertacion Alliance developed a very 
participative and consensual political style, which has been described as 
transversalismo (transversalism) (Boeninger, 1998:453). This style was 
reflected in the formation of pluralist teams to create the government 
programme and later, by appointing ministers and vice ministers of 
different parties to each ministry.   
 
The roots of transversalism may be found in the organizational process of 
the Concertacion por el No coalition, created in 1988 to address the yes-
no referendum. The alliance organization was composed by a directive 
committee formed by top politicians of the main opposition parties, plus 
an executive secretary under which a number of multi-party teams worked 
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in areas related to the promotion of the no option in the referendum 
(Aylwin, 1998:344). 
 
The transversalism principle was supported by the personal style of 
President Patricio Aylwin, which has been described as very participative 
and open to debates within the government coalition (Boeninger, 
1998:454). As his ex-housing minister Alberto Etchegaray recalls:  
 
“President Aylwin had fortnightly cabinet meeting during all 
his administration and his attitude was always to share the 
government’s duties, explaining what he was experiencing 
and allowing ministers to address a particular issue. Hence, 
ministers really felt working in a team, and when a president 
encourages participation in such a way, somehow this style 
is transmitted downwards so I applied the same style in the 
housing ministry” (Etchegaray, interview, September 2003).  
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Aylwin’s personality was reinforced by his vast political experience as 
founder of political parties and coalitions in the country. In 1957 he 
participated in the foundation of the Christian-Democrat party that was 
formed by the fusion of three different Social-Christian parties. He became 
president of the party in 1958, position that he will hold seven times in the 
following three decades. Aylwin was also one of the leaders behind the 
creation of the Concertacion Alliance in 1987. 
 
 
Etchegaray concludes that: 
 
“there is no history in any country of a person [general 
Pinochet] managing the country for 17 years and 
subsequently staying on with the newly arrived president,  
particularly after they fought so hard, nor is there any case 
of a man [President Aylwin] able to lead a group of 8 
political parties in an Alliance of Parties for Democracy. This 
process was conducted by Aylwin with integrity, and his 
place in history is assured because he led an exemplary 
transition” (Etchegaray, interview, September 2003). 
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5.1.8 Funds from external cooperation became available (FO-CE2) 
 
Once democracy arrived, funds from external cooperation to address the 
most urgent needs of Chilean population became available. External 
cooperation was fuelled by the widespread support from the international 
community for the return of democracy in Chile. In 1989, Sergio Molina, a 
leading Christian Democrat politician who played an important role in the 
Chilean road to democracy, assumed the duty of obtaining and securing 
external funds for the new democratic government. By mid-1989, Molina 
was well advanced in this duty, having secured near 28 million USD for 
the first year of the new government (Molina, interview, June 2003; 
Calderon, interview, September 2003).  
  
5.1.9 Chilean experts (Garcia, Flaño and Molina) helped designing 
the Concertacion Alliance government programme, and 
contributed to the idea of introducing a social fund in Chile (FO-
EE3) 
 
Given its consensual policy style, when the Concertacion Alliance started 
designing its government programme by mid-1989 a harmonious policy-
making approach was easy to apply. A number of groups were set up to 
plan the future government’s policies. The groups covered a number of 
different areas, including economic and social spheres. Group members 
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were selected according to their expertise, while securing that they 
represented evenly all the Concertacion Alliance parties.  
 
Egaña (interview, January 2007) highlights that those who designed new 
social policy  programmes came mainly from NGOs: 
 
“the people preparing [the FOSIS programme] belonged 
mainly to the NGO world, because universities were closed . 
. . and political foundations were non-existent . . . as 
political foundations and think-tanks arrived later” 
 
In July 1989, Alvaro Garcia and Nicolas Flaño arrived to Chile to integrate 
the Concertacion Alliance groups of experts that were working in the new 
government’s programme. Given their positive view of social funds, 
opinion that was also shared by other Concertacion Alliance social policy 
experts, it was agreed that one of the groups planning the government’s 
social policy would assume the duty of designing a social fund for Chile. 
Alvaro Garcia led the design group, which included about ten Concertacion 
Alliance experts from the academic and NGO’s worlds (Flaño, interview, 
August 2003; Calderon, interview, September 2003). 
 
Hence, creating a social fund was a consensual decision of the group of 
Concertacion Alliance social policy experts that were participating in the 
design of the future government programme. However, it may be stated 
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that Alvaro Garcia and Nicolas Flaño were key players in making this 
decision, given their previous experience with social funds. 
 
During the FOSIS policy-making process, experts considered only those 
technical elements that were free from any party-politics motivation, 
which also may be the result of the consensual policy-making style that 
characterized the Concertacion Alliance. As Nicolas Flaño recalls:  
 
“It was a time of hard work. We spent many hours defining 
elements of the programme, and luckily we did it in a very 
non-ideological manner with good will and with no party-
politics considerations. Our main motivation was that we 
were doing a big and noble duty by building an important 
programme to help overcome poverty in the country” (Flaño, 
interview, August 2003). 
 
Sergio Molina was also a relevant actor in the FOSIS policy-making 
process. While Garcia and Flaño contributed their technical expertise to 
the FOSIS design process, Molina had a more political role. He is regarded 
as the `father’ of the group that designed FOSIS, as he was able to 
visualize the place that FOSIS will occupy in the broader social policy 
scheme that the Concertacion Alliance was creating. He also envisaged 
FOSIS’ potential to channel funds from international cooperation to 
finance social policy programmes (Flaño, interview, August 2003).  
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According to Molina’s account: 
 
 “I was working in two areas of the future government: 
obtaining funds from international cooperation and helping 
to design part of the future social policy strategy . . . at the 
end of the day, FOSIS represented an innovative 
programme able to receive resources from international co-
operation and to channel them to social policy projects” 
(Molina, interview, June 2003). 
 
Additionally, FOSIS allowed confronting the restricted fiscal budget 
scenario that the Concertacion Alliance was encountering by channelling 
external funds to finance social policy programmes (Molina, interview, 
June 2003). Indeed, the need for extra funds was non trivial. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, the democratic government inherited social 
sectors that suffered dramatic budgetary cuts during the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the military government fixed the first year fiscal budget to 
the Aylwin’s government, which not surprisingly, was very stringent in the 
social policy area. 
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5.1.10 New social policy institutions were created (AGCI, 
MIDEPLAN), both closely related to the FOSIS programme (FO-
EE4) 
 
While preparing the democratic government programme, Sergio Molina 
promoted the creation of the Agencia de Cooperacion Internacional (AGCI) 
(International Cooperation Unit), to receive and allocate funds from 
international agencies (Molina, interview, June 2003).  
 
Hence, Molina was a main actor in the policy-making process of both AGCI 
and FOSIS, two separate institutions that worked together to obtain and 
allocate external funds to social projects, with AGCI obtaining and 
supplying external funds and FOSIS receiving and allocating them. 
Ultimately, both institutions were assigned to the same ministry, the newly 
created Ministry of Planning (MIDEPLAN), where Sergio Molina was 
appointed as minister39.  
 
                                                 
39 It has been suggested that Molina also promoted the creation of MIDEPLAN during the 
creation process of the Concertacion Alliance government programme (Gatica, interview, 
September 2003). In fact, the design of a coherent social policy institutional framework in 
Chile has been a long lasting interest of Sergio Molina (See Appendix 2). 
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In Sergio Molina’s own words (interview, June 2003): 
  
“these two institutions were located in MIDEPLAN for mostly 
personal reasons. The story was that I was working for the 
Concertacion Alliance in the areas of international 
cooperation for social purposes and in social policy. The 
institutional design was more accidental than intentionally 
planned: We realized that both the reception of external 
resources to finance social programmes and the creation of 
an institution [FOSIS] that could develop social policies in a 
new way needed to occur simultaneously”. 
 
5.1.11 The final FOSIS programme elements were introduced 
(FO-EE5) 
 
As already mentioned, existing social funds in other Latin American 
countries had a palliative aim as they were created to alleviate the social 
costs of recessions, mainly unemployment. Also, they were created as 
substitutes of existing government institutions, to avoid bureaucracy. This 
final point was not applicable to the Chilean case as Chilean public 
institutions showed low bureaucratic and corruption levels. Their main 
problems were related more to a lack of resources than to structural 
deficiencies in their working (Flaño, interview, August 2003).   
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Hence, the Chilean experts designing the social fund engaged in the 
creation of what they called a ‘second generation social fund’, which was 
aimed to provide a new social policy approach rather than to substitute or 
replicate existing social policy programmes. The fund was designed as a 
flexible, small and decentralized organization, contrasting with the 
traditionally big and centralized social sector ministries (Flaño, interview, 
August 2003). 
 
In Nicolas Flaño’s words (interview, August 2003): 
    
“when formulating the program we learnt from experiences 
that were compiled by the World Bank and the IDB about 
the cases of Bolivia and Guatemala. There was a rich 
exchange because the WB and the IDB were closely linked 
to the Bolivian social fund . . . but in some way FOSIS was a 
second generation fund  . . . in other countries social funds 
tended to replace social ministries that worked badly. In the 
Chilean case, ministries were strong and entrenched [public] 
institutions. The problems were associated more with a lack 
of resources than to malfunction . . . the idea was to have a 
light, decentralized, agile, and flexible structure, the 
opposite of a bureaucracy”.  
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Fernandez (interview, August 2003) confirms Flaño’s view: 
  
“this fund was not designed to replace or to cover up the 
flaws of social ministries, as in most Latin American countries 
where social funds were created to provide temporary 
employment, infrastructure, etc. This was not our case as it 
was not a palliative policy but one designed to develop 
innovative social policy programs and projects, in some 
cases with the support of social ministries”. 
 
Allowing beneficiaries to have an active role in the working of the fund 
was considered important for the experts designing FOSIS, as it fulfilled 
the Concertacion Alliance social policy pro-participation principle. FOSIS 
was designed as a bottom-up social policy approach where beneficiaries 
are able to take the initiative to develop a project while FOSIS provides 
financial resources and supports beneficiaries during the different phases 
of the process.  
 
 204 
In Flaño’s words (interview, August 2003): 
  
“ [FOSIS] was complementary to social policy as it worked 
from the bottom up rather than top down. [Traditional] 
ministries are hierarchical, defining and implementing 
policies top-down. What we developed was different from 
this, involving identifying people’s needs and then providing 
support to develop projects, find funding, monitor progress, 
etc.”. 
 
Naming FOSIS as a solidarity and investment fund was intended to 
highlight the fact that its goal was to invest in people, rather than to 
provide a palliative or transitory help (Flaño, interview, August 2003). A 
clear objective in this respect was to support the poor in developing their 
productive skills in order that they may overcome poverty by themselves. 
This feature was in line with the Concertacion Alliance social policy 
principle of creating programmes that provided social investment 
opportunities to their beneficiaries. 
 
5.1.12 The FOSIS programme was launched (FO-EE6) 
 
In March 1990 Patricio Aylwin appointed his cabinet, setting up the newly 
created FOSIS programme, as well as the AGCI and MIDEPLAN institutions. 
Sergio Molina assumed as minister of MIDEPLAN. FOSIS and AGCI were 
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incorporated into the MIDEPLAN structure as lateral institutions, with a 
high level of autonomy. Alvaro Garcia was assigned as vice-minister of 
MIDEPLAN and Nicolas Flaño assumed as director of FOSIS. Many experts 
that worked in the FOSIS design group were incorporated into the 
programme.  
 
5.1.13 The Congress passed the law creating FOSIS (FO-LE1) 
 
In July 1990, just five months after the arrival of the new government, the 
Congress passed the law creating MIDEPLAN, FOSIS and AGCI. The law 
was aimed to secure public funds as well as an institutional setting for the 
FOSIS programme. 
 
5.1.14 Summary 
 
The above narrative has highlighted the particular characteristics of the 
period when the FOSIS policy-making process took place, covering the 
final year of the military government and the initial one of the new 
democratically elected Concertacion Alliance government. This phase 
presented many elements related to the return of democracy in Chile and 
to the social and political struggle against the military government that 
allowed achieving this aim.  
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It was shown that the exercise of joining forces against the military 
government by the democratic opposition shaped the way in which the 
new government behaved and developed its new policies. The 
Concertacion Alliance confronted the military regime in open elections, 
and needed to show that their politicians were able to lead the country 
without any internal party-politics disputes. This fact prompted a 
consensual policy-making style where experts from all the Concertacion 
Alliance parties were able to participate. Hence, groups of Concertacion 
Alliance experts were set up to create the government programme 
following only technical considerations.  
 
It is also evident that the economic crisis that affected the country during 
the 1980s played a significant role in the process. It contributed to 
building up social and political pressure against the military regime, and 
ultimately to the reestablishment of democracy in 1990. Moreover, the 
policies adopted by the military regime which increased poverty and 
unemployment to unprecedented levels, convinced the Concertacion 
Alliance politicians that a new poverty-alleviation approach was required.  
 
Having social funds already in operation in other Latin American countries 
and backed by important international organisations was also a relevant 
event in the process. It allowed confirming that this kind of initiative was 
feasible in Chile. Hence, one of the groups working on the new 
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government programme decided to create a social fund, taking these 
funds as basic examples from where to start designing FOSIS. 
 
Finally, the availability of significant funds from international cooperation 
to finance social projects in the country was also important at the moment 
of creating FOSIS, as the programme allowed channelling these funds to 
social projects. 
 
The narrative demonstrates that a small number of individuals played 
significant roles in the FOSIS policy-making process. The first one was 
President Patricio Aylwin. His role may be regarded an indirect, as he had 
no direct involvement in the FOSIS policy-making process. However, he 
promoted a participative policy-making process which was reinforced by 
his personal style as Concertacion Alliance leader and later as President. 
In this sense, President Aylwin contributed to the creation of a policy-
making process that allowed technical considerations and debates inside 
the Concertacion Alliance. 
 
Two important actors played a clear technical role in the FOSIS policy-
making process 40 . They where Alvaro Garcia and Nicolas Flaño who 
participated in the creation of social funds in Guatemala and Bolivia, and 
that later integrated the group of experts designing the social policy 
strategy of the future democratic government. Thanks to their expertise 
                                                 
40 As mentioned, they also assumed political roles after the policy-making process, by 
being appointed in different positions inside the Concertacion Alliance governments. 
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they contributed to arrive to the decision of creating a social fund and to 
define the particular form of the fund. 
 
The third main process actor was Sergio Molina. He was able to visualize 
the big social policy framework where FOSIS was introduced. Furthermore, 
he helped to create this new framework by promoting the creation of 
social institutions related to FOSIS, such as AGCI and MIDEPLAN.  
 
A final type of relevant actors in the FOSIS policy-making process were 
international organisations, mainly the World Bank and the UN’s PREALC, 
that were promoting the development of social funds in the Latin 
American region during the 1980s. 
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5.2 CHILE BARRIO PROGRAMME POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
 
Figure 5.2 
Chile Barrio policy-making process 
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5.2.1 A continuous rural-urban migration occurred in Chile during 
the second half of the 20th century (CB-PE1) 
 
A rural-urban migration process occurred throughout the twenty century 
in Chile. Total urban population grew from 58.4% in 1950 to 83.3% in 
1992 (Rojas, 1999:1). The capital Santiago grew from less than 800,000 
inhabitants in 1930 to over 1,600,000 in 1952 (Kusnetzoff, 1997:292). In 
1990, Santiago had 4,253,469 inhabitants, equivalent to 32% of the entire 
country’s population, according to official statistics41.  
 
This rapid urbanization process produced a sharp increase in the demand 
for housing that was partially satisfied by public programmes. Only during 
the 1960s, with the creation of the ministry of housing, did the 
government start providing a significant level of houses, with an average 
of 30,000 units built annually (Kusnetzoff, 1997:292). However, this 
production level was clearly below the number of houses needed to 
accommodate new families and to cover for the obsolescence of the 
housing stock, estimated in 80,000-100,000 houses per year (Rojas, 
1999:12).  
 
                                                 
41 Source: National Statistics Institute of Chile (INE) website, www.ine.cl  
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5.2.2 Land invasions gave rise to Campamentos (shantytowns) 
(CB-PE2) 
 
Families unable to buy a house or access a public housing programme 
were forced to invade land and later to share homes. Massive Tomas (land 
invasions) occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, a practice that was 
allowed by authorities as a system’s `safety valve’. Land invasions 
increased from 10 in 1968 to 220 in 1970. In Santiago alone, 103 land 
seizures occurred in 1970. Neighbourhoods that developed from these 
land invasions become known as Campamentos, where by 1970 no less 
than 300,000 individuals were living (Kusnetzoff, 1997:294). 
 
Most Campamento’s houses were self-help constructions built with light 
materials. Due to their nature as unplanned neighbourhoods they 
concentrated multiple problems and shortages, including deficient housing 
conditions, lack of basic social infrastructure such as electricity, sewerage, 
pavement streets, and lack of property rights for the plots of land. 
 
Campamentos were located in the outskirts of big cities where land was 
available. Hence, a progressive concentration of poor inhabitants in the 
outskirts of main cities developed, leading to high social segmentation in 
big cities, especially in the capital Santiago.  
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The military regime repressed land invasions thus forcing population in 
need of accommodation to start sharing houses. This practice became the 
new system’s safety valve with near 800,000 individuals sharing houses in 
1983 in Santiago alone (Gilbert, 1993:61). The only land invasions that 
occurred under the military were Campamento Raul Silva Henriquez and 
Campamento Juan Francisco Fresno, comprising near 8,000 families 
(Kusnetzoff, 1997:297). These land seizures ocurred in 1983 in the south 
of Santiago, thanks to an increasingly organized social movement fuelled 
by the deteriorated economic condition in the country during that year42. 
 
As a result, at the beginning of the 1990s Campamentos were well-
delimited neighbourhoods of big cities where poverty was concentrated 
and highly visible. They were an undeniable and highly visible indication 
that significant groups of Chilean population were living in miserable 
conditions. 
 
5.2.3 A second Concertacion Alliance government was elected 
(CB-PE3) 
 
According to the Chilean constitution, the first democratic government that 
followed the military was allowed to stay in power for four years while the 
following ones should last six years. Hence, in December 1993 presidential 
elections were conducted in the country and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the 
                                                 
42 Chapter Seven describes the developments of Campamentos-related social movements 
under the military. 
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Concertacion Alliance candidate, won with a remarkable 57.9% of total 
votes. 
 
5.2.4 Fast economic growth occurred during the first half of the 
1990s (CB-PE4) 
 
The first half of the 1990s is part of what local economists have described 
as the ‘golden age’ of economic growth in Chile. This period of fast growth 
started in the mid-1980s after the military government introduced 
stringent policies to adjust the economy, including a substantial 
depreciation of the local currency. Economic growth was led by exports 
and between 1984 and 1989 it averaged a 6.5% yearly rate. 
 
The arrival of the Concertacion Alliance only furthered this growth process.  
During the Aylwin government (1990-1993) yearly economic growth 
averaged 7.7%, while under the Frei Ruiz-Tagle administration (1994-
1999) it reached 5.6% (Ffrench-Davis, 2002:7). Employment responded 
favourably to the growth process, with an unemployment rate of 7.3% on 
average during the Aylwin government and of 7.4% during the Frei Ruiz-
Tagle administration (Ffrench-Davis, 2002:7). 
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5.2.5 Poverty levels dropped sharply during the first half of the 
1990s (CB-PE5) 
 
In line with economic growth, poverty also showed a positive trend, as 
national poverty and extreme poverty incidence decreased continuously 
during the first half of the 1990s (Table 5.0).  
 
Table 5.0 
Chile: Poverty and extreme poverty incidence, 1987-2006 (1) 
 Extreme poverty (2) Poverty (3) 
Year Number (4) % (5) Number (4) % (5) 
1990 1,674.7 13.0 4,968.3 38.6 
1992 1,206.4 9.0 4,390.6 32.9 
1994 1,045.1 7.6 3,815.9 27.6 
1996 822.4 5.7 3,320.5 23.2 
1998 825.5 5.6 3,184.0 21.7 
2000 838.2 5.6 3,038.9 20.2 
2003 726.5 4.7 2,905.4 18.7 
2006 516.7 3.2 2,208.9 13.7 
Source: MIDEPLAN (2007). 
Notes:  
(1) Poverty is measured applying an income definition of poverty by comparing 
household per head income with poverty and extreme poverty lines. 
(2) Individuals whose income is insufficient to buy one basic food basket that represents 
nutritional needs.  
(3) Individuals whose income is insufficient to buy two basic food baskets. Poverty 
figures include those of extreme poverty. 
(4) Thousands of individuals. 
(5) Percentages over total population. 
 
 
In effect, between 1990 and 1994 poverty incidence decreased from 38.6% 
to 27.6% of total population, while extreme poverty incidence dropped 
from 13.0% to 7.6%. This reduction has been attributed to the joint effect 
of economic growth and the social policies applied by the Concertacion 
Alliance (Krause and Puentes, 2001).   
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5.2.6 Problems surfaced in the housing policy for the poor (CB-
PE6) 
 
Around 1993, independent housing experts started criticizing the 
government’s housing policy for not providing a suitable solution for 
extremely poor families (Mercado, interview, June 2003; Montes, interview, 
July 2003). These critiques signalled a mismatch between the available 
government housing programmes and the particular characteristics and 
needs of poor families.  
 
On the one hand, they pointed out that certain characteristics of housing 
programmes were preventing extremely poor families to access them. All 
housing programmes asked families to apply to obtain a housing benefit. 
In addition, programmes requested families to contribute with savings to 
finance a fraction of the house cost. Hence, the government housing 
programmes assumed that all families were able to apply for benefits and 
to contribute a certain amount of savings to receive it. These 
characteristics conflicted with the fact that extremely poor families lacked 
resources to make a contribution for a house, as their members were 
usually unemployed or sporadically employed. Besides, extremely poor 
families tended to have a very poor access to information and social 
connections, making them less likely to apply for government benefits.  
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On the other hand, housing experts signalled that if an extremely poor 
family was successful in obtaining a house from the government it was 
under the risk of finishing up in a worse and unsustainable situation as 
they would have to move to the neighbourhood where the government’s 
housing development was located, thus disconnecting from their original 
social and economic networks (Mercado, interview, August 2002; Celedon, 
interview, September 2002; Montes, interview, July 2003). All houses 
provided by the government were part of urban developments, generally 
located in the outskirts of big cities where land was cheaper. Hence, 
families receiving a house had to move to a different area of the city, 
which was a critical decision for poor families that were surviving thanks 
to a strategy linked to their original neighbourhood.  In this sense, families 
were under the risk of being sent to a more alien neighbourhood requiring 
them to change their traditional way of life and needing extra resources to 
maintain the new house and pay for the bills (Mercado, interview, August 
2002; Celedon, interview, September 2002). 
 
Based on these considerations, housing experts suggested that keeping 
poor families in their current neighbourhood was a necessary condition for 
a housing programme directed to the poor to be successful.  Besides, a 
successful programme will have to address all shortages affecting poor 
families, and not just a single dimension such as their housing needs. 
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Carlos Montes, a socialist deputy and housing expert played a key role at 
this stage of the process (Nieto, interview, September 2002). Montes was 
an active politician in housing matters, occupying by that time the post of 
head of the housing commission of the deputy chamber. In 1993, the 
commission was pressing the government to address the housing 
problems of the poor43 . When referring to his role in the Chile Barrio 
policy-making process, he notes:  
 
“the congress and myself influenced the government by 
generating the sensibility required to address the problem, 
and by pressing for the creation of a multi-dimensional 
programme for a sector that by that time was outside the 
[housing] policy” (Montes, interview, July 2003). 
 
5.2.7 Eduardo Frei introduced his initial anti-poverty agenda (CB-
PE7) 
 
Eduardo Frei defined the overcoming of poverty as a national duty, thus 
providing a concrete goal to the broad objective of achieving social equity 
that the Aylwin’s government proposed (Clert, 2000:107).  
                                                 
43 Montes actions may have been even more significant. According to one interviewee, 
Montes may have directly suggested president Frei to follow the example of his father’s 
by addressing the housing needs of the poor. See section 5.2.9 in this Chapter. 
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For instance, in one of his first discourses as President, he expresed:  
 
 “as I noted in the Message to Congress, I think that during 
these last years of the twentieth century Chile has a unique 
opportunity to overcome extreme poverty. To achieve this 
goal, in my government we want to concentrate all our 
efforts in that 9% of our population, which represents 
approximately 1,200,000 Chileans who live in sub-human 
conditions, in abject poverty or destitution” (Frei, 1994b:2). 
 
To advance in this direction, during the first month of his government he 
created the Comite Interministerial Social (CIS) (Multi-Ministers Social 
Committee) devoted to design and implement the Programa Nacional de 
Superacion de la Pobreza (PNSP) (National Plan to Overcome Poverty). 
Frei chaired the CIS to highlight the priority that he was giving to this 
effort. MIDEPLAN assumed as executive coordinator of the CIS and its 
technicians started designing the PNSP.  
 
In general terms, the PNSP’s aim was to bring together and coordinate 
existing poverty-alleviation public programmes in the poorest councils of 
the country. The programme assigned local authorities responsibility for 
coordinating and formulating local plans (Raczynski and Serrano, 2002:18).  
 
 219 
MIDEPLAN was able to identify a total of 125 poverty-alleviation 
programmes being implemented in the country by different government 
institutions. It also listed 79 councils along the country that were 
displaying the highest poverty levels. Hence, the PNSP was planned to be 
focused on these 79 councils. 
 
Concurrently to the creation of the CIS and the PNSP, Frei formed the 
Consejo Nacional para la Superacion de la Pobreza (CNSP) (National Board 
for Overcoming Poverty), composed of 20 members representing all 
Chilean civil society. Their mission was to cooperate with government to 
achieve the aim of eradicating poverty from the country. In particular, 
they were asked to advise government in the areas of social policy and 
poverty-alleviation programmes.  
 
5.2.8 Eduardo Frei abandoned his initial anti-poverty agenda (CB-
PE8) 
 
By 1996, unsatisfactory and highly diverse PNSP results emerged in 
different councils. Lack of fresh resources for the PNSP, plus difficulties in 
implementing a multi-sectoral and participative approach at the local level 
by using the traditional government structure have been suggested as 
main causes of this early failure (Raczynski and Serrano, 2002:19). Foxley 
(2004:13) confirms that a lack of fresh resources for Municipalities to 
implement the PNSP contributed to the failure of the programme. In 
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addition, he suggests that the programme was controversial to implement 
as it was directed only to the 79 poorest Municipalities of the country, 
which many times were just slightly poorer than the non-selected group. 
At the end of the day, it is likely that the combination of an excessively 
ambitious programme with a rigid and hard to articulate public sector 
explained the failure of the PNSP. 
 
As a result of its insufficient results, the Frei administration started loosing 
faith in the PNSP, considering it too wide and diffuse (Calderon, interview, 
September 2003). Besides, the administration became convinced that 
poverty eradication was a long run process where economic growth played 
the main part. Hence, at the third year of his government, president Frei 
definitely abandoned the PNSP programme (Raczinsky and Serrano, 
2002:20; Calderon, interview, September 2003).  
 
The CIS started being operated by lower-ranking government officials with 
no significant decision-making means. The CNSP disappeared as a formal 
government’s advisory group. However, their members decided to 
continue their activity as an NGO, renaming the group as the Fundacion 
Nacional para la Superacion de la Pobreza (FNSP) (National Charity for the 
Overcoming of Poverty). 
 
 221 
As Egaña (Interview, January 2007) explains: 
 
“the CIS failed because its goal was to coordinate  programs 
yet it had no political authority to act as a social authority . . .  
later the CIS dissipated. The CNSP that represented the non-
governmental leg of the plan was also diluted . . .  As these 
two groups were dismantled during the first half of 1997, the 
search for alternative instruments began, and when the Chile 
Barrio programme arrived it was like the icing on the cake”. 
 
5.2.9 Despite the failure of his initial anti-poverty approach 
Eduardo Frei continued committed to addressing poverty (CB-EE1) 
 
As the son of Chilean ex-president Eduardo Frei Montalva, Eduardo Frei 
Ruiz-Tagle belongs to a family of renowned Christian Democrat politicians. 
Frei Montalva governed the country between 1964 and 1970, introducing 
a number of social reforms to improve the life conditions of the least well-
off population44.  
 
It may be argued that Frei Ruiz-Tagle inherited from his father the 
concern for the least well off. A number of interviewees agree that 
President Frei Ruiz-Tagle was highly committed to overcome poverty 
during his government and some of them even mention that he appeared 
                                                 
44 See Chapter Four. 
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to be ‘obsessed’ with this idea (Montes, interview, July 2003; Calderon, 
interview, September 2003; Anonymous, interview). 
 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle combined a favourable view towards economic 
growth and entrepreneurial activity with a strong commitment to advance 
the overcoming of poverty. Trained as a civil engineer, he spent part of his 
career in the private sector where he developed a sympathetic view of the 
roles that this sector and economic growth can play in the country. He 
started his political carer as senator in 1989, becoming president of the 
Christian Democrat Party in 1991.  
 
5.2.10 Frei introduced a results-oriented anti-poverty strategy 
and asked his housing minister to create a new poverty-
alleviation programme (CB-EE2) 
 
After the failure of the PNSP, Eduardo Frei looked for a less ambitious 
initiative to fight extreme poverty, searching for visible actions with the 
potential to generate measurable results (Clert, 2000:115).  
 
Purely political considerations may have also played a role in this change 
of approach (Anonymous, interview). According to this opinion, the PNSP 
main characteristics, i.e. its size, complexity, and its initially poor results 
made it a hard candidate to generate political benefit in the short to 
medium run. Instead, programmes producing tangible, visible and 
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achievable results were considered more likely to generate these 
benefits45.  
 
In any case, the end of the PNSP at the third year of Frei’s six year 
presidential period created a worrying gap in his social agenda, with no 
programme addressing his initial ambitious plans of overcoming poverty in 
the country (Calderon, interview, September 2003). Hence, in 1996, 
president Frei asked his housing minister Hermosilla to create a specific 
programme to address the housing needs of the poor (Araos, interview, 
August 2002; Nieto, interview, September 2002; Calderon, interview, 
September 2003).  
 
In the words of an anonimous interviewee: 
    
“President Frei asked [Minister Hermosilla] to try to develop 
a project within the Ministry of Housing to address a specific 
social problem, an urgent and visible problem that could be 
displayed”. 
 
The interest of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle to address this problem has been 
interpreted as an attempt to finish a job that his father started (Celedon, 
Nieto, interviews, September 2002).  In 1964 Eduardo Frei’s father 
                                                 
45 In a more crude language, the idea was to follow a strategy that produced foto y voto 
(a photo and a vote), that is, visible results with positive impact in public opinion 
(Anonymous interviewee).  
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created the Operacion Sitio (Plot of Land Action) to provide a serviced plot 
of land to poor families for them to self-build their house. At the end of 
the day, Operacion Sitio was considered unsuccessful in achieving its goals, 
mainly due to a lack of resources. The programme became caricaturized 
as Operacion Tiza (Chalk Action) as population realized that most of the 
times it only involved the delimitation of the plot of land with chalk, 
without the promised provision of basic services (Kusnetzof, 1997:293).  
 
5.2.11 The Ministry of Housing UDF unit considered that a multi-
dimensional approach was required to address the housing needs 
of the poor (CB-CE1) 
 
As a result of the already mentioned criticisms received from Congress, 
two separate units inside the ministry of housing where addressing the 
problems of the programmes directed to the poor. These were the Unidad 
de Difusion y Fomento (UDF) (Promotion and Dissemination Unit) and the 
Direccion Tecnica (DITEC) (Technical Direction).  
 
The UDF was created at the beginning of the 1990s by the minister of 
housing Alberto Etchegaray to advice him on social issues. The unit was 
composed by a group of social workers that were in close contact with the 
reality of the poor population and their housing needs, thanks to their 
frequent visits to poor housing areas. From these experiences they 
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became convinced that to address the housing needs of the poor a multi-
dimensional approach was required. From their view, 
 
“poverty is an integral problem. As a result, the provision of 
just a house does not resolve the central problem. Instead, 
providing poor families with a house and transferring them 
to a new neighbourhood creates social conflict in the 
receiving area and breaks all the social nets that the family 
had in their original location . . . after a while, most of the 
families in this situation prefer to return to their original 
neighbourhoods” (Celedon, interview, September 2002). 
 
5.2.12 The Ministry of Housing DITEC unit was quantifying the 
number of Campamentos (CB-CE2) 
 
While the UDF was developing a view about how to address the housing 
needs of the poor population, DITEC was focusing its concerns on the 
specific issue of quantifying Campamentos. As a result, in 1995 DITEC 
commissioned an external study to quantify the number of Campamentos 
in the country. Thanks to this investigation, a clear assessment of the 
number of Campamentos became available. Precarious settlements were 
identified according to the existence of legal terrain ownership, the 
availability of basic services, and the structural conditions of houses. 
Results of the study became available in 1996, showing that a total of 972 
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Campamentos existed in the country, comprising 500,000 inhabitants. 
Later, DITEC commissioned another study to obtain a socio-economic 
characterization of Campamentos inhabitants. The study found that the 
majority of individuals living in Campamentos were poor or extremely poor 
persons (Araos, interview, August 2002).  
 
5.2.13 Housing minister Hermosilla included the UDF and the 
DITEC views into the Chile Barrio design (CB-EE3) 
 
After receiving the president’s request and consulting with his UDF 
advisers, minister Hermosilla concluded that in order to address the 
housing needs of the poor a multi-sector programme was required, with 
housing being only one component of the programme. President Frei 
agreed with this approach. Hence, the opinions and influence of UDF 
members was significant in designing a programme that addressed the 
housing needs of the poor by applying a multi-dimension approach 
(Celedon, interview, September 2002). 
 
On its side, DITEC’s quantification of Campamentos helped Hermosilla to 
reduce the scope of the programme from the broad universe of extremely 
poor families to the inhabitants of Campamentos only (Araos, interview, 
August 2002; Celedon, interview, September 2002; Montes, interview, July 
2003; Calderon, interview, September 2003). This data allowed the 
government to identify a well-defined, concrete and visible problem that 
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was compatible with the new directions that the poverty-alleviation 
agenda was following. Besides, the availability of a technically sound 
quantification of Campamentos provided a solid foundation for the Chile 
Barrio policy-making process (Araos, interview, August 2002). 
 
5.2.14 Housing minister Hermosilla created a group of experts to 
design the Chile Barrio main characteristics (CB-EE4) 
 
Once it was decided that the programme should provide a multi-dimension 
approach focusing on the 972 Campamentos already identified, minister 
Hermosilla created a multi-sector group to design the programme details. 
This group was composed of experts from different government 
institutions (such as members of the Ministry of Housing, MIDEPLAN, 
FOSIS, plus representatives from other smaller government institutions) 
that were likely to be involved in the programme’s implementation.  
 
5.2.15 The group of experts introduced the final elements of the 
Chile Barrio programme (CB-EE5) 
 
The first activity of the group was to look for examples of similar 
programmes in the Latin American region. Thanks to the participation of 
one group member in a housing seminar organized in Brazil, they 
discovered the Favela Bairro (Shantytown Neighbourhood) programme, 
being applied in Rio de Janeiro. The entire group of experts travelled to 
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Rio to learn insitu about this experience. Favela Bairro was a programme 
of social promotion, directed to help inhabitants of shantytowns. This 
programme also provided a clue to the Chile Barrio programme’s name 
(Nieto, interview, September 2002). More importantly, the programme 
confirmed that a social development programme directed to poor 
neighbourhoods was a feasible option. 
 
To design a multi-sector programme, the group decided that in addition to 
taking care of the housing needs of Campamento’s inhabitants, the 
programme should ensure the quality of the urban structure surrounding 
the Campamento, and provide educational and training opportunities for 
Compamento’s inhabitants. 
 
The group decided to start implementing the programme with a pilot 
phase. According to one interviewee, this choice responded to the political 
requirement of executing the programme in such a way that positive 
results were obtainable and verifiable in the medium run. Hence, five 
particular Campamentos were selected for this initial stage, mainly 
because basic infrastructure was already being built there, thus increasing 
the chance of having visible results in the short run (Anonymous, 
interview).  
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In the words of this anonimous interviewee: 
  
“the pilot worked in five settlements from three regions of 
the country that were chosen because infrastructure 
solutions were most advanced, so President Frei would be 
able to show something by the end of the year”.  
 
5.2.16 The pilot phase of the Chile Barrio programme was 
launched by President Frei (CB-EE6) 
 
The 21st of May 1997 in his annual nation’s address, President Eduardo 
Frei launched the pilot phase of the Chile Barrio programme. There he 
expressed: 
 
“[we do not want] more misery in riverbeds!, in the outskirts 
of cities!, near rail tracks!, we want a Chile without 
Campamentos, with dignified houses for our people!” (Frei, 
1997). 
 
5.2.17 An office was created inside the Ministry of Housing to 
manage Chile Barrio at the national level (CB-LE1) 
 
During 1998, the definitive phase of the programme was implemented 
with the creation of a specific institution that covered the entire country. A 
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directorate and an executive manager were established at the 
government’s central level, a structure that was also replicated at the 
regional level. This organization was physically and financially linked to the 
ministry of housing. 
 
5.2.18 Summary 
 
The mapping of the Chile Barrio policy-making process has revealed that 
the second Concertacion Alliance government assumed power amid high 
economic growth and a continuous reduction of poverty. These facts, in 
addition to the strong presidential interest in addressing poverty resulted 
in the setting of ambitious government goals in the poverty-related area. 
 
The narrative has shown that the failure of Frei’s initial poverty-alleviation 
strategy, just in the middle of his administration, created a vacuum in his 
poverty-alleviation agenda. In parallel to this failure, housing experts were 
stating that the government’s housing policy for the poor was failing. As a 
result, the President decided to address this problem by creating a new 
programme that would fill this space in his agenda.  
 
The process of designing the programme was influenced by the availability 
of a clear quantification of Campamentos inside the ministry of housing, 
which allowed focusing the programme to a well-bounded group of 
individuals. Besides, the experiences and opinions of experts inside the 
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ministry contributed to designing the programme as a multi-dimension 
approach to address poverty. Finally, the knowledge of a similar poverty-
alleviation programme implemented in Brazil was an important influence 
on the final design phase of the process. 
 
Regarding main actors in the Chile Barrio policy-making process, President 
Eduardo Frei comes first as the initiator of the process. He contributed not 
only with the general orientation that he gave to his government to 
advance in the overcoming of poverty, but also by directly instructing his 
housing minister to create a specific programme to address the housing 
needs of the poor.  
 
Housing minister Edmundo Hermosilla comes second in the line of main 
actors as he played a fundamental role in the part of the process that was 
carried out inside the ministry of housing. He decided to create a multi-
sector programme focused on Campamentos, and to set a group of 
experts to finalise the design process.  
 
Other actors included Carlos Montes, a Concertacion Alliance deputy and 
housing expert, who from his post at the deputy chamber pressed the 
government to modify the current housing policy approach applied to 
address the housing needs of the poor. As well, the experts from the 
ministry of housing and from other government institutions that formed 
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the group in charge of designing the Chile Barrio programme contributed 
their technical knowledge in the final design phase of the process.  
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5.3 CHILE SOLIDARIO PROGRAMME POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
 
Figure 5.3 
Chile Solidario policy-making process 
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5.3.1 A third Concertacion Alliance government arrived (CS-PE1) 
 
On March 11th 2000, Ricardo Lagos assumed the presidency of Chile, 
becoming the third president of the Concertacion Alliance to govern the 
country. He was the first socialist president of the Concertacion Alliance 
era after two Christian Democrat governments.  
 
From the beginning of his government, Lagos reiterated his goal of 
pursuing social justice, claiming that development and progress should 
reach all sectors of the population. In his first message to the nation, just 
two months after assuming the presidency, he declared:  
 
“we will put forward reforms in the social, political, economic 
and cultural areas. These are not going to be any type of 
reforms, as Chile doesn’t requires any kind of change, but 
only those that allow our children to grow in equality and 
freedom, securing that all individuals that are born in our 
land have the same possibilities, regardless of the place and 
conditions in which they are born” (Lagos, 2000). 
 
Ricardo Lagos may be described as a heavyweight Chilean politician. 
Trained as a lawyer and economist, he worked for the United Nations 
during the 1970s and assumed a key role during the fight for democracy 
in Chile during the 1980s, as one of the leaders of the Socialist party and 
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as the president of the Alianza Democratica (Democratic Alliance), a 
political force that grouped most of the parties opposed to the military 
regime.  
 
Lagos had a great impact on public opinion and consolidated his political 
authority during the months running to the 1988 ‘yes-no’ referendum46. 
After almost 20 years of no political discussions in the country, a television 
programme allowed some opposition politicians to express their ideas in 
favour of the ‘no’ option. There, while pointing his finger to the camera, 
Ricardo Lagos asked the fearsome general Pinochet to fulfil his promise of 
allowing democracy to return to the country and to stop his personal 
ambition of remaining in power. This gesture had big repercussions on 
both public opinion and the media, locating Lagos among the top leaders 
of the democratic opposition (Aylwin, 1998:352). 
 
Later, when democracy arrived, Lagos assumed as Aylwin’s education 
minister, and as infrastructure minister under the Frei government, 
contributing in both positions to the implementation of significant reforms, 
and demonstrating his skills not only as a party politician but also as a 
successful minister. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 See: Section 5.1.5 in this Chapter. 
 236 
 
5.3.2 An economic slowdown occurred by the end of the 1990s 
(CS-PE2) 
 
President Lagos was assuming power amid a troubled economic 
environment. A recession linked to the Asian crisis affected the country in 
1999, when the GDP dropped 1.1%. While economic growth returned in 
2000 with a satisfactory 4.4% growth rate, the economy was proving hard 
to generate new jobs at the same speed as during the 1990s. 
Unemployment reached 8.9% in 1999, and 8.3% in 2000, figures well 
above the 1990s decade minimum of 5.3% obtained in 1997. 
 
5.3.3 Extreme poverty levels stagnated by the end of the 1990s 
(CS-PE3) 
 
Regarding poverty, by the end of the 1990s CASEN data showed a less 
positive picture than during the first half of the decade (MIDEPLAN, 2007) 
(see Table 5.0 in this Chapter). While poverty incidence decreased all 
along the 1990s, the speed at which it dropped was clearly slower in the 
second half of the decade. For instance, between 1998 and 2000 the 
incidence of poverty dropped slightly from 21.7% to 20.2%. 
 
The evolution of extreme poverty incidence was more worrying. After 
dropping sharply and continuously between 1990 and 1996 from 13.0% to 
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5.7%, it remained practically static for the following four years (MIDEPLAN, 
2007). Furthermore, the number of individuals living in extreme poverty 
increased slightly between 1996 and 2000 with near 832,000 individuals, 
equivalent to 225,000 families living in extreme poverty by 2000. 
 
This new poverty scenario was not a minor problem for the Concertacion 
Alliance. As already mentioned, a key Alliance goal was to introduce more 
social justice in the country, ensuring that economic growth benefitted all 
individuals, particularly those in the most disadvantaged positions. While 
1999 showed an economic downturn, between 1996 and 2000 the 
economy showed a healthy 5% yearly average growth rate, making 
unlikely that the stagnation in extreme poverty levels resulted from a lack 
of economic growth.  
 
5.3.4 The government’s poverty-alleviation approach started 
being criticized (CS-PE4) 
 
As a result of this new poverty situation, discontent started to come out 
among Concertacion Alliance experts and politicians in relation to the 
prevailing poverty-alleviation strategy.  
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As two interviewees stated,  
 
“from some time the Concertacion has been thinking of 
giving a turn to social policy. There exists a feeling that 
equity problems are still serious in the country, which is 
highlighted by the stagnation in extreme poverty. There still 
exits a pending debt in terms of social equity” (Anonymous, 
interview). 
 
“I believe that the Chile Solidario programme responds to 
the realization among policy makers that we would not be 
able to tackle the hard core of poverty ” (Montes, interview, 
July 2003). 
 
While the Government attributed the lack of progress in reducing extreme 
poverty to the recent slow down in economic growth (MIDEPLAN, 2001), 
independent experts signalled the possibility that the current poverty-
alleviation approach was proving to be inadequate in addressing an 
increasingly complex phenomenon (Raczinsky and Serrano, 2002). It was 
argued that despite the reduction in poverty incidence, there existed a 
‘hard nucleus’ of extreme poverty that was difficult to address with 
existing social policy programmes (Raczinsky and Serrano, 2002). 
Furthermore, these experts indicated that the government’s poverty-
alleviation programmes were showing rigidities and poor participation 
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levels (Raczinsky and Serrano, 2002). Specialists linked to the opposition 
focused their concerns on the degree of targeting of these programmes 
(Irarrazaval, interview, September 2003). According to these opinions, the 
lack of progress in reducing extreme poverty in the country suggested that 
social expenditure was not benefitting the poorest of the poor. 
 
5.3.5 MIDEPLAN suffered a crisis (CS-PE5) 
 
Back in 1997 and during the Frei administration, MIDEPLAN, the institution 
in charge of overseeing the government’s poverty-alleviation approach, 
started having problems with its role and functions inside government, 
particularly regarding its role as coordinator of social policy programmes 
directed at the poor. These problems became evident when President Frei 
openly proposed to close the ministry, after the failure of the PNSP 
programme that was under MIDEPLAN’s coordination 47 . The idea of 
closing MIDEPLAN never materialized, but generated a lot of noise and 
trouble inside this ministry.  
 
The opposition’s opinion about MIDEPLAN’s was also negative. For 
instance, in its balance of the 2002 performance of ministries, the 
opposition-linked Instituto Libertad (Freedom Institute) think-tank stated 
                                                 
47 See section 5.2.7 in this chapter. 
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that, “each MIDEPLAN’s initiative has been synonym to failure and bad 
planning”48. 
 
5.3.6 President Ricardo Lagos experienced a reduction in his 
approval ratings (CS-PE6) 
 
After arriving in power on March 2000, Ricardo Lagos started suffering a 
continuous reduction in his approval ratings, according to surveys from 
think tanks linked to different political views. In effect, the opposition-
related CEP National Opinion Survey (CEP, 2002), showed that from a 49% 
public approval of his administration in July 2000, he dropped to 44% in 
January 2002. Likewise, the opposition-linked Fundacion Futuro (Future 
Foundation) public opinion survey (Fundacion Futuro, 2002), 
demonstrated a reduction in the percentage of population approving the 
Lagos government from 57% in April 2000, to 38% in December 2001. In 
the same line, the pro-Concertacion Alliance CERC National Survey (CERC, 
2002), showed a reduction from 67% of government approval in May 
2000 to 53% in December 2001.  
 
Hence, despite differences in the approval ratings levels of the Lagos’ 
administration, all surveys where showing a fast reduction in public 
support for Lagos, a situation that corresponded most likely to the poor 
                                                 
48 Cited in: www.emol.com/noticias/documentos/evaluacion_lyd.asp  
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performance of the economy. Egaña (interview, January 2007) confirms 
this view: 
 
“I think that the Chile Solidario programme’s appearance 
came as a result of two very pragmatic political 
considerations rather than public policy issues. The question 
that was asked was: what can we do to recover political 
capital in a relatively complex economic crisis and in a 
political scenario where the government has been greatly 
discredited?”. 
 
5.3.7 The DIPRES office of the Ministry of Finance decided to 
address the problems of the poverty-alleviation system (CS-EE1) 
 
In 2001 and as a response to the discontent with the government’s 
strategy directed at the extremely poor, a group of experts from the 
finance ministry’s Direccion de Presupuesto (DIPRES) (Budget Office), led 
by its director Mario Marcel, decided to start analysing the safety net 
system for the poor in order to propose ways to improve it (Crispi, 
interview, September 2002)49. They considered that, given the failure of 
economic growth to reduce extreme poverty levels, improving the safety 
                                                 
49 DIPRES is the office allocating financial resources to ministries and other government 
agencies. Its main objective is to “secure an efficient use and allocation of public 
resources in accordance with fiscal policy, through the application of financial 
management, planning and control tools and systems” (DIPRES, 2004). This role gives 
DIPRES a privileged position inside the Chilean government to influence policies. 
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net system was the only option available to the government. As Moreno 
(interview, December 2006) states: 
 
“Marcel was proposing a modification to the non-contributory 
safety-net system of monetary transfers . . . his outlook was 
based on the stagnation in [extreme] poverty levels. . .”. 
 
The Chilean non-contributory safety net system, created during the 
military regime, comprised a group of means tested monetary transfers50. 
The Concertacion Alliance adopted the system as it was considered an 
appropriate palliative response to extremely poor individuals that were 
unable to benefit from the social investment programmes. As mentioned 
in Chapter Four, during the 1990s most of the Concertacion Alliance 
initiatives relating to these programmes were focused on increasing the 
amount of the transfers. 
 
DIPRES decided to start evaluating the system by contracting the World 
Bank to assess and propose alternatives to improve the system.  Many 
meetings between DIPRES and World Bank experts were conducted and 
about ten preliminary papers were produced by the Wold Bank during 
2001. By March 2002, DIPRES started hurrying the World Bank to finish 
the study and provide a document with final results and proposals (Crispi, 
interview, September 2002).  
                                                 
50 See Chapter Four. 
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In Crispi’s own words (interview, September 2002): 
 
“we were hurrying the World Bank people as we wanted 
their analysis quickly. . . we validated [our view] a lot with 
the [World Bank] experts’ analysis which was similar to our 
own”. 
 
Simultaneously, during 2001 DIPRES worked with Berta Teitelboim, the 
head of MIDEPLAN’s Social Studies Department, to analyse the 
characteristics of the extremely poor population as well as the level in 
which the safety net system was covering them. This information, 
obtained from the CASEN survey, allowed them to estimate the cost of a 
possible expansion of the system.  
 
Besides, during 2001 DIPRES invited an expert from the Spanish social 
security ministry to explain their approach. Interviewees suggest that by 
highlighting the key role that municipalities played in the Spanish system, 
the Spanish expert contributed to recognizing the importance of giving 
municipalities a central role as articulators of the safety net system and as 
a single access point where families can obtain the different benefits that 
the government offers (Crispi, interview, September 2002).  
 
As a result, by the end of 2001 DIPRES was able to identify the main 
weaknesses of the Chilean safety net system (Crispi, interview, September 
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2002). These flaws were a lack of integration between the different 
programmes of the system; disparities between programmes in their 
eligibility criteria for beneficiaries; absence of a focus on families as 
objective units (as most programmes were directed to individuals); 
existence of multiple and unclear ‘windows’ to access benefits; and 
excessive reliance of the system on the beneficiary’s initiative to apply for 
benefits.  
 
5.3.8 A new MIDEPLAN minister was appointed (CS-CE1) 
 
In January 2002, Cecilia Perez was appointed as new MIDEPLAN minister. 
Her arrival was part of an important restructure of Ricardo Lagos’ cabinet, 
with six new ministers arriving.  
 
Perez fitted the profile that President Lagos was looking for his cabinet, as 
a person coming from the civil society world and with previous experience 
in the poverty field (Perez, interview, January 2007). In effect, she 
occupied the post of executive director of the FNSP NGO during 2001.  
 
Some informants perceived her as a flexible and well regarded person by 
the president, lending support to the idea that this may have been a 
presidential move to start preparing the ministry to assume new roles and 
to strengthen its position inside government (Marquez interview, 
September 2002; Moreno, interview, December 2006). In their own words:  
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“Cecilia Perez did not have her own agenda nor did she 
contribute to the government´s agenda, she was told exactly 
what she had to do, and that came directly form La Moneda” 
(Moreno, interview, December 2006).  
 
Perez herself appears to confirm this view. She declares that inside 
government they were interested in having  
 
“an available and willing MIDEPLAN ministry, conducted by a 
minister qualified to understands the subject [of poverty]” 
(Perez, interview, January 2007).  
 
5.3.9 President Lagos instructed his new MIDEPLAN minister to 
start looking for new poverty-alleviation alternatives (CS-EE2) 
 
Immediately after arriving in office, Cecilia Perez was instructed by 
President Lagos to start thinking of new poverty-alleviation policy 
alternatives (Perez, interview, January 2007).  
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According to Perez,  
 
“the president had the clear intention of doing something 
new in the social field, something powerful in the areas of 
social exclusion and poverty . . . [because] he had very well 
addressed other social areas such as health, justice, labour 
and housing, all already incorporated into his agenda . . . so 
he asked me for proposals”.  
 
Hence, in order to fill this gap in the government’s agenda, Minister Perez 
started discussing with MIDEPLAN’s experts about possible policy 
alternatives.  
 
Marquez (interview, September 2002) comments on President Lagos’ 
reasons for addressing poverty: 
 
“[I heard ] Lagos mention that during his mandate he would 
be evaluated not by the components of his social policy 
[approach] such as participation or targeting levels, but by 
how many poor or extremelly poor were still living in Chile”. 
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5.3.10 FOSIS implemented programme Puente at the beginning 
of 2002 (CS-CE2) 
 
In January 2002, FOSIS started implementing programme Puente (Bridge), 
as a pilot programme aimed to improve the living conditions of extremely 
poor families. The programme commenced working in four regions of the 
country to help 14,000 extremely poor families. 
 
Veronica Silva, a social worker, was the person behind the creation of the 
programme. She arrived in FOSIS in 2001, after working as head of 
MIDEPLAN’s Social Division. Prior to this post, she worked at the populous 
La Florida Municipality in Santiago, where she obtained a direct experience 
of the problems affecting the poor. In 2000, during her position at 
MIDEPLAN, Silva designed the methodology behind the Puente 
programme, which she was able to materialize later while at FOSIS 
(MIDEPLAN, 2002). 
 
In many respects, programme Puente represented a significant departure 
from the traditional way in which the Chilean state addressed extreme 
poverty. For instance, the programme defined the family as its focus of 
attention (instead of individuals, as in most social programmes); it 
encouraged families to develop behaviours that improve their living 
conditions and facilitated their access to the social benefits that the state 
provides. The programme also provided psychosocial support to families. 
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The core of the programme was the establishment of an agreement 
between the beneficiary family and a programme representative, with the 
family committing to take appropriate actions to improve their socio-
economic situation. In exchange, the representative offered guidance, 
psychosocial assistance and information on how to access the existing 
government’s social benefits. 
 
5.3.11 DIPRES and MIDEPLAN suggested President Lagos a 
tentative poverty-alleviation policy alternative (CS-EE3) 
 
When arriving at MIDEPLAN in January 2002, Cecilia Perez contacted 
Veronica Silva as well as Berta Teitelboim, to respond to the President’s 
request. Soon they concluded that the Puente programme was a potential 
alternative to fulfil the President’s demand of a new poverty-alleviation 
programme. While still a very new programme working at a pilot phase, 
they considered that it was suitable of being enlarged to cover the entire 
country. After arriving at this conclusion, Perez had a meeting with the 
DIPRES group to present programme Puente as a potential new poverty-
alleviation programme, and to verify DIPRES’ opinions.  
 
The DIPRES group were clear that programme Puente would address 
many of the problems that they were detecting in the safety net system 
(Crispi, interview, September 2002). In effect, the programme was 
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suitable to serve as the single ‘entrance door’ to the government’s safety 
net system, allowing extremely poor families to access the entire 
government’s net of benefits. Besides, programme Puente would let the 
state to assume a more proactive role in its poverty-alleviation strategy, 
thanks to the role of the programme representative. 
 
A meeting between Cecilia Perez, the DIPRES group and President Lagos 
occurred by the end of January 2002, to present Ricardo Lagos these 
ideas. Cecilia Perez (interview, January 2007) expresses the reaction of 
President Lagos,  
 
“the President liked the idea . . . but at the same time he 
was doubtful, he said that he wanted to discuss this idea 
with other people; that he wanted to listen to different 
opinions”. 
 
5.3.12 President Lagos organized a meeting to validate and test 
the DIPRES-MIDEPLAN poverty-alleviation programme proposal 
(CS-EE4) 
 
Given the President’s doubts, DIPRES considered it appropriate to 
organize a meeting between the President and a wide group of social 
policy experts. It was envisaged that the participation of the President 
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would give the meeting an attractive Presidential status, thus securing the 
attendance of the experts (Crispi, interview, September 2002).  
 
In March 2002, President Lagos organized the meeting in his private office, 
where experts with different political views as well as government 
representatives from different ministries and NGO’s members attended. 
Particularly, attendants included advisers to the President, the minister of 
finance, the newly arrived MIDEPLAN minister, the head of programme 
Puente, FOSIS representatives and academic experts. Opposition views 
were represented by two social policy experts. 
 
The meeting started with a presentation made by Mario Marcel, the head 
of DIPRES, to highlight the problems that the Chilean safety net system 
was experiencing. Afterwards, the solution proposed by DIPRES and 
MIDEPLAN to the President was introduced as an alternative to address 
these problems. In this regard, Veronica Silva was able to explain the 
main features of programme Puente and to show the favourable initial 
evaluations that it was obtaining. She also suggested that the programme 
was suitable to be replicated at the national level.  
 
During the meeting President Lagos asked participants their opinions 
about the differed issues being discussed, particularly about the possible 
policy alternatives to address the problem of extreme poverty stagnation. 
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The meeting generated significant expectations among non-government 
participants who viewed it as the first step of an open and participatory 
policy-making process. A few weeks later, these expectations resulted 
unfulfilled as they concluded that the meeting was carried out only to 
validate an already well-advanced idea, rather than to generate an open 
and participatory policy-making process. These negative perceptions were 
a response to the celebratory manner in which the programme was 
launched, only one month after the meeting. In their own words,   
 
“the meeting was carried out just to announce us what the 
government was planning to do” (Baranda, interview, 
September 2003). 
 
 “everything was well cooked before they invited us to the 
meeting . . . at most they were trying to obtain a last minute 
validation from people involved in the subject” (Irarrazaval, 
interview, September 2003). 
 
“in my opinion, the only reason for the meeting to occur was 
to say that they consulted all these organisations” (Esposito, 
interview, September 2003 ). 
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Minister Peres herself confirms this view: 
 
“[in the meeting] there was no debate at all, it was more a 
sort of checking . . .  a practice employed by the president. 
But after that it was a completely internal construction that 
applied financial and political logic” (Perez, interview, 
January 2007). 
 
5.3.13 President Ricardo Lagos became convinced that a new 
poverty-alleviation programme was feasible (CS-EE5) 
 
Some meeting participants agreed that the main role of the meeting was 
that it allowed President Lagos to realize that a new programme to 
overcome extreme poverty was feasible (Crispi, Marquez, interviews, 
September 2002). Lagos ended the meeting encouraged by the idea of 
creating such a programme and many participants left the meeting with 
the certainty that this programme will become a reality, thanks to the 
President’s will. Cecilia Perez was of the view that the meeting allowed 
confirmation of their ideas, thus legitimizing the poverty-alleviation 
alternative that they were trying to introduce (Perez, interview, January 
2007).  
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In Perez’ words: 
 
“what happened in that meeting was that all our hypotheses 
were confirmed, which provided a tremendous legitimacy . . .  
the President was seeking to legitimize [the programme] 
that we wanted to implement . . . what was presented were 
just sketches of what we were trying to do, a diagnosis of 
the situation and some clues as to what we wanted to do”. 
 
The fact that during the meeting President Lagos showed a clear interest 
in creating a new programme prompted some of the participants to 
advance independently in designing the programme (Crispi, interview, 
September 2002). In effect, after the meeting with the President, three 
different groups inside the government started independently designing 
the future Chile Solidario programme. Apart from the DIPRES group, 
MIDEPLAN started working on the proposal autonomously as well as a 
group formed by some Lagos advisers.  
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According to Crispi (interview, September 2002): 
 
“The President ended the meeting convinced that something 
needed to be done, so we all left the meeting thinking that 
we were going to do something in this area, specially given 
(President) Lagos’ interest . . . we were planning on waiting 
for the final results of the [World Bank study] to decide what 
to do . . . [however] unintentionally we triggered some 
political dynamics with that meeting, so different groups 
[inside the government] started developing projects and 
ideas. . . we were thinking in longer terms. Our idea was 
that during the 21st of May [presidential message] only a 
small mention of what we were doing would be made and 
that we would have the rest of the year to think and design, 
but everything accelerated given the high interest of the 
President and the fact that different groups started working”. 
 
5.3.14 President Lagos commanded DIPRES to conclude the Chile 
Solidario policy-making process (CS-EE6) 
 
In light of this competition to influence and ultimately design the 
programme, the DIPRES group claimed to the President their authority to 
conclude the policy-making process. Lagos accepted DIPRES’ request but 
with the condition of having the programme ready to be launched during 
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his next message to the nation on the 21st of May, that is, just in one 
month time, a requirement that DIPRES accepted.  
 
Interviewees confirms the existence of discrepancies inside the 
government regarding the new poverty-alleviation programme. They recall 
that during the Chile Solidario policy-making process,  
 
“internal discussions were strong, we disagreed frequently, 
we argued, both inside MIDEPLAN and with the DIPRES” 
(Perez, interview, January 2007).  
 
“there were weeks of friction, debate and discussion with 
people from other parts of government about what to do” 
(Crispi, interview, September 2002). 
 
In this period, the final Chile Solidario design was accomplished frantically 
by the DIPRES group, with the support of MIDEPLAN. The design process 
included two discussion meetings with some of the experts that attended 
the president’s meeting. DIPRES had to negotiate some characteristics of 
the programme with the powerful group of advisers to the president that 
were also working in the programme, which resulted in a final design that 
compromised the views of the two groups (Crispi, interview, September 
2002).  
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In general terms, the president’s advisers were trying to maximize the 
political impact of the programme by tying to it a new monetary transfer 
to beneficiary families. The DIPRES group was contrary to this new 
transfer, as they viewed no need to create a new monetary benefit. 
Instead, they preferred improving the working of the existing ones. At the 
end of the day, DIPRES was forced to accept the introduction of a new 
monetary transfer, although obtaining a reduction in its amount and 
limiting its provision only as long as beneficiary families remained in the 
programme (Crispi, interview, September 2002). In Crispi’s words 
(interview, September 2002): 
 
“what arose from all this was that our design had to be 
modified a litlle bit, so the Bono Familiar (Family transfer) 
was introduced even though it was not in our original plan. 
We had no interest in introducing new instruments as we 
thought there were enough monetary transfers. What was 
needed was to put them in order and to improve the way in 
which the existing instruments targeted that (population) 
group”. 
 
Crispi (interview, September 2002) explains that the final Chile Solidario 
policy-making process “was like fitting pieces of a puzzle together”. One 
important piece in this puzzle was MIDEPLAN, which provided the 
institutional setting for the programme. In the final Chile Solidario design, 
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MIDEPLAN was given the role of coordinating and overseeing the 
implementation of the programme, resulting in a total re-alignment of its 
traditional duties.  This was clearly a win-win situation for MIDEPLAN as 
this new role allowed a strengthening of its weakened position inside 
government. According to Crispi, at the time when Chile Solidario was 
being designed, MIDEPLAN was like an institution looking for a reason to 
exist, and Chile Solidario became that reason (Crispi, interview, September 
2002)51. In Crispi’s own words (interview, September 2002): 
 
“one question was who was going to implemented the 
programme. There were people saying that this should be 
the duty of the Superintendencia de Seguridad Social (Social 
Security Superintendency) as they were already 
administering some monetary transfers. (However) we said 
that the huge MIDEPLAN infrastructure would be needed . . . 
it was time for MIDEPLAN to assume a powerful role . . .” 
 
A final ingredient in the Chile Solidario design was the CASEN survey, 
which allowed defining the target group of the programme. As already 
mentioned, the 2000 version of the CASEN survey dimensioned poverty 
and extreme poverty in the country. These figure let DIPRES to establish 
that the Chile Solidario programme should be targetted at all families 
living in extreme poverty by 2000, equivalent to 225,000 families 
                                                 
51 See Appendix 2. 
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according to the CASEN survey. Hence, the availability of this data during 
the policy-making process of Chile Solidario was fundamental in defining 
the number of potential beneficiaries of the programme. 
 
5.3.15 President Lagos launched the Chile Solidario programme 
(CS-EE7) 
 
The 21st of May 2002, when delivering his third message to the nation, 
Ricardo Lagos announced the creation of programme Chile Solidario. In 
this discourse, President Lagos adopted the same goal that ex-president 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle pursued unsuccessfully: to eradicate extreme 
poverty from the country. Particularly, Lagos stated that:  
 
“it is a decision of my government that by the end of my 
mandate the social drama of extreme poverty and misery 
will no longer exist in Chile. Today, May 21st 2002, we can 
and should assume a big goal: to free Chile from extreme 
poverty!” (Lagos, 2002). 
 
 259 
Perez (interview, January 2007) comments that very few people inside the 
government were aware that this programme was going to be launched: 
 
“on May 21st the President announced the programme and it 
was a tremendous political hit because he did not tell 
anybody about it and people from the Concertación Alliance 
were not informed about what the president was going to 
announce in that area. In general, President Lagos was not 
used to making his messages known in advance”. 
 
By May 2003 Chile Solidario had incorporated 55,000 families (Lagos, 
2003) and by December 2004 the number of beneficiary families reached 
166,000 (Lagos, 2004).  
 
5.3.16 The law creating the Chile Solidario programme was sent 
to Congress (CS-LE1) 
 
In September 2002, the law creating the Chile Solidario programme was 
sent to Congress. The law was aimed at securing funds for the 
programme and to modify MIDEPLAN’s duties to undertake its new role as 
manager of the programme. During the legislative process some details of 
the programme were modified. Finally, the law was passed with a 
significant majority in May 2004. 
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5.3.17 Summary 
 
The above narrative shows that in no more than one year, a big-scale and 
completely new poverty-alleviation programme was created, aimed at 
eradicate extreme poverty from the country. It was also shown that the 
final phase of the policy-making process was accomplished in just one 
month. 
 
Main events that affected the Chile Solidario policy-making process 
included the stagnation of extreme poverty levels by the end of the 1990s, 
which led social policy experts to conclude that the prevailing poverty-
alleviation policy approach was failing. As a response, the Ministry of 
Finance’s DIPRES office decided autonomously in 2001 to start analysing 
options to deal with this problem.  
 
In addition, the government approval ratings were decreasing 
continuously, a fact linked to the weak economic performance experienced 
since 1999. An important ministerial reshuffle occurred at the beginning of 
2002 when a new MIDEPLAN minister was appointed. At that moment, 
President Lagos asked his new MIDEPLAN minister to start thinking of 
policy alternatives in order to introduce a ‘powerful’ programme into the 
poverty arena.  
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MIDEPLAN and DIPRES experts joined forces to fulfil the presidential 
request, and soon they discovered the recently implemented programme 
Puente, an innovative poverty-alleviation programme directed at the 
extremely poor. DIPRES and MIDEPLAN officials visualized this programme 
as the entrance door to the new programme that they were planning to 
create. They presented their ideas to President Lagos, who was interested 
but doubtful about them.  
 
A meeting between the President and a wide group of social policy experts 
to discuss the DIPRES-MIDEPLAN policy alternative was crucial in the 
series of process events. The meeting confirmed the appropriateness of 
the DIPRES-MIDEPLAN proposal, and covinced President Lagos about the 
soundness of such a policy option.  
 
From there on, the Chile Solidario policy-making accelerated dramatically, 
as President Lagos asked DIPRES to have the programme designed before 
his message to the nation to be delivered in just one month’s time.  
 
Clearly, President Ricardo Lagos emerges as the main process actor in the 
Chile Solidario policy-making process, thanks to his central role as 
accelerator of the process, both by asking his new MIDEPLAN minister to 
develop policy alternatives to address extreme poverty, and by requesting 
DIPRES to design the programme after feeling confident about its 
technical soundness.  
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Another relevant process actor was the DIPRES team, particularly its 
director Mario Marcel and Jaime Crispi, the Head of DIPRES’ Studies 
Department, as they initiated and commanded the entire policy-making 
process.  
 
Cecilia Perez, the MIDEPLAN’s minister, searched for policy alternatives to 
address extreme poverty inside MIDEPLAN, and collaborated later with 
DIPRES to design the final programme. Veronica Silva, the head of 
programme Puente, was also relevant as she designed and promoted this 
programme which later became the core of the Chile Solidario programme. 
 
Secondary actors that influenced the process were experts that 
participated in the programme’s design discussions, particularly a group of 
advisers to the president who pressed for the introduction of a new 
monetary transfer into the programme. Besides, World Bank experts who 
were contracted by DIPRES to study the Chilean safety net system, as well 
as a social policy expert from the Spanish government contributed with 
their expertise during the initial stage of the process. 
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5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
By mapping the policy-making process of the three programmes under 
study, this chapter has addressed the first aim of this thesis as well as 
answering the related research questions. These questions relate to the 
main events and actors involved in the processes. 
 
Regarding predominant events, the mapping shows that political events 
played a significant role in the evolution of the processes. These events 
included the return of democracy, changes in administration, the arrival of 
new ministers, the Concertacion Alliance (and Presidential) commitment to 
address poverty, a reduction in government’s approval ratings and the 
setting of a presidential meeting with social policy experts. For instance, in 
the case of the FOSIS policy-making process, the fact that the country 
was returning to democracy shaped the process as it allowed Concertacion 
Alliance politicians to apply a technical and consultative policy-making 
approach. In the Chile Barrio policy-making process, in addition to the 
importance that the Concertacion Alliance gave to improving equity and 
social justice in the country, the personal commitment of president Frei to 
address the problem of poverty was fundamental to arrive to a new 
poverty-alleviation programme. In the Chile Solidario policy-making 
process, the organization of a Presidential meeting with social policy 
experts served to validate a particular policy alternative and to accelerate 
the process.  
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As well as political considerations, socio-economic events were also 
relevant. They included the economic cycle, the size and trajectory of 
poverty and the occurrence of a significant rural-urban migration. For 
example, in the case of the FOSIS policy-making process, the economic 
crisis that affected the country during the 1980s increased poverty 
incidence to extremely high levels, which motivated Concertacion Alliance 
politicians to address this problem by incorporating an innovative 
programme into the government’s initial agenda. In the case of the Chile 
Barrio policy-making process, the rural-urban migration that occurred in 
Chile throughout the 20th century gave rise to  Campamentos which the 
Chile Barrio programme aimed to eradicate. In the Chile Solidario policy-
making process, the stagnation of extreme poverty levels during the 
second half of the 1990s directed policy experts to criticize the prevailing 
anti-poverty approach, and government officials to initiate studies to 
address this problem.  
 
Other process events were related to occurrences in existing programmes, 
policies, or institutions related to the social policy field. They included the 
failure of a poverty-alleviation programme, criticism of existing policy 
approaches, a crisis in a ministry of the social policy area and the 
existence of poverty-alleviation programmes under implementation both 
inside and outside the country. For instance, in the FOSIS and Chile Barrio 
processes, the knowledge of poverty-alleviation programmes under 
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implementation in the Latin American region helped Chilean policy-makers 
to define a policy alternative to address poverty. In the Chile Solidario 
policy-making process, the existence of programme Puente was central to 
the design of the final Chile Solidario programme design. 
 
The availability of poverty-related data, obtained mainly from the CASEN 
series of surveys, was also an important event in the policy-making 
processes. It allowed policy-makers to have a clear and fresh 
understanding of poverty and its evolution in the country. It also helped 
raise the extent and effects of poverty among social policy experts and 
influenced public opinion. For instance, in the FOSIS policy-making 
process, the CASEN data enabled a recognition of the critical levels that 
poverty had reached by the end of the 1990s. In the Chile Barrio 
programme, a data set on the extent of Campamentos justified focusing 
the Chile Barrio programme on the inhabitants of Campamentos. In the 
Chile Solidario policy-making process, CASEN poverty data supported the 
fact that extreme poverty remained stagnant for nearly four years, and 
also helped to demarcate the target group of the programme as families 
identified as extremely poor by the survey. 
 
In relation to main process actors, the chapter has demonstrated that the 
Chilean policy-making process of poverty alleviation programmes is 
overwhelmingly controlled by top level political actors inside the 
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government, with little or no influence from middle-rank government 
officials and from actors outside the government.  
 
In the words of  Benito Baranda, director of the main chilean poverty-
related charity (interview, September 2003): 
 
“these programmes have been designed in a very self-
centred manner and under the control of the state . . . 
sometimes it is claimed that they benefited from private-
sector or third sector experience, but the participation levels 
have been low . . . and if participation levels are low among 
groups like ours who work alongside the country for the poor 
and extremely poor, then the participation levels of those 
directly affected by these programmes are much lower. Most 
of these programmes . . . were announced by the state for 
political reasons, or [at least] they were launched in advance 
for political reasons”. 
 
The cases show that Presidents have a predominant role in the policy-
making process as they are able to influence, accelerate, or initiate the 
process. For instance, President Aylwin influenced the process through his 
political style, open to agreement and accord inside the alliance. President 
Frei influenced the policy-making process of programme Chile Barrio, 
given his interest in having a poverty-alleviation programme representing 
 267 
a concrete and results-oriented approach. Finally, while the Chile Solidario 
policy-making process was initiated by public officials at DIPRES, President 
Lagos clearly accelerated the process as soon as he intervened in it. 
 
The significance of other top government officials in the process shouldn’t 
be overseen. Particularly, ministers played significant roles in the policy-
making process of the three programmes programmes. In the FOSIS case, 
Sergio Molina (later MIDEPLAN minister) has been labeled as the ‘father’ 
of the group in charge of designing the programme. While not a minister 
at that moment, Molina was clearly a high level political figure inside the 
Concertacion Alliance. Housing minister Edmundo Hermosilla was 
responsible for the Chile Barrio design process after being instructed by 
president Frei to create it. He proposed the broad Chile Barrio features to 
president Frei and delegated more specific design details to a group of 
experts. Finally, in the case of the Chile Solidario programme, a group 
from the powerful DIPRES office, led by its director Mario Marcel initiated 
and conducted the entire process. 
 
Mid-level poverty experts inside ministries contributed to the final form of 
the programmes. Their presence allowed technical considerations to be 
introduced into the processes, particularly during their final design stage, 
thanks to their field experience with poverty, and/or designing and 
implementing other poverty-alleviation programmes. For instance, in the 
case of the FOSIS process, the inclusion of two experts with previous 
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experience in social funds into the group in charge of designing the new 
government’s programme was key to reaching the decision of creating 
FOSIS. In the Chile Barrio process, experts from the Ministry of Housing 
were able to define some key characteristics of the programme, thanks to 
their proximity to the housing minister and to their participation in the 
group of experts that designed the programme once its broad features 
were established. In the Chile Solidario process, the participation of FOSIS 
poverty experts, involved in implementing programme Puente, was 
fundamental to influencing the final features of programme Chile Solidario. 
 
Finally, relevant actors in the policy-making process of the programmes 
were international organisations that provided their expertise to the 
process and that advocated for particular policy alternatives. For instance, 
international organisations were advocating the creation of social funds in 
Latin America during the FOSIS policy-making process. Besides, at the 
beginning of the Chile Solidario policy-making process, the World Bank 
was contracted by the Ministry of Finance to study and evaluate the 
Chilean safety net system. 
 
In synthesis, political events and top-level political actors appear to be 
central in the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process. In this 
policy arena top-level actors inside government are able to create new 
programmes in a very autonomous and isolated way, free from 
negotiations or discussions with other non-government actors. While some 
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debates occur among government politicians and experts, as was the case 
during the Chile Solidario policy-making process, discussions with other 
non-government actors are absent or are deemed irrelevant. Particularly, 
the FOSIS and the Chile Barrio policy-making processes developed entirely 
inside small groups of government politicians and experts. While a 
Presidential meeting with a group of government and non-government 
experts was conducted at the final stages of the Chile Solidario policy-
making process, it remained entirely under the control of government 
actors who timed the meeting in such a way that they never risked loosing 
their control of the process. An explanation of this particular policy-making 
dynamic is provided in Chapter Six. 
 
 270 
Chapter Six 
Understanding the Chilean 
Poverty-alleviation policy-making process 
 
In a presidentialistic country like Chile, rather than the backing of a 
minister you need the backing of the president, a father figure that is 
willing to get angry to obtain results”  
 (Key interviewee, speaking about the creation process of poverty-
alleviation programmes in Chile) 
 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the evolution of the processes 
mapped in Chapter Five, and while doing so, to discuss which one of the 
theoretical frameworks presented in Chapter Two is most suitable for 
understanding the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process. 
 
The figures that map the policy-making process of the three cases that 
were included in Chapter Five are also incorporated in the present Chapter 
to help identifying the different process events cited in this Chapter. 
Similarly, three figures that identify the type of actors involved in each 
event of the cases are also presented here. These figures help finding 
similarities in the type of actors that participate across the three processes.  
 
The Chapter starts with a section that argues that none of the three 
policy-making processes showed advocacy during their development. As a 
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result, it is proposed that the cases do not support theories that include 
advocacy as one of the main forces behind the policy-making process, 
such as Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework or Baumgartner and 
Jones’ Punctuated Equilibrium Model. This consideration applies also to 
the Transaction Cost Approach, given its assumption of multiple players 
competing in a game-like policy-making process.   
 
The following section highlights that the main actors in the three cases 
were top-level politicians inside government, mainly the president and 
ministers, with little or no influence from other actors. This result confirms 
the predictions of Grindle and Thomas’ model regarding the relevance that 
policy elites have in policy-making in developing countries. However, it is 
also highlighted that this models presents limitations to understand the 
underlying mechanisms driving the processes.  
 
The next section reviews the cases to see if they fit the Multiple Stream 
Model. The Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process is found to 
contain lively political and problems streams. However, the analysis finds 
that a proper policies stream is missing in this case. The final section 
presents the main conclusions of the Chapter. 
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Figure 6.1 
FOSIS policy-making process 
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Figure 6.2 
Chile Barrio policy-making process 
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Figure 6.3 
Chile Solidario policy-making process 
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6.1 A PROCESS THAT LACKS ADVOCACY 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework 
requires ‘mature’ policy subsystems for the framework to be applicable 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999:135). This requirement is related to the 
capacity of policy subsystems to formulate policies. 
 
A similar consideration also applies to the Punctuated Equilibrium Model. 
In this model, discussions of political issues develop in a number of issue-
oriented policy subsystems. The model states that policies change as a 
result of policy advocacy from actors that are able to break the policy 
monopoly of one of these policy subsystems (True, Jones and 
Baumgartner, 1999:99).  
 
In Chile, policy discussion and analysis started very slowly with the return 
of democracy in 1990, taking place only among a very limited group of 
experts and government officials. 
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According to Montes (interview, July 2003): 
 
“there is litlle debate about today’s social reality and about 
what the appropriate social policy is for present times. This 
is a debate that should have existed prior to the creation of 
new institutions and I think it is missing . . . there is a lack of 
diagnosis . . . political parties have no opinion of these issues, 
and universities are not interested either . . . i think that to a 
certain degree we have duplicated the U.S. experience. 
However we have missed a stage, we have not assumed our 
ouw reality”. 
 
The military government that ruled the country between 1973 and 1989 
abolished all democratic institutions and policy discussion was inexistent. 
Decision-making was carried out in a very closed and centralized way. Any 
opposition to the regime suffered repression and public participation 
remained absent from public policy discussions. In 1990, the new 
democratic government assumed institutions and procedures that, most 
often, were non-participatory. Under this situation, policy discussion and 
advocacy in the country remained limited to small groups of experts, most 
of them linked to the government52.  
 
                                                 
52 Chapter Seven studies in deeper detail the reasons behind this lack of policy advocacy.  
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The mapping presented in Chapter Five confirms the absence of advocacy 
in the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process. The FOSIS policy-
making process was initiated and conducted entirely by the political elite 
of the Concertacion Alliance, following only their drive to address poverty 
by creating a programme that differentiated from the military palliative 
and paternalistic anti-poverty approach (FO-EE1, FO-EE2, FO-EE3). In 
the case of the Chile Barrio policy-making process a Concertacion Alliance 
congressmen advocated for a change in the housing policy directed to the 
poor (CB-PE6). However his input was only an exception in a process 
that was overwhelmingly driven by president Frei and his housing minister 
Hermosilla (CB-EE1, CB-EE2, CB-EE3, CB-EE4). Finally, the Chile 
Solidario policy-making process also lacked advocacy, as it started due to 
DIPRES’s autonomous decision of studying and improving the country’s 
safety net system to confront the stagnancy that extreme poverty was 
showing at that time, and continued under DIPRES’ control (CS-EE1, CS-
EE3, CS-EE6). As mapped in Chapter Five, during the final stages of the 
policy-making process some debates occurred among policy elites from 
different government institutions (CS-EE6). However, this limited level of 
intra-government discussions during the policy-making process of this 
programme can hardly justify the view that policy advocacy is a central 
element of the process.   
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As Etchegaray (interview, September 2003) comments: 
 
“the vast majority of Chilean public policies are top-down. 
This is a very authoritarian country. People in public 
positions think they know everything, and on top of that, 
that fostering participation is costly, cumbersome and 
laborious”. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Transaction Costs Approach also 
assumes that the policy-making process is driven by different actors that 
advocate for their preferred policy views. This approach has been used to 
study the policy-making process in Latin American countries by focusing 
on the balance of power that exists between the executive and congress, 
and on the impact that this balance has on the ability of governments to 
put forward laws required to implement programmes (IADB, 2006).  
 
Evidence from the present research weakens the relevance of the balance 
of power between government and congress during the poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process for a number of reasons. First, having a law was 
needed only in some of the cases under study as in other cases the 
programme was implemented without pursuing a law. In effect, the 
creation of programme Chile Barrio did not require passing a law, as no 
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new special funds were needed53. Instead, the programme was created by 
a presidential decree that established a directorate to coordinate the 
actions of the programme, formed by government members and headed 
by the minister of housing. Funds for the programme were redirected from 
the Ministry of Housing budget. Hence, in this case the balance of power 
between the government and the political opposition in congress, or the 
level of agreement between these actors in relation to the programme 
was completely irrelevant. Second, in some of the cases studied, the 
implementation stage of the process started before any law related to the 
programme was passed by congress. For instance and as explained in 
Chapter Five, the Chile Solidario programme started being implemented by 
mid 2002, while the law related to this programme was passed by 
congress in May 2004. Third, in this case sending a law to congress was a 
choice of the government rather than a requirement to implement the 
programme. According to one interviewee (in the case of the Chile 
Solidario programme) some top level government politicians considered 
that a law was not required in this case (Egaña, interview, January 2007).  
                                                 
53 Chilean legislation obliges governments to discuss in congress any policy innovation 
involving additional resources. The government’s budget is discussed yearly in congress 
and any budget increase should be a matter of law. See: Aninat et al (2006). 
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In Egaña’s words, 
 
 “Chile Solidario may have been implemented without a 
law . . . a big political discussion occurred about why the 
Lagos administration was sending this law, when a law was 
not required . . . [I think] it was send to create a political 
event, to institutionalize a policy view, because when there 
exists a law there are certain obligations, and also [because] 
the law may have been needed to give MIDEPLAN additional 
powers than the ones that its original law gave it” (Egaña, 
interview). 
 
It may be concluded that theories that consider multiple actors engaging 
in policy advocacy and policy competition as central elements of the 
policy-making process such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the 
Punctuated Equilibrium Model, and the Transaction Cost Approach may be 
applicable only to those policy arenas where many actors are involved in 
the policy-making process, and when these actors share enough power to 
be able to compete and advocate for their particular views. Clearly, this 
was not the case in the Chilean poverty scene during the 1990s. 
 
Chapter Seven will highlight that this lack of advocacy was a particularity 
of the poverty-alleviation policy-making arena, as some pressure from 
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different actors existed in other social policy areas. Possible explanations 
to this difference are discussed there. 
  
6.2 A PROCESS DRIVEN BY GOVERNMENT’S POLICY-ELITES  
 
6.2.1 Presidents 
 
As Chapter Two demonstrated, the weight of Presidents or Heads of State 
in the policy-making process has been highlighted in different studies on 
the subject (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Kingdon, 1995; Mainwaring and 
Soberg, 1997; Grindle, 2000; Grindle, 2002). In the particular case of 
Chile, there are good reasons to consider the President as the most 
important political actor, given the ‘presidentialistic’ nature of the political 
system (Faundez, 1997; Siavelis, 1997). This idea is based on the 
significant powers that Presidents have in the country, especially in 
relation to other state powers such as the congress. According to these 
authors, a preponderant role of Presidents in the political system has 
existed in Chile since 1932, including the 40 years of uninterrupted 
democratic life that followed that date.  Later, under the military regime, 
the power of the President was strengthened as the military applied a 
centralized style of command and abolished any alternative democratic 
power. Besides, a new constitution introduced in 1980 by the military 
reinforced the role of the President. While some modifications were made 
to this constitution with the arrival of democracy in 1990, the core of it 
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has continued to provide the main guidelines of Chilean law under the 
Concertacion Alliance governments. In particular, the Chilean constitution 
let the President to control the legislative process and set the legislative 
agenda by declaring executive urgencies, when an immediate discussion 
of the President’s proposal must be carried out by congress delaying the 
consideration of other issues and laws. Besides, the President is allowed to 
call the legislature into extraordinary sessions. Apart from these powers, 
the Chilean constitution provides the President with additional means, 
particularly to exercise authority in all matters that are not of a legal 
nature. On top of that, there are certain informal elements that reinforce 
President’s authority in the political process, such as their visibility, the 
weight of their image and opinions in a traditionally presidential 
government, and their role as symbols of the nation (Siavelis, 1997:331). 
As a result, it is recognized that under the Concertacion Alliance,  
 
“the Chilean presidency remains one of the most powerful in 
Latin America and the world, with broad powers to control 
the legislative process” (Siavelis, 1997:322). 
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Figure 6.4 
FOSIS policy-making process 
Map of actors 
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Figure 6.5 
Chile Barrio policy-making process 
Map of actors 
 
 
 
CB-PE2
CB-EE1
The President
(Eduardo Frei)
CB-PE8
The President
(Eduardo Frei)
CB-PE4  
The Episode  
(1996-1997)
CB-PE3 
Prior Events
Later 
Events
Contemporaneous Events
CB-PE1  
CB-PE5 
CB-PE7 
The President
(Eduardo Frei)
CB-EE2
The President
(Eduardo Frei)
CB-CE1 
Career Civil Servants
(Members of the UDF 
unit)
CB-CE2 
Career Civil Servants
(Members of the DITEC 
unit)
CB-EE4 
The Minister of Housing
(Edmundo Hermosilla)
CB-LE1
CB-PE6
The Congress
A Congressman
(Carlos Montes)
CB-EE5 
Career Civil Servants
(From different ministries)
CB-EE6
The President
(Eduardo Frei)
CB-EE3
The Minister of Housing
(Edmundo Hermosilla)
Career Civil Servants
(Members of the UDF and DITEC units)
 285 
Figure 6.6 
Chile Solidario policy-making process 
Map of actors 
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Given the relevant position that Presidents have had in the Chilean 
political system it is not a surprise to find that they also played a 
prominent role in the less formal policy-making process. Presidents were 
central figures in the policy-making process of all poverty-alleviation 
programmes studied. The degree in which they influenced the process 
varied from case to case, but always the President’s backing was a 
fundamental prerequisite for a new programme to be created.  
 
Sometimes the President’s involvement was highly visible as when the 
President himself proposed the creation of a specific programme. This was 
the case of the Chile Barrio programme, commissioned by President Frei 
to his housing minister to address the housing needs of the poor (CB-
EE2). Something similar occurred during the Chile Solidario process, as 
President Lagos asked Cecilia Perez, his new MIDEPLAN minister, to start 
looking for policy alternatives in the area of poverty (CS-EE2).   
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As Perez stated (interview, January 2007): 
 
“before the 21st of may, 2002 [the President] instructed us 
to start working with DIPRES . . . to design a powerful 
programme to fight poverty . . . then the President asked me 
for proposals . . . [the Chile Solidario programme] was not 
something that came out directly from [the President’s] 
mind, but very soon he started linking ideas . . . he wanted 
to be sure that the design would work and that it was 
technically sound. Should we be able to guarantee that, then 
he would provide his full support”. 
 
In this case, the President’s influence also accelerated the process by 
asking DIPRES to have the programme ready to be launched during his 
message to the nation (CS-EE6). Only in the FOSIS programme policy-
making process the President played a less decisive role, as he did not 
participate directly in the process. However, the mapping of the FOSIS 
policy-making process highlighted that Aylwin’s personality contributed to 
the consensual approach that was used to create his government 
programme, including the FOSIS programme (FO-EE2). Besides, it was 
also noticed that the first Concertacion Alliance government was assuming 
power in a very particular scenario, when democracy returned to the 
country (FO-CE1). At that moment, the Concertacion Alliance realized the 
need to apply a consensual governmental approach to highlight the unity 
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of the Alliance, which reduced the possibility of a more ‘presidentialistic’ 
policy-making process (FO-EE2).  
 
The significance of Presidents in the Chilean policy-making process is 
congruent with evidence about the social policy process in the Latin 
American region. In effect, Grindle’s (2002) study of cases of social policy 
reform during the 1990s in Latin America, concluded that Presidents 
played a significant role in these policy-making processes. She focuses the 
analysis on reforms applied to the health, education and pensions sectors. 
According to her, 
 
“case studies of education and health reform suggest that 
these issues got on public agendas because specific political 
actors – usually presidents, or ministers with the support of 
presidents- made specific choices to put them there” 
(Grindle, 2002:102).  
 
In synthesis, the President is the single most important and decisive 
process actor in the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process, a 
situation that also occurs in the Latin American region in relation to other 
types of social policies. The three cases under study showed that the form 
in which Presidents influenced the policy-making processes varied 
according to their personal style or to the context of their governments, 
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ranging from a very explicit role as process initiators to a less direct role 
as inspirers or accelerators of a particular policy-making process.  
 
6.2.2 Ministers  
 
As cited in Chapter Two, ministers and other political appointees may be 
highly relevant in the policy-making process by raising an issue to the 
government’s agenda or by generating policy alternatives to fulfil a 
request from the president.   
  
The mapping presented in Chapter Five showed that ministers, or 
individuals with an equivalent rank inside government, were the main 
coordinators of the policy-making processes under analysis. Hence, while 
Presidents’ influence was related to defining main agenda issues and to 
decide addressing a particular problem, ministers usually engaged in the 
process of arriving at concrete programmes, a role that may be described 
as ‘policy-process managers’. As mapped, the FOSIS process occurred 
when the Aylwin’s government programme was being developed six 
months before its arrival to power, making impossible for a minister to be 
present in this process. However, two of the most important process 
actors assumed later as ministers. In fact, some key individuals that 
participated in the process were high-level Concertacion Alliance politicians 
and experts, in a privileged position to assume as ministers later (FO-
EE3). This was the case of Sergio Molina, who became MIDEPLAN 
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minister during the Aylwin’s administration, and education minister under 
President Frei. It was also the case of Alvaro Garcia, who was appointed 
as economy minister during the Frei administration and as SEGPRES 54 
minister under the Lagos government. This supports the idea that the 
relevance of ministers in the policy-making process may be linked more to 
their privileged connection ‘up’ to the President than to the institutional 
resources that the duty of minister involve. 
 
The Chile Barrio policy-making process was conducted by Hermundo 
Hermosilla, the minister of housing, after being instructed by President 
Frei to create such a programme (CB-EE2). By following suggestions from 
experts inside the housing ministry, Hermosilla was able to define the 
main features of the programme and to present them to President Frei 
(CB-EE3). Later, he created a group of experts from different ministries 
to design the programme in all its details (CB-EE4). 
 
In the case of the Chile Solidario policy-making process, a group of 
experts from DIPRES, the budget office inside the ministry of finance, led 
by its director Mario Marcel initiated and managed the process (CS-EE1). 
Besides, the newly arrived minister of MIDEPLAN helped DIPRES to design 
the programme during the final stages of the process (CS-EE2, CS-EE3). 
While DIPRES is a middle rank institution inside the Chilean government, 
formally inferior to a ministry, its duties and powers to allocate financial 
                                                 
54 Secretaria General de la Presidencia (General Secretary of the president). 
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resources to ministries transform it into a high level actor inside 
government. Hence, it may be argued that the head of DIPRES occupies a 
position of equal or higher relevance than that of a traditional minister.  
 
In synthesis, ministers or equivalent political appointees were fundamental 
process actors in the three poverty-alleviation cases, performing the role 
of process managers. This key role resulted from their privileged position 
inside government and particularly from the political support and direct 
link that they had with the President. 
 
6.2.3 Career civil servants and government experts  
 
Mid-level civil servants and experts inside government played secondary 
roles in the policy-making process of the three programmes studied. They 
contributed with their expertise and experience during the design phase of 
the processes. For instance, in the case of the FOSIS programme, about 
ten social policy experts designed the programme (FO-EE3). Some of 
them, such as Alvaro Garcia and Nicolas Flaño, led the process thanks to 
their previous experience in this area. In the case of the Chile Barrio 
programme, groups of government experts participated during different 
stages of the policy-making process. Experts from the Ministry of Housing 
contributed to define the fundamental features of the programme, such as 
the convenience of having a programme that addressed all the needs of 
the poor and not just their housing needs (CB-CE1). Later, a group of 
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experts formed by members of different ministries provided the final 
details of the programme (CB-EE5). In the case of the Chile Solidario 
policy-making process, the DIPRES group, composed by the head of the 
office plus two other experts, participated in all the stages of the policy-
making process (CS-EE1, CS-EE3, CS-EE6). This group interacted with 
experts from MIDEPLAN to design the programme (CS-EE3). 
 
These results are in line with the secondary role that the Grindle and 
Thomas (1991) model as well as the Kingdon (1995) model give to middle 
level civil servants and experts in the policy-making process. 
 
6.2.4 Other actors  
 
Apart from the individuals already mentioned, cases included other actors 
playing secondary roles in the processes. This was the case of 
international organisations and their staff members. For instance, in the 
Chile Solidario policy-making process, DIPRES contracted the World Bank 
to study the Chilean safety net system and to suggest alternatives to 
improve it (CS-EE1). Proposals from this investigation were incorporated 
later in the final Chile Solidario design.  Besides, during the FOSIS policy-
making process, the World Bank and the UN’s PREALC were active players 
in promoting the development of social funds in the Latin American region 
(FO-PE3). 
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Another secondary process actor was Carlos Montes, a Concertacion 
Alliance member of congress who played a role in the Chile Barrio policy-
making process. From his post as the head of the housing commission of 
congress he criticised the government’s housing policy directed at the 
poor (CB-PE6). These criticisms prompted the ministry of housing to 
engage in the analysis of this policy, a step that contributed to the Chile 
Barrio policy-making process. According to one interviewee, it is also likely 
that the opinions of Montes influenced President Frei in addressing this 
problem by creating a programme, like Chile Bario, aimed at the housing 
needs of the poor.  
 
6.2.5 Revisiting the Grindle and Thomas model  
 
As stated in Chapter Two, Grindle and Thomas (1991) give a prominent 
role to government policy-elites in the policy-making process, a prediction 
that fits the cases under study. However, despite its accuracy in 
identifying the main actors in the policy-making process, Grindle and 
Thomas’ model presents certain characteristics that limit its use as a 
theoretical framework for the present research.  
 
First, as mentioned in Chapter Two, it provides no clear picture of the 
precise mechanisms behind the creation of a programme. In other words, 
while the model offers a precise description of policy-elites and their 
contexts in developing countries, no causal mechanism is given to explain 
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why the policy-making process unfolds in a certain manner. This limitation, 
while not critical to the mapping of the policy making processes, presents 
a problem in fulfiling the second aim of this thesis, which is to explain the 
processes under study. 
 
Second, while putting process actors at the centre of the analysis, other 
forces and elements that may be relevant in the process are given only 
secondary roles, as they are considered merely as resources or contexts 
that limit or strengthen policy-elites’ room for manoeuvre. This may limit 
the scope of the model only to those cases where no other relevant 
autonomous force is involved in the process. In contrast, the mapping of 
the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process shows that 
government’s policy-elites are central process actors, but it also 
demonstrates that they are not the only relevant force affecting the 
process. For instance, as Chapter Five showed, political considerations 
that are independent from the motivations of individual actors played an 
important role during the processes. In particular, cases showed that the 
Concertacion Alliance focus on addressing poverty as well as the arrival of 
a new administration opened a space for the creation of a new poverty-
alleviation programme.  
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6.3 THE MULTIPLE STREAMS MODEL: THE CASE OF A MISSING 
STREAM 
 
In light of the review of the policy-making frameworks provided in Chapter 
Two and the shortcomings of alternative models explored above, the 
Multiple Streams Model presents characteristics that are convenient for its 
use as theoretical framework for this research. 
 
First, the model includes a wide spectrum of forces and actors in the 
analysis. Particularly, the model considers the influence of a variety of 
elements related to the problems, policies and politics streams in the 
unfolding of events. Second, it provides a clear description of the 
mechanisms behind the evolution of the policy process. Essentially, the 
model predicts that policies will emerge thanks to the occurrence of a 
policy window, a particular moment when well defined conditions are 
present. Besides, the model explains that during a policy window a 
coupling of streams may arise, giving place to the beginning of a policy 
process. Third, it highlights the roles played by different process actors 
from a variety of institutions (policy entrepreneur). In particular, it states 
that policy entrepreneurs will use their resources and skills to promote a 
particular policy alternative, and by doing so, they will contribute to the 
coupling of streams that ultimately will lead to the creation of a new policy 
initiative.  
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At this stage, the potential limitations of the Multiple Stream Model as 
theoretical framework for this research should be pointed out. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the Multiple Streams Model assumes that 
many actors participate in the policy stream by proposing, discussing and 
advocating different policy alternatives. These actors are located in 
different places, such as the government, think tanks and academia. Their 
activity forms a ‘primeval soup’ where policy alternatives evolve. It may be 
stated that this assumption may limit the applicability of this model to the 
cases under study, as they presented only a limited number of 
government actors participating in the policy-making process.  
 
In this regard the Multiple Streams Model presents the same limitation 
found in the alternative frameworks considered. Having said that, it is 
important to highlight that in these alternative frameworks, policy 
discussion and advocacy was a central element of the model, as it was 
responsible for the dynamic of the process. In contrast, in the case of the 
Multiple Streams Model this assumption may be considered only a lateral 
feature of the framework, as its scope is limited to one part of the model, 
the policy stream, and not to the central elements that explain the 
unfolding of the process, such as the coupling of streams and the 
occurrence of policy windows. In any case, section 6.3.3 in this Chapter as 
well as Chapter Seven will contrast this model feature with evidence from 
the cases, in order to find divergences, propose explanations and discuss 
the theoretical consequences involved.  
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As a result of the above considerations, it is concluded that the 
advantages of the Multiple Streams Model exceed its limitations as 
theoretical framework for the present research. In what follows, the 
mapping of events presented in Chapter Five is contrasted with the 
predictions of this model. 
  
6.3.1 The politics stream: A dominating force in the process 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Multiple Streams Model states that 
political factors affecting the policy-making process are electoral, partisan, 
or pressure group considerations (Kingdon, 1995:145). From this view, 
potential agenda items that are congruent with the current national mood, 
and/or that enjoy support from interest group or lack organized opposition, 
and/or that fit the orientations of the prevailing legislative coalitions or 
current administration are more likely to rise to agenda prominence that 
other items that do not meet these conditions. Besides, the turnover of 
key political participants, such as a change of administration, may 
generate significant changes in policy agendas (Kingdon, 1995:20). 
 
The comparison of these theoretical considerations with the Chilean 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process confirms that both the broad 
political orientations of the Concertacion Alliance as well as the turnover of 
administrations generated significant effects in the process. On the 
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contrary, the cases provide no evidence to support the idea that the 
national mood or pressure group’s activity played any significant role. 
Nevertheless, Chapter Seven will discuss the possibility that a lack of 
pressure from interested groups was a significant element in the poverty-
alleviation policy-making process. 
 
6.3.1.1 The Concertacion Alliance social policy principles 
 
As pointed out in Chapter Four, on assuming  power the Concertacion 
Alliance introduced new socio-economic orientations into its policies, 
highlighting that in addition to high economic growth, increasing social 
equity was also a key objective. The new orientations included a series of 
social policy guidelines, such as promoting solidarity and equity, 
developing integral, participative, and targeted programmes, and creating 
social investment initiatives (MIDEPLAN, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996). 
Improving social equity involved addressing the record levels of poverty 
and extreme poverty that the country was experiencing by the end of the 
military regime. Hence, the new Concertacion Alliance social policy 
principles were a clear and explicit guideline to each Concertacion Alliance 
government to address the problem of poverty in the country.  
 
The idea of developing a process of ‘growth with equity’ was put forward 
by the Aylwin’s government to synthesize the new Concertacion Alliance 
views (FO-EE1). Aylwin’s social concerns materialized in a series of 
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measures to improve the income level of the least well-off population, 
such as increasing minimum wages, basic pensions and other social 
transfers that were freeze or reduced during the final years of the military 
(Boeninger, 1998:469). Besides, the creation of the FOSIS programme, 
right at the beginning of his government, allowed the materialization of 
the Concertacion Alliance social policy principles in a concrete programme. 
 
With the arrival of Eduardo Frei’s second Concertacion Alliance 
government, addressing poverty became a higher-ranking issue in the 
government’s social policy agenda (CB-PE7). In his messages to the 
nation, president Eduardo Frei defined overcoming poverty as a national 
duty and incorporated this objective in his government programme by 
creating the Plan Nacional de Superacion de la Pobreza (PNSP) (National 
Plan to Overcome Poverty) (Frei, 1994a). Hence, while the Aylwin’s 
government interpreted the goal of achieving social equity in broad terms, 
Frei adopted a more precise interpretation by defining the overcoming of 
poverty as the main objective of his social agenda. Both the PNSP and the 
Chile Barrio programme were created by Frei to fulfil this objective.  
 
The third Concertacion Alliance government was a continuation of the Frei 
administration in terms of emphasizing the goal of alleviation poverty in 
the social policy agenda. President Ricardo Lagos took over Frei’s goal of 
eradicating extreme poverty when launching the Chile Solidario 
programme during his third year of mandate (CS-EE7). The programme 
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was conceived as an integral social investment programme, aimed to 
alleviate the problems affecting all extremely poor families in the country 
before the end of the Lagos administration (Chile Solidario, 2003).  
 
Hence, it may be stated that the Concertacion Alliance principle of 
improving social equity in the country was present in the three 
Concertacion Alliance governments, and that this principle contributed to 
the creation of a series of poverty-alleviation programmes under each 
administration as it guided governments to consider poverty as an 
important problem in their agendas.  
 
6.3.1.2 President’s turnover 
 
According to the Multiple Streams Model, the arrival of a new 
administration creates the opportunity to introduce new policy initiatives 
linked to the views and interests of the new administration. Besides, a 
change in administration produces powerful effects in policy-making as 
presidents and heads of state are at the top of the list of relevant actors in 
the policy-making process (Kingdon, 1995:23). Moreover, if each 
administration is interested in ‘leaving a mark’ in a particular policy arena, 
an incentive will exist to introduce new initiatives to fulfil this aim.  
 
As a confirmation of this statement, it is remarkable to note that each 
Concertacion Alliance administration felt compelled to create a new 
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poverty-alleviation programme despite the existence of a set of poverty-
alleviation programmes already under implementation in the country. 
Furthermore, in the case of the Frei and Lagos administrations, new 
poverty-alleviation initiatives were introduced despite the availability of 
anti-poverty programmes under execution that were incorporating the 
new Concertacion Alliance social principles. This consideration supports 
the view that administration turnovers played a significant role in the 
policy-making process of the programmes under study.  
 
The cases show that Concertacion Alliance presidents needed to be sure 
that they were leaving a significant mark in the poverty arena, not only by 
contributing to alleviate the problem, but mainly by creating an innovative 
poverty-alleviation programme, clearly different from the existing ones. In 
effect, the FOSIS programme applied a new approach to address the 
problem, acting as a social investment fund. As well, the Chile Barrio 
programme differentiated by being directed to a particular groups of poor 
individuals, the inhabitants of shantytown. Finally, the Chile Solidario 
programmes was focused to the extremely poor only and applied a very 
innovative approach, particularly in relation to elements such as the 
government’s decision to approach poor families, and the establishment of 
a contract between the government an beneficiary families.  
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One interviewee highlighted the fact that the Concertacion Alliance 
presidents have tended to have ‘pet’ programmes and to disregard 
programmes inherited from previous administrations. In his words,  
 
“a programme that is the son of an administration will be a 
respected cousin for the following administration, but the 
best of the cousins is always less regarded than the worst of 
the sons” (Carderon, interview, September 2003). 
 
In synthesis, political events played key roles in the processes studied. In 
particular, the political orientations of the Concertacion Alliance compelled 
each administration to consider the problem of poverty into their agendas. 
Besides, the turnover of Concertacion Alliance administrations gave each 
new president a chance to address the problem of poverty in an original 
way, thus making a distinctive ‘mark’ in this arena.  
 
6.3.2 The problems stream: A permanent problem with sporadic 
visibility 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Multiple Streams Model states that 
problems come to policy-makers attention by the use of indicators, 
through feedback from existing programs and from the occurrence of a 
crisis. All these elements are related to the process of problem 
recognition, that is, the circumstances that allow policy-makers to view or 
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interpret a particular situation as a problem. Hence, a central task when 
studying the problems stream is to understand how a given condition is 
defined as a problem for which a governmental action is needed, as well 
as how and why one set of problems rather than another occupies 
officials’ attention (Kingdon, 1995:87). Kingdon stresses that someone 
must be convinced that a condition corresponds to a problem and this 
interpreter must also be capable of convincing others that this condition is 
in fact a problem,  
 
“conditions become defined as problems when [policy-
makers] come to believe that they should do something 
about them” (Kingdon, 1995:109).  
 
6.3.2.1 The availability of poverty statistics 
 
The mapping of the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process 
demonstrates that the availability of poverty statistics was crucial for 
policy-makers to visualize poverty as a problem requiring a governmental 
action. The perception of poverty as a problem was determined mainly by 
the availability of reliable poverty statistics during the 1990s.  
 
Historic studies point out that poverty has existed in Chile at least during 
most of the 20th century (Arellano, 1988). For instance, it is mentioned 
that at the beginning of the century near 25% of urban population lived in 
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precarious housing conditions, with limited access to basic services such 
as sewerage and drinking water (Arellano, 1988:22). The health and 
education conditions of the population were also precarious, with high 
rates of illiteracy and mortality. Data suitable to dimension in an accurate 
manner this condition became available only during the 1960s. It 
confirmed the existence of high levels of poverty and extreme poverty in 
Chile (Table 6.0).  
 
Table 6.0 
Santiago (1): Extremely poor, poor, and non-poor households  
1969-89, selected years 
(%) 
Status 1969 1979 1988 1989 
Extremely poor 8.4 11.7 22.9 14.9 
Total poor (2) 28.5 36.0 49.7 41.2 
Non-poor 71.5 64.0 50.3 58.8 
Source: Schkolnic and Teitelboim (1989). 
(1) Chilean capital. 
(2) Figures for the poor include the extremely poor. 
 
 
Poverty measurements available during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were 
not free from limitations as some of them did not represent the entire 
country and also because poverty figures were obtained from datasets 
with different objectives. For instance, Table 6.0 was constructed using 
data gathered to study the employment condition of Santiago’s 
population, the Encuesta de Ocupacion (Occupation Survey), created in 
1957. Consequently poverty statistics are obtained according to the level 
of wages of individuals. Other poverty statistics constructed during these 
years were poverty maps built in the 1970s and 1980s from the housing 
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and population census applied each ten years in the country (Katz and 
Molina, 1975; Mujica and Rojas, 1986). In these cases, poverty was 
measured according to the housing characteristics of households.  
 
Only with the arrival of the first Concertacion Alliance government in 1990, 
accurate poverty statistics became available. Given its commitment to 
address the problem of poverty in the country, the Concertacion Alliance 
decided to apply the CASEN nation-wide socio-economic survey every two 
years and to re-focus its use towards the measurement and 
characterization of poverty. This decision represented a clear turning point 
in Chile in terms of the availability of a reliable and technically sound 
series of poverty indicators55. 
 
The mapping of the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process 
demonstrates that during the 1990s, the availability of poverty statistics 
obtained from the CASEN survey helped policy-makers and society as a 
whole to visualize poverty as a real and pressing problem. In effect, 
poverty statistics from the CASEN survey were accessible and widely 
known in the country during the policy-making process of the three 
programmes under study. For instance, in the case of the FOSIS 
programme, the publication in 1987 of poverty statistics from CASEN data 
supported the view that poverty levels were unexpectedly high and that a 
                                                 
55 It is worth mentioning that the CASEN survey was created in 1985 by the military 
government to assess the targeting level of government social expenditures, without 
considering the measurement of poverty as one of the uses of the survey. For a 
description of the process of creation of the CASEN survey see: Appendix 3.  
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clear government emphasis in improving social equity was required to 
address this problem (FO-PE2). In this case, it may be argued that the 
availability of poverty statistics supported the idea that the neo-liberal 
policies applied by the military government created a ‘social debt’ in the 
country, and that these policies were inappropriate to achieve social 
development and particularly to address poverty. Hence, the first 
Concertacion Alliance government proposed `growth with equity’ as an 
alternative socio-economic approach to allow the economy to continue 
growing while the government addressed the problems related to the 
social debt, such as unemployment, poverty and extreme poverty. The 
FOSIS programme was the first materialization of this new policy approach 
developed to deal with the high levels of poverty that the CASEN survey 
was showing. 
 
As mapped in Chapter Five, during the Chile Barrio policy-making process 
both the CASEN and the Campamentos surveys played important roles. 
During the first part of the 1990s, the CASEN series of surveys were 
presenting a reduction in poverty and extreme poverty (CB-PE5). Indeed, 
in 1994 when Eduardo Frei arrived to power and later in 1996, during the 
Chile Barrio design phase, poverty and extreme poverty incidence levels 
were following a decreasing trend. These reductions occurred in a period 
of high and continuous economic growth that generated an optimistic 
mood among many politicians (CB-PE4). As a result, eradicating poverty 
and extreme poverty in a matter of years was considered feasible by many 
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experts and politicians in the country. Eduardo Frei’s initial plan of 
overcoming extreme poverty completely during his government may be 
related to this optimistic mood, and to the positive poverty figures that the 
CASEN surveys were showing. In this sense, the CASEN survey 
contributed to the Chile Barrio policy-making process by providing 
politicians and policy-makers with a clear picture of poverty reduction, 
thus stimulating them to address a problem that by that time was showing 
clear signs of a fast and definitive resolution. Another poverty survey that 
played an important role in the Chile Barrio policy-making process was the 
Campamentos survey, contracted out by the housing ministry in 1995 to 
dimension the number of shantytowns that existed in the country (CB-
CE2). Data from this study allowed the government to focus the Chile 
Barrio programme only on the inhabitants of shantytowns.  
 
In the case of the Chile Solidario policy-making process, the role of CASEN 
poverty statistics was crucial as they showed that extreme poverty was 
stagnant, a situation that suggested the need for a new anti-poverty 
initiative (CS-PE3). In effect, during the second half of the 1990s extreme 
poverty incidence remained static despite the positive levels of economic 
growth that the country was experiencing. Between 1996 and 2000, 
extreme poverty remained around 5.7% of total population while poverty 
incidence showed a moderate reduction from 23.2% to 20.2%56 . This 
meagre trend generated discontent among Concertacion Alliance 
                                                 
56 See: Chapter Five, Table 5.0. 
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politicians and experts, prompting government officials from the budget 
office of the finance ministry to start revising the government’s safety net 
directed to the extremely poor in order to introduce improvements. As 
Chapter Five showed, this was the starting point in the chain of events 
that led to the creation of the Chile Solidario programme. CASEN data also 
allowed limiting the size of the group to which the Chile Solidario 
programme was directed (CS-EE6). Indeed, the CASEN survey of the year 
2000 showed that nearly 225,000 families were extremely poor in the 
country. Hence, the programme was planned to cover all these families 
between 2002 and 2006. As a result, the CASEN survey played two 
important roles in the Chile Solidario policy-making process: first, it 
illuminated policy-makers about the new poverty reality that was unfolding, 
and second, it acted as a focusing instrument, allowing policy-makers to 
circumscribe the programme to a well defined and limited group of 
individuals. 
 
In synthesis, the case studies provide convincing evidence that a 
significant ingredient in the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process was the availability of poverty statistics; especially those obtained 
from the CASEN series of surveys. These statistics, created by the 
Concertacion Alliance governments, transformed the long-lasting and 
fuzzy phenomenon of poverty into a visible, well-defined issue. This higher 
visibility contributed to the creation of specific poverty-alleviation 
programmes during the 1990s.  
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6.3.2.2 Feedback from existing programmes 
 
As Chapter Five showed, in some cases government officials received 
indications that there were problems in existing poverty-alleviation 
programmes at the beginning of the policy-making processes. In 
particular, feedback from existing programmes existed in the Chile Barrio 
and in the Chile Solidario processes. The Chile Barrio process was affected 
by the failure and abandonment by the government of a preexisting 
programme, the PNSP (CB-PE8). Clearly, this failure indicated that 
something was not working in the government’s poverty-alleviation 
approach, which prompted President Frei to look for an alternative 
programme to fill this vacuum in his agenda. Notably, this same case 
provides another indication that feedback from existing programmes was a 
relevant element in the process. As the mapping indicated, by 1993 some 
housing experts inside Congress started criticizing the hosing policy 
directed at the poor, arguing that it was ill-suited to satisfy this group’s 
needs (CB-PE6). As a result, the ministry of housing commenced 
analyzing the programmes directed at the poor, a decision that 
contributed to  design the Chile Barrio programme.   
 
In the Chile Solidario case, the stagnation in extreme poverty levels that 
occurred since 1996 generated a negative view among Concertacion 
Alliance politicians and social policy experts about the social policy 
approach directed at this group (CS-PE3, CS-PE4). This feedback 
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prompted officials inside the ministry of finance to analyze the system of 
benefits directed to the extremely poor in order to find ways to improve it. 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, this move was the starting point of the 
Chile Solidario policy-making process. 
 
6.3.2.3 Interpreting poverty as a problem 
 
The Concertacion Alliance socio-economic principles contributed to 
reframing poverty as a problem that required a prompt response and 
solution from the government. According to the Alliance, the government 
had the duty of introducing equity enhancing policies in the country as 
market forces and economic growth were not enough to secure prosperity 
for all population groups (FO-EE1). From this view, those at the bottom 
of the income distribution constitute an inescapable priority group for the 
government. In addition and as already mentioned, the Concertacion 
Alliance emphasis on improving social equity allowed re-orienting the 
CASEN survey towards measuring and characterizing poverty. The 
increased visibility of poverty that the CASEN surveys gave, resulted from 
the new socio-economic orientations introduced by the Concertacion 
Alliance, which visualized poverty as one of the main problems deserving 
government response.  
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6.3.2.4 A poverty crisis 
 
The information obtained from interviewees provided no evidence that the 
occurrence of a crisis played any significant role in the processes, as no 
poverty crisis occurred before or during the period when the programmes 
were created. The only episode that corresponds to a poverty crisis in the 
country happened in 1982, when poverty peaked due to the debt-related 
economic recession. After that, from 1984 onwards, the economy grew at 
a steady high rate allowing a reduction in poverty levels.  In 1998, the 
country suffered again an economic slowdown but much milder than the 
1982 one57. As already described, no poverty increase occurred but just 
stagnation in extreme poverty levels, a situation that can hardly be 
interpreted as a poverty crisis. This result coincides with the type of social 
policy process that prevailed in other Latin American countries during the 
1990s (Grindle, 2002). Grindle explains that there is evidence that when 
introducing social reforms, Latin American politicians were responding to 
their personal convictions about the importance of carrying out changes, 
rather than to a pressing crisis in a particular area. In this sense, and 
using Grindle’s terminology, policy innovations applied in Chile in the 
poverty-alleviation area resemble ‘chosen’ reforms rather than ‘pressing’ 
reforms (Grindle, 2002:103). 
 
                                                 
57 GDP dropped 1.1% in 1999, compared with a drop of 17.2% in 1982-83. 
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6.3.3 The policy stream: A missing stream   
 
The multiple streams model suggests that policy proposals and 
alternatives are generated by policy communities that compose the 
policies stream. Policy communities are formed by groups of specialists 
that share an interest in one particular policy area and that may belong to 
different institutions such as academia, think tanks, NGOs, and the 
government. These communities generate policy alternatives by a process 
that is described as a ‘primeval soup’, where ideas float, evolve and 
recombine. This process produces a gradual accumulation of knowledge 
that ultimately leads to the generation of policy recommendations 
(Kingdon, 1995:17). 
 
The case studies do not support the idea of a stylized policy stream in the 
Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process for a number of reasons. 
First, the group of individuals involved in the generation of poverty-
alleviation policy alternatives does not constitute a policy community.  As 
already highlighted in the present Chapter, the Chilean poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process is dominated entirely by government actors. Local 
non-government actors are insignificant in the process, probably because 
they constitute a small and fragmented group of experts, as Chapter 
Seven will explain. Furthermore, government experts participating in 
poverty alleviation policy-making are dispersed in different ministries, 
offices and government departments, carrying out their duties in a rather 
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isolated way. As a result, poverty experts inside government lack 
interaction and articulation, which prevents the existence of a policy 
community inside government. 
 
Second, the cases show no indication of a ‘primeval soup’ process to 
generate policy alternatives. Instead, the process is highly punctuated and 
isolated, which results from the afore mentioned lack of a policy 
community. In other words, the fact that the process is controlled by an 
unarticulated governmental policy elite prevents the existence of a 
primeval soup process to generate policy proposals.  
 
6.3.3.1 A poverty-related policy community? 
 
The analysis of the cases demonstrates that the fragmentation that 
prevails among Chilean experts interested in poverty prevents the 
existence of a policy community involved in policy-making, in the terms 
defined by Kingdon.  
 
In particular, the case studies show that government policy-elites were the 
main process actors, with no significant participation of non-government 
experts. This is most likely the result of the isolation in which government 
policy-elites conducted the policy-making process. For instance, the 
mapping of the FOSIS policy-making process showed that the programme 
was designed by a small group of specialists closely linked to the 
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Concertacion Alliance in only six month during the preparation of Aylwin’s 
government programme (FO-EE3). Hence, more than a policy community 
generating a policy proposal what existed in this case was a small group 
of top Concertacion Alliance experts that designed the programme in a 
very isolated and expedited way. Their main input to develop the 
programme came from examples of social funds already developed in 
other Latin American countries that were known by some of these experts. 
 
In the case of the Chile Barrio policy-making process a similar pattern was 
observed. The design of the programme occurred entirely inside 
government circles of officials from the housing ministry. At an advanced 
phase of the process, the minister of housing decided to create a group of 
government experts from different ministries to introduce the final 
programme details (CB-EE4). At this stage, the Brazilian Favela Barrio 
programme was used as a model for the future Chile Barrio programme. 
While in this case the design process was not as accelerated as in the 
FOSIS case, it is clear that it developed entirely among small groups of 
government experts. 
 
The Chile Solidario policy-making process was conducted by a small group 
of top government officials from DIPRES, the government’s budget office, 
which operated in a highly isolated and secret way from other government 
and non-government experts. They decided to contract out the World 
Bank to provide an assessment of the government safety net system 
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directed to the extremely poor with the aim of improving it. Later, after 
one year of work, a meeting between the President and a group of non-
government experts was organized, which dramatically accelerated the 
Chile Solidario policy-making process (CS-EE4). While non-government 
experts attended the meeting with the president, their participation 
proved to be insignificant to the Chile Solidario final design. Furthermore, 
many meeting attendants complained that they were invited to the 
meeting only as a move from DIPRES to give a participative image to a 
clearly non-participative policy-making process. Immediately after this 
meeting, the president asked DIPRES to design in detail the programme in 
about one month, for it to be launched in the annual President’s message 
to the nation (CS-EE6). 
 
In addition, the case studies confirm that the policy-making process of 
poverty-alleviation programmes was monopolized by experts from a 
particular ministry or government office, which limited the degree of 
interactions that may have developed between experts from different 
government institutions. For example, the Ministry of Housing controlled 
the Chile Barrio policy-making process and the Ministry of Finance 
commanded the Chile Solidario policy-making process. In both cases, 
experts from each respective organization were responsible for developing 
the programme’s details and for taking important decisions related to the 
characteristics of each programme. Anyhow, some interactions occurred at 
different points of the processes between experts from the ‘commanding’ 
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ministries and experts from other government institutions (CB-EE4, CS-
EE3, CS-EE6). However, these interactions were limited to particular 
phases of the processes (mainly the final design phase).  
 
This monopolization of the process by a single ministry may be explained 
by the rigidity in which the Chilean government is structured. In effect, 
traditional social policy ministries such as the ministries of health, 
education, housing, labour and social security operate in an autonomous, 
isolated and un-articulated way. This lack of articulation has existed also 
between departments inside ministries, as they are structured into very 
rigid offices (Gatica, interview, September 2003). As a result, individuals 
from different departments inside a ministry can develop a line of work 
that may remain unknown to other individuals of the same ministry, 
including heads of departments (Moreno, interview, December 2006). This 
fact constitutes an institutional barrier to develop an articulated intra-
government community involved in policy making. 
 
The previous evidence supports the view that there is no policy 
community participating in the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process. Instead, the process is controlled by small groups of government 
experts, usually linked to a single Ministry or office, which conduct the 
process and generate policy alternatives in a very autonomous and 
isolated manner.  
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This result may be explained as in developing countries the lack of 
resources may prevent a significant level of policy discussion amid the 
policy-making process. Grindle (2002) confirms that governments are the 
only institutions that engage in social policy design in Latin America as 
countries lack the means needed to develop a community of academic 
institutions and think tanks to produce a policy discussion process. An 
alternative explanation may be that, despite the existence of a community 
of poverty experts, the government may be monopolizing the policy-
making process, thus avoiding the participation of non-government actors. 
Chapter Seven will further investigate the causes of the non-existence of a 
poverty-related policy community in Chile during the 1990s. 
 
6.3.3.2 A primeval soup? 
 
The generation of policy alternatives in the Chilean poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process is far from the long run, complex and interactive 
process depicted by the multiple stream model as a ‘primeval soup’ 
(Kingdon, 1995:116). Instead, the process is short-run, and limited in 
terms of the interactions and recombination of components involved. 
These features are related to the characteristics of the poverty-related 
policy community already mentioned, as the policy-making process of the 
programmes was carried out by government’s policy-elites acting in 
seclusion from non–government actors and other government institutions 
and experts.  
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Thus, the non-articulation of the Chilean government institutional 
framework may prevent the occurrence of a primeval soup process. In 
effect, ministries may act autonomously and isolated from each other to 
defend their jurisdiction or arena of influence, what Kingdon identifies as 
‘battles for turf’ (Kingdon, 1995:155). This isolation may obstruct the 
interactions that are essential for a primeval soup process to occur. This 
point has been highlighted by Hardy (2001) and Molina (2003) in relation 
to the difficulty that exists in coordinating different social ministries in the 
Chilean case. They highlight the historical weight that traditional social 
ministries, such as health, housing and education have inside government. 
Their autonomy and power is supported by the size of the budgets that 
they manage, and by the different social programmes that they 
implement. Hence, Molina (2003) concludes that the Chilean governmental 
framework in charge of social policy is a case of an institucionalidad 
dispersa (dispersed institutional framework), which calls for the creation of 
a coordinating institution in the social policy arena. 
 
This institutional barrier is further aggravated by the absence of a specific 
government institution aimed at coordinating poverty-alleviation efforts 
and  developing poverty-alleviation programmes. Such an institution would 
serve as a ‘gravity centre’ for the discussion, debate and accumulation of 
knowledge about poverty-alleviation policies inside government, thus 
providing a space where a ‘primeval soup’ process may develop. It is 
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interesting to note that when created in 1990, MIDEPLAN was given the 
duty of coordinating the different programmes aimed at alleviation poverty 
in the country. However, MIDEPLAN was unable to perform this job and, 
in particular, was irrelevant or had a secondary role in the policy-making 
process of the poverty-alleviation programmes considered in the present 
thesis58 . Partly as a response to this failure, an inter-ministerial social 
committee composed by ministers and top-level representatives of all 
social ministries was created in 1994 by President Frei (CB-PE7). Its main 
duties were to coordinate social efforts to overcome poverty and to put 
forward the PNSP, a national plan to overcome poverty (Raczynski and 
Serrano, 2002). Sadly, due to the dissatisfaction of the Frei administration 
with the PNSP results (CB-PE8), lower-ranking government officials 
started operating the social committee thus leaving the government 
without an effective authority to coordinate the efforts to address poverty. 
 
The cases do show that during the policy-making process, Chilean policy-
makers searched for examples of programmes in the Latin American 
region to construct poverty-alleviation programmes (FO-PE3, FO-PE4, 
FO-EE3, CB-EE5). This fact also confirms the absence of a poverty-
related ‘primeval soup’ in the country, which may have forced policy-
makers to look for suitable policy alternatives in other countries with 
similar types of problems.   
 
                                                 
58 Appendix 2 presents a brief history of MIDEPLAN to explain this failure. 
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In synthesis, the mapping of the three policy-making processes presented 
in Chapter Five shows no indication of a primeval soup-like process to 
generate ideas for each specific poverty-alleviation programme. This is 
explained by the absence of a poverty-related policy community at a 
national level, and by the lack of articulation that the Chilean government 
displays, particularly in the social policy area, which prevents the 
development of an interactive process of policy discussion and knowledge 
accumulation inside government. This lack of articulation is reinforced by 
the autonomy in which traditional social sector ministries operate, and by 
the absence of an entity inside government in charge of coordinating the 
initiatives directed at addressing poverty and of stimulating the discussion 
and analysis of poverty-alleviation programmes. Chapter Seven will 
investigate the causes behind the absence of a policy stream in the 
poverty-related field in Chile. 
 
6.3.4 Other model elements 
 
6.3.4.1 Policy entrepreneurs 
 
As mentioned in section 6.2, Presidents, ministers and small groups of 
government officials are with a few exceptions the only process actors in 
the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process, a result that differs 
from the predictions of the multiple streams model, which states that 
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process actors are diverse in terms of their position. When presenting his 
notion of policy entrepreneurs, Kingdon mentions that,  
 
“entrepreneurs are found in many locations. No single formal 
position or even informal place in the political system has a 
monopoly on them” (Kingdon, 1995:179).  
 
This divergence may be linked to features of the policy-making process in 
developing countries where governments tend to monopolize the policy 
process, as Grindle and Thomas (1991) have confirmed.  
 
The fact that individuals at the top of the government’s chain of command 
were identified as the main process actors supports the idea that their 
hierarchical position was fundamental to their relevance in the process. 
This result is corroborated by Grindle (2002), as she highlights that 
presidents and ministers have the most significant role in the social policy-
making process in Latin American countries. Hence, the hierarchical 
position inside government appears to be the most significant resource 
that an individual may have in order to influence the policy-making 
process, a fact that contrasts with the multiple streams model statement 
that policy entrepreneurs use a variety of resources to push for their 
preferred policies, such as their personal skills, time, energy, reputation, 
and money (Kingdon, 1995:179). In sum, the result that top-members of 
the government, particularly presidents and ministers, were the principal 
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actors in the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process rejects the 
idea that process actors are a diverse group of policy entrepreneurs. 
 
6.3.4.2 Policy windows 
 
Policy windows are central elements in the multiple streams model, as 
they represent opportunities for policy initiatives or proposals to 
materialize. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the multiple streams model 
predicts that a policy window will open due to changes in the politics 
streams, such as changes in administration, in the national mood, in the 
distribution of power in congress, or to changes in the problems stream, 
when a new problem gets the attention of policy-makers (Kingdon, 
1995:168).  
 
Two of the cases under study present events that may be interpreted as a 
policy window. One was the FOSIS process that started six months before 
the arrival of the first Concertacion Alliance President at the beginning of 
1990, when groups of experts prepared the future government’s 
programme. It may be argued that in this case the arrival of a democratic 
government, after 16 years of military rule, was an anticipated policy 
window that Concertacion Alliance policy-makers took advantage of to 
introduce a new poverty-alleviation programme (FO-CE1). It is important 
to highlight that in this case the policy window was related to the arrival of 
democracy and not to a change in the problems stream, as statistics 
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showing the severity of poverty in the country were widely known since 
198759.  
 
In addition, in the Chile Barrio policy-making process a policy window may 
have opened when the PNSP failed in 1996, creating a gap in the social 
policy agenda of President Frei (CB-PE8). After this failure, President Frei 
asked his Minister of Housing to create a programme to address the 
housing needs of the poor (CB-EE2).  
 
The cases also show that circumstances that fit the definition of a policy 
window such as changes of administration and the availability of new 
poverty data occurred significantly before the policy-making processes, 
pointing out to the idea that a policy window may have been opened for 
the government to create and launch a new policy initiative for a 
significant span of time. The fact that the three poverty-alleviation 
programmes were created under different administrations of the 
Concertacion Alliance, suggests that each new administration may have 
visualized its arrival as a window of opportunity to create a new poverty-
alleviation programme, thus leaving a mark in the highly sensitive, visible 
and politically significant issue of fighting poverty. Besides, a policy 
window may have opened when CASEN poverty statistics became 
available in the country, as these data was widely analyzed and 
commented by experts and the media, contributing to raise the issue of 
                                                 
59 See: Appendix 3. 
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poverty to a higher status in the government’s agenda. However, the 
policy-making process of the Chile Barrio and Chile Solidario poverty-
alleviation programmes occurred much later than when a new president 
arrived or when the most recent CASEN statistics were available. In effect, 
the Chile Barrio policy-making process occurred in 1996-1997, in the 
middle of the Frei mandate and after a series of five CASEN surveys 
showed a persistent downward trend in poverty. Similarly, CASEN data 
indicating stagnation in extreme poverty levels in the country was already 
available in 1998, while the Chile Solidario policy-making process was 
carried out between 2001 and 2002, about one year after the beginning of 
Ricardo Lagos’ government.  
 
It is also interesting to note that clear episodes that may be interpreted as 
policy window closers were present in the cases, episodes that may be 
characterized as self imposed political deadlines. For instance, in the Chile 
Barrio and the Chile Solidario processes, Presidents considered that the 
21st of May, when Chilean Presidents present their Mensaje a la Nacion 
(Message to the Nation) to Congress, was the ideal moment to launch the 
new poverty-alleviation programme (CB-EE6, CS-EE7). As already 
mentioned, the Mensaje a la Nacion is a formal ceremony when Chilean 
Presidents assess the evolution of their administration in the last 12 
months and when their government’s action plan for the next year is 
presented to Congress and other state’s authorities. Consequently, these 
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episodes constitute the main centre stage scheduled ceremony for 
Presidents, attracting the entire country’s attention. 
 
Baranda (interview, September 2003) comments that the rush to have the 
Chile Solidario programme ready for launching during the Mensaje a la 
Nacion  may have affected its technical correctness: 
 
 “in my opinion, it would have been appropriate for a panel 
of external evaluators to demonstrate to Congress that the 
programme would be successful, and this should have been 
done before enlarging it. That is my technical criticism . . .  
we should have assured optimal impact, and this was 
affected by the political pressure to implement it [as it was]”. 
 
In synthesis, the FOSIS and the Chile Barrio cases show events that may 
be described as policy windows, brief moments when advocates for a 
particular policy push for their preferred alternative. Additionally, the Chile 
Barrio and the Chile Solidario cases also sustain the idea that policy 
windows may have remained open for a significant span of time, providing 
an ample space of time for government’s policy-makers to take some 
action to address the problem of poverty. In two of the cases the policy 
window closing was a self imposed decision, due to the proximity of the 
President’s Mensaje a la Nacion. 
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6.3.4.3 Streams coupling  
 
Another central element of the Multiple Streams Model is the convergence 
or coupling of the three streams that occurs when a policy window is 
present. Ultimately, this coupling allows the creation of a new policy as all 
the required ingredients -a problem, a solution for this problem and the 
appropriate political circumstances- coincide when a policy window opens.  
 
The cases confirm the existence of streams coupling but only between the 
problems and the politics streams, an immediate result of the already 
mentioned lack of a policy stream in this area. Hence, while the idea of a 
coupling of streams is still relevant, its occurrence differs from what the 
model predicts. In effect, the cases show that elements linked to the 
policy stream come to bear on the process only after the politics-problems 
stream coupling has occurred.  
 
Concisely stated, the coupling resulted from the confluence of a governing 
coalition that was willing to address the problem of poverty and the 
increased visibility that poverty gained during the 1990s. Once the 
decision to address poverty was taken, the choice of how to fulfil this goal 
was taken briskly and secretly inside government. For instance, in the 
case of the FOSIS programme, the interest of Concertacion Alliance 
politicians to include an anti-poverty programme in the new democratic 
government programme in conjunction with the high levels of poverty that 
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were present, moved them to create a group of social policy experts to 
achieve this aim. Once formed, the group decided to create a social fund, 
thanks to the previous experience of some key group members. In the 
case of the Chile Barrio programme, positive poverty figures prompted 
president Frei to set ambitious goal in his poverty-related agenda. This 
element was added to Frei’s special willingness to address the housing 
needs of the poor. Once a decision was made to advance in this area, Frei 
asked his housing minister to design a programme to fulfil this goal. At 
this stage, the minister consulted his experts at the ministry of housing to 
start designing the programme. Finally, the Chile Solidario programme was 
created thanks to President Lagos’ interest in introducing an innovation 
into the poverty area, in light of the stagnation that extreme poverty was 
displaying in the country. His interest accelerated the efforts of DIPRES 
and MIDEPLAN’s officials to have a policy alternative available.  
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Commenting on the Chile Solidario policy-making process, Baranda 
(interview, September 2003) points out: 
 
“technical soundnes would have required that the Chile 
Solidario programme be piloted for at least one year in order 
to provide sufficient time to evaluate it. Expansion should 
have ocurred later, but political logic accelerated it so as to 
cover as many families as possible . . . so there was a lack of 
technical rigor that didn’t come from the people 
implementing the programme but rather from the political 
pressure that accelerated approval of these programmes”.  
 
A rather similar picture is presented by Esposito (interview, September 
2003): 
 
 “poverty is always a good political tool, and President Lagos 
promised to end extreme poverty, so there was an urgency 
to fulfil a promise that the President made strongly and with 
a lot of conviction as to its feasibility”. 
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6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter began by establishing the lack of advocacy in the cases of 
policy-making studied. This result dismissed any model that places 
advocacy at the center of the policy-making process as a posible 
theoretical framework. Hence, the Advocacy Coalition, the Punctuated 
Equilibrium and the Transaction Cost models were considered 
inappropriate.  
  
The centrality of government’s policy elites in the poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process was confirmed by the three cases considered. The 
President and ministers were on top of the list of relevant process actors. 
This result confirmed the prediction of Grindle and Thomas’ approach 
regarding the weight of policy-elites in the policy-making process in the 
developing world. However, despite this confirmation, Grindle and Thomas’ 
policy-elites approach was considered unsuitable as theoretical framework 
for the research, mainly from its lack of a clear policy-making explanatory 
mechanism.  
 
Following the previous considerations, and after evaluating the pros and 
cons of the Multiple Streams Model it was concluded that this model was 
the most suitable theoretical framework for the research. 
 
 330 
The cases have confirmed the occurrence of central elements of the 
Multiple Streams model, particularly, the existence of a politics stream and 
of a problems stream. The politics stream was highly vigorous in the cases 
under study. Key features of the Multiple Streams model in this area were 
confirmed by the cases, such as the importance of the policy orientations 
of the current administration and the role of administration turnovers. 
Regarding the problems stream it was highlighted the relevance of having 
poverty statistics available in the country to bring this issue into the 
government’s agenda, in line with Kingdon’s prediction.  
 
Policy windows, a key element of the Multiple Streams Model, were 
present in the cases but in a mixed way in terms of their briefness. Short 
events fitting the traditional definition of a policy window were present in 
the FOSIS and in the Chile Barrio processes. In addition, the Chile Barrio 
and the Chile Solidario cases included events that provided an opportunity 
for policy-makers to create a new programme during a significant length 
of time. This result contradicts with the idea that policy windows are brief 
by nature. On the contrary, it appears that in the Chilean poverty arena, 
some policy windows are not brief but of significant duration, providing a 
long period of time for a new policy to emerge.  
 
Another partial divergence between cases and the model relates to the 
idea of policy entrepreneurs. Given that main process actors of the cases 
were government policy-elites that employed resources related to their 
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posts inside government during the processes, the applicability of the 
concept of policy entrepreneurs as diverse actors that use a variety of 
resources to push for policy alternatives appears to be invalidated.  
 
A marked difference between cases and the Multiple Streams Model is 
related to the existence of a policy stream. Cases showed no evidence of 
such a stream in the Chilean poverty arena. This is a key finding related to 
the way in which the poverty-alleviation policy-making process may occur 
in developing countries and in Chile in particular. Cases demonstrated that 
policy alternatives emerged after the problem and the politics streams 
joined and that these alternatives were constructed by government-
related officials in an isolated and expedite way. Besides, the coupling of 
the problems and politics streams resembled more a ‘joining’ of streams 
than a ‘coupling’ of streams, as these two streams remained together for a 
long time, as long as a policy window was open. 
 
This sort of policy generation process differs from the suggestion of a 
continuous flow of ideas and policy proposals that recombine and interact 
to obtain solutions for a particular problem. The fact that a number of 
programmes under study ‘copied’ some of its features from programmes 
implemented in other Latin American countries supports the finding that in 
the Chilean poverty-alleviation arena the policies stream is lacking. All 
these consideration are further developed in Chapter Seven, where an 
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explanation for this palpable absence in the poverty-alleviation field is 
presented. 
 
Notwithstanding these differences between the Multiple Streams Model 
and the evidence put forward by the research, it may be established that 
this model has been a highly useful theoretical framework for the present 
investigation, as it has allowed contrasting the cases with precise 
theoretical propositions related to main events, actors and mechanisms 
behind the policy-making process. Furthermore, the fact that cases have 
confirmed, partially confirmed, and invalidated different predictions of the 
Multiple Streams Model has allowed a greater understanding of the policy-
making processes studied here.  
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Chapter Seven 
Explaining the absence of a poverty-
related policy stream in Chile  
 
 “Well into the second government of the Concertacion, the political arena 
in Chile is dominated by a caste of professional politicians who control the 
policy-making process . . . political input by other popular organisations is 
minimal, given their fragmented state and a generalized withdrawal from 
non-electoral forms of political participation”   
(Roberts, 1998:160) 
 
 
“Proposals for policy change were generated by the executive rather than 
by legislature, political parties, interest groups or think tanks”  
(Grindle, 2002:104, describing the policy-making process in Latin America) 
 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter Six addressed the second aim of the thesis by explaining the way 
in which the policy-making process of the three programmes under 
analysis occurred. One important finding was that cases differed from the 
Multiple Streams Model regarding the absence of a poverty-related policy 
stream, a central component of the model.  
 
This conclusion was reached after recognizing that the process to create 
the programmes lacked two central features of the policy stream: its 
independence from the other two streams and its continuity. On the 
contrary, results showed that solutions to problems were developed after 
the problems and politics streams coupled, and that these solutions 
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materialized in a punctuated manner, with no previous process of analysis, 
discussion or advocacy of possible policy alternatives inside a poverty-
related policy community. 
 
In the present chapter this absence is explained by arguing that in the 
cases under study, non-government actors that may have participated in 
the policy stream such as popular movements, interest groups, political 
opposition and social policy experts were absent, disinterested or ignored 
by the process controllers. This generated a policy monopoly that allowed 
the government to introduce policies without discussing its features with 
non-government policy experts. Additionally, this monopoly allowed the 
government to disregard policy alternatives proposed by non-government 
poverty experts, even if some of these alternatives were backed by an 
important poverty-related NGO.   
 
This explanation is based on the fact that the existence of a policy stream 
depends crucially on the presence of interested policy actors, individual or 
groups that may discuss policy initiatives. As highlighted in Chapter Two, 
the Multiple Streams Model assumes the existence of actors that,  
 
“generate proposals for public policy change, and engage in 
such political activities as election campaigns and pressure 
groups lobbying” (Kingdon, 1995:197).  
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All these actors comprise of communities that form the policy stream, 
where alternatives are generated and narrowed. Kingdon recognizes that 
agenda setting is controlled mainly by elected officials, principally the 
President and his appointees, while other participants, such as academics, 
consultants, career bureaucrats, congressional staffers and analysts 
working for interest groups participate more in the process of alternative 
specification (Kingdon, 1995:199-200). Besides, Kingdon stresses that 
these actors’ activities may be an impetus or a challenge to the 
development of policies, as when pressure groups block or oppose a 
government initiative (Kingdon, 1995:197). 
 
What may be impact for the Multiple Streams Model if the assumption of 
numerous actors involved in policy discussion is lifted? In particular, what 
will be the result if in a particular policy arena such as poverty, interest 
groups are completely absent and academics and congressional actors 
rarely participate in the process? The proposed answer to these questions 
is that the entire policy-making process and not just agenda setting will be 
controlled by top-government officials, and that a stylized policy stream 
will be non-existent.  
 
The chapter also argues that an additional factor that may explain the lack 
of a policy stream in the poverty arena is the absence of institutionalized 
links between policymakers and researchers which may facilitate the 
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development, accumulation and discussion of poverty-alleviation policies, 
much in the way predicted by the Multiple Streams Model.  
 
7.1 THE ABSENCE OF POLICY CONTESTANTS  
 
Recent literature studying the factors that help research influence public 
policies confirms that the absence of policy contestants may weaken the 
link between research and policy (Porter, 1998; Court and Young, 2003; 
Court and Young, 2004; Court and Cotterrell, 2006). While recognizing 
that there is no systematic understanding of the elements that strengthen 
the link between research and policy, these authors identify a group of 
potential factors based on an extensive literature review and case studies.  
 
Court and Young (2004) and Court and Cotterrell (2006) emphasize the 
role of political variables on the degree in which research may be applied 
into policy-making. These elements include the degree of political 
contestation, the existence of institutional pressures and vested interests 
as well as the attitudes and views of officials (Court and Young, 2004:5). 
For instance, it is noted that when policymakers are willing to accept 
assistance from non-government researchers to develop policies, it is 
more likely that research knowledge will be included in the policy-making 
process (Court and Young, 2004:11; Court and Cotterrell, 2006:9). 
Besides, from three case studies of international development policy 
change, Court and Young (2004) find that an increase in the number of 
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non-government actors participating in the policy-making process, such as 
think tanks and NGOs, will translate into a greater use of evidence based 
research into policy-making (Court and Young, 2004:12). 
 
7.1.1 A weak popular movement 
 
The literature on Chile highlights the weakness of popular movements 
during the 1990s (Oxhorn, 1995; Roberts, 1998; Foweraker, 2001). This 
situation resulted both from the repressive policies applied by the military 
during the 1970s and 1980s, and by the transitional character of 
democracy during the 1990s, when the heightening of popular 
participation was considered a threat to securing the maintenance of 
democracy. 
 
The Chilean military government limited the degree to which civil society 
was able to participate in government. In effect, some authors mention 
that the introduction by the military government of a neo-liberal socio-
economic approach combined with political repression prompted an 
atomized and individualistic civil society instead of a more associative one 
(Oxhorn, 1995:3; Foweraker, 2001:9). This situation persisted during the 
1990s, as the few events where strong public participation was present 
occurred only at the end of the decade and as a reaction to certain 
government initiatives, such as the construction of highways amid 
populated areas and the installation of garbage sites in the vicinity of the 
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capital Santiago. For instance, Ducci (2001:11-14) presents the case of 
the Ciudad Viva (Living City) urban social movement, which was born to 
oppose the building of a highway project cutting through a Santiago 
neighbourhood. 
 
Additionally, it has been noted that during its sixteen years in power the 
military created a government institutional structure that was not planned 
to stimulate the participation of civil society (Hershberg, 1997:351). In 
effect, the military carried out their policies in a very top-down and non-
participatory fashion. The Concertacion Alliance inherited this government 
structure, which remained highly limited in its ability to provide spaces for 
civil participation, despite the introduction of some modifications such as 
the creation of new ministries and offices related to social policy60. 
 
                                                 
60 See: Chapter Four, section 4.5. 
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Esposito (interview, September 2003) shows no doubt about the lack of 
civil participation  during the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process: 
 
“what I saw in the field when I was working with extremely 
poor families was that there was no participation from 
potential beneficiaries during the design, implementation or 
evaluation phases. This is a complaint I hear from 
beneficiaries of the Chile Solidario programme as well as 
from [programme] workers. . .  zero participation . . . I 
would apply the same reflection . . .  to all social policy, 
[that] aside from a few experiences in participatory 
budgeting, people’s participation is very low during the 
programme design, implementation and evaluation phases”. 
 
To analyse the demobilization of civil society under the military 
government, the case of shantytowns dwellers is cited as one of the few 
social movement that emerged during this period (Oxhorn, 1995).  Their 
organization has been explained as a reaction to the repressive policies 
applied by the military (Oxhorn, 1995:3). More precisely, grassroots 
movements filled the vacuum created by the supression of political parties 
and labour organisations by the military. Hence, territorially based 
organisations emerged as the only channel to express the interests and 
views of the poor in the non-democratic environment. The economic 
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recession that affected the country in 1982 reinforced the development of 
self-help organisations as it forced the poor to associate to survive. For 
instance, ollas comunes (soup kitchens) were common in shantytowns 
across the country to feed dwellers in an economic way. Members of the 
ollas comunes organized to cook and to obtain food donations (Oxhom, 
1995:2-3). 
 
Later, during the final part of the 1980s a demobilization of the 
shantytown-related social movements occurred, a phenomenon that has 
been explained by the return of open elections to the country and the 
related channelling of social demands through traditional political parties 
(Oxhorn, 1995:26; Roberts, 1998:85; Foweraker, 2001:8). According to 
this view, there existed an antagonistic relationship between political 
parties and shantytown-related civil organisations in the Chilean 
democratic scenario, as the relevance of these movements under the 
military was linked to the lack of democracy in the country, which included 
the suppression of all traditional forms of civil organization such as 
political parties and labour and professional unions. Hence, with the arrival 
of elections and the legalization of traditional forms of civil organization 
the significance of grassroots movements diminished dramatically. 
 
The strategy followed by the Concertacion Alliance to secure the transition 
to democracy at the beginning of the 1990s, further contributed to 
dismantle the civil movement that emerged under the military. To secure 
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the return to democracy, an objective that was considered at risk given 
the reluctance of the military to release power, the Concertacion Alliance 
negotiated a transition process with the regime, involving a gradual 
introduction of a fully democratic system to avoid an eruption of repressed 
popular movements that may have destabilized the fragile new democracy. 
As a result, the Chilean transition to democracy has been described as an 
act of securing the consolidation of democracy at the expense of limiting 
its deepening (Roberts, 1998:141). As an illustration, when describing the 
Concertacion Alliance position during the negotiating process with the 
military to transfer power, Boeninger states that,  
 
“securing the transfer of government was considered the 
fundamental element, despite not securing simultaneously 
the equivalent transfer of power” (Boeninger, 1998:364). 
 
In addition, some authors note that popular movements distrusted political 
parties as they perceived them as a threat to their autonomy rather than 
as potential partners to channel their demands (Graham, 1994:50). 
According to this view, pobladores (shantytown dwellers) viewed political 
parties as a source of division inside their organisations, and considered 
that political discussions were not directly linked to their particular 
concerns (Graham, 1994:51).  
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Other authors concur that the Chilean democratic political system has 
been dominated traditionally by government elites that limit the 
development of a participatory policy process (Oxhorn, 1995:282; 
Hershberg, 1997:340; Roberts, 1998:139; Foweraker, 2001:9). These 
elites are characterized by being insulated from base-level organisations. 
Graham (1994:51) explains the non-participatory character of Chilean 
governments as political parties build their base on labour and 
professional unions rather than on grassroots movements, consequently 
excluding pobladores from their central committees. In synthesis, the non-
participatory legacies of the military government, the transitional character 
of democracy during the 1990s and the traditionally elitist style of Chilean 
democracy generated an adverse environment for the participation of 
popular groups in political activity.  
 
7.1.2 The lack of interest groups 
 
It has been suggested that during the policy-making process, 
policymakers contrast the costs and benefits of the innovations that they 
plan to introduce (Navia and Velasco, 2003:275; Court and Cotterrell, 
2006:9). It may be postulated that the existence of interest groups in a 
specific policy area may prompt the government to develop policies more 
openly, in such a way that resistances from interest groups are assessed 
and anticipated. This might allow the government to negotiate with these 
groups, thus avoiding confrontations that may generate political costs. 
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In this respect, the area of poverty lacks any interest or pressure groups 
such as labour or professional unions, and private sector organisations 
involved in social policy. For instance, no labour or professional union 
related to the implementation of poverty-alleviation programmes exists, 
mainly because the implementation of most of these programmes is 
carried out autonomously by municipalities at the local level, whose 
workers are involved in a variety of activities apart from implementing pro-
poor programmes. This lack of poverty-related unions may reinforce the 
government’s perception that this is a policy area where significant room 
of manoeuvre exists to control the policy-making process without risking 
political costs.  
 
This feature contrasts sharply with what occurs in other social policy 
sectors such as health and education where powerful interest groups are 
present in the policy process, as documented by literature focused on the 
Latin American region and Chile in particular (Grindle, 2000; Molina, 2000; 
Navia and Velasco, 2003; Foxley, 2004). These authors indicate that in the 
health and education sectors pressure groups have tended to block 
government’s initiatives.  
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For instance, Foxley highlights that Chilean health workers and teachers 
represented a considerable blocking force when reforms were introduced 
into their sectors (Foxley, 2004:11). His words leave no doubt about this 
issue,  
 
“doctor and health care labour unions have consistently 
opposed health reforms in Chile for 12 years, and 
governments have not been willing to endure work 
stoppages in hospitals and emergency care units, with the 
consequent political costs attached to it” (Foxley, 2004:11).  
 
Foxley present a rather similar panorama for the educational sector, 
where teachers resisted the introduction of reforms involving the 
evaluation of their activities (Foxley, 2004:11). When recalling his 
experience as education minister during the Frei administration, Molina 
(2000) highlights that teachers complained about their low participation in 
the design of the educational reforms introduced in Chile during the 1990s. 
Given their lack of identification with the reform, Molina states that they 
became opponents to change rather than leaders of the reform. A final 
example for the Chilean case is provided by Boeninger (1998). He 
documents the social conflicts that the Aylwin’s first Concertacion Alliance 
government confronted, mentioning that these conflicts involved almost 
exclusively public workers (Boeninger, 1998:494). In particular, among 
these conflicts the gravest one was a dispute between the government 
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and the powerful Colegio Medico (Medical Doctor’s Union).  The pressure 
of the union forced the minister of health to resign, as a prerequisite for 
negotiations between the two parts to resume (Boeninger, 1998:495).  
 
When comparing the policy process in the poverty-alleviation arena with 
the processes in other policy areas, Contreras (interview, December 2006) 
explains: 
  
 “from a conceptual point of view there are some non-
controversial subjects, such as health and education, which 
present the problem that it is hard to accomplish things 
because the private sector intervenes, so when you want to 
introduce a reform you start bothering different actors . . .  
this is not the case in the area of poverty as there is no 
participation of the private sector here”.  
 
Navia and Velasco (2003) analyse the reforms adopted in Latin America 
during the 1990s, which they label as second generations reforms, 
stressing that these reforms confronted significant vested political 
obstacles when compared to the reforms applied in Latin America during 
the 1980s (first generation reforms). According to their opinion, in the 
case of second generation reforms the potential ‘victims’ of innovations 
were less atomistic and more organized groups that during first-stage 
reforms. Among these groups, they list teacher’s unions, upper echelons 
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of public bureaucracy and the medical establishment (Navia and Velasco, 
2003:268). 
 
Other pressure groups affecting the policy-making process of the health 
and education sectors in Chile are actors from the private sector that 
participate in social policy. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Chilean 
social policy sector allows the participation of private actors in different 
areas, particularly health and education. There exists evidence that these 
actors were interested in the policy-making process of specific government 
initiatives when they perceived that their interests were at risk. For 
instance, when the laws to put forward a health reform under the Lagos 
administration were introduced, the Asociación de ISAPRES (Health 
Insurance Private Institutions Association), expressed their opposition to 
this legislation as they considered it inadequate. Particularly, the head of 
the Asociación de ISAPRES expressed that some of the ideas debated in 
Congress,  
 
“were jeopardizing the stability of the [health] private sector 
and that a government proposing such an aggressive reform 
will lose ISAPRE’s support” (Merino, 2002).  
 
Another example of the intervention of private sector related-groups into 
the Chilean social policy process is provided by Contreras (interview, 
December 2006). During 2006 he was invited to participate in a 
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government’s advising group to study how to improve the quality of 
education. He recalls that,  
 
“while participating in the group, I saw teachers defending 
their union, as well as Sostenedores (Subsidized Private 
School Managers) defending their sector . . . I was never 
sure if [their] opinions were focusing on the long run or if 
they were just addressing the circumstantial problem that 
they were confronting” (Contreras, interview, December 
2006). 
 
In synthesis, no organized pressure group such as popular organisations, 
labour and professional unions, or interest groups from the private sector 
was present in the poverty area in Chile, in sharp contrast to what was 
observed in other social areas, particularly health and education. This 
palpable absence may have accentuated the policy monopoly that the 
government enjoyed in the poverty area, as no pressure existed to 
develop a more open and participative poverty-related policy process. 
 
7.1.3 A complacent political opposition 
 
As was explained Chapter Six, sending to Congress a law relating to the 
programmes occurred only in some of the cases under investigation. It 
was also noted that in some cases, having a law was irrelevant to begin 
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implementing some of the programmes. In any case, when a law is sent 
to Congress it is necessary to specify the level of opposition that the 
government found when discussing these laws. This may have indicated 
that at least in the legislative arena the poverty-alleviation innovations 
created by the Concertacion Alliance were challenged.  
 
Interviewee’s opinions as well as relevant literature indicate that when a 
law related to some of the poverty-alleviation programmes under study 
was sent to Congress, as was the case in the FOSIS and the Chile 
Solidario programmes, no significant challenge from the political 
opposition existed. The views of Sergio Molina provide critical support for 
this point as he witnessed the behaviour of the opposition when the law 
that created the FOSIS programme was approved. He highlights that there 
existed a wide support in Congress for the creation of the programme, 
with the only doubts from the opposition linked to the potential political 
use of the funds that the FOSIS will allocate (Molina, interview, June 
2003).  
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In Molina’s own words (interview, June 2003):   
 
“I would say that there generally was support, aside from a 
slight reluctance from the political opposition until it was 
sure that these resources had social and productive ends 
rather than purely political goals. We tried to be as 
transparent as possible”.  
 
Later, when commenting on passing the FOSIS law, Molina (interview, 
June 2003) explained: 
 
“there was a law that created FOSIS and MIDEPLAN, and 
this legislative procedure was quick. We had to explain what 
FOSIS was, and that it was designed to have little staff in 
order to avoid bureaucracy”. 
 
The legislative process of the Chile Solidario programme may also be 
considered an expedite one, bearing in mind the consensus that was 
reached in Congress to pass the law that created the programme (Chile 
Solidario, webpage). The law was approved unanimously by the lower 
chamber and with a majority by the Senate, after some modifications to 
the original project were introduced to limit the action of the programme’s 
representatives to avoid any political use of their activities (Chile Solidario 
webpage). 
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In contrast, many examples sustain the view that the political opposition 
confronted more decisively the government’s policy innovations in the 
areas of health and education. For instance, Molina states that the 
educational innovations that he headed while serving as education 
minister under the Frei government generated significant conflicts with the 
political opposition. He highlights that an agreement with the opposition 
was reached in Congress but only after a negotiation as,  
 
“the opposition congressmen expressed that they were not 
willing to approve a partial [education] legislation, but 
policies and laws congruent with the broader [educational] 
context” (Molina, 2000).  
 
Also, the legislative process of the health reform that Ricardo Lagos 
introduced in parallel to the law creating Chile Solidario followed a 
strenuous road. The law was sent to Congress in June 2002, and was 
approved two years later, in February 2004, after a heated debate 
between government representatives, opposition leaders, the medical 
union, and actors linked to the ISAPRES (Sanchez, 2004:1). The 
government’s original proposal suffered important modifications during 
this debate. In particular, the government was forced by the political 
opposition to remove the idea of creating a Fondo de Compensacion de 
Riesgo (Health Risk Compensating Fund) to finance the reform, where all 
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Chileans would have contributed to finance the medical services 
guaranteed by the reform. This was the only way to have enough votes to 
pass the law, given that the political opposition strongly rejected the idea 
of such a fund (Sanchez, 2004:2). 
 
The lack of political opposition to the introduction of poverty-alleviation 
programmes may be explained by the perception that the government’s 
poverty-alleviation approach was providing good results, and because 
addressing poverty was a shared aim of all political parties. As already 
explained in this thesis, poverty incidence displayed a continuous 
reduction during the 1990s in Chile 61 . This positive trend has been 
interpreted by the government and by international organisations as the 
result of the mix of policies that the Concertacion Alliance applied during 
the 1990s, including the set of poverty-alleviation programmes under 
study in the present thesis (MIDEPLAN, 1996; World Bank, 2000; De 
Ferranti et al, 2004)62.  
                                                 
61 See: Chapter Five, table 5.0. 
62 Official poverty figures are generated by the government, which are not challenged by 
non-government experts or politicians, or by international organizations. They are 
constructed from the CASEN socioeconomic survey, a widely accepted instrument in 
terms of its technical validity. Besides, the methodology employed to construct the 
poverty indicators, is backed and promoted by the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin 
American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), for the entire Latin American region. See Appendix 
3. 
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The fact that during the 1990s poverty was a non-pressing problem is 
confirmed by Contreras (interview, December 2006) who states that, 
 
 “fortunately poverty levels have been diminishing . . . as a 
result I do not see too much opposition or difficulty [in this 
area] . . .  it seems that [poverty] trajectory helps”.  
 
As Chapter Four illustrated, the aim of addressing poverty is widely shared 
in Chilean society, particularly across the political establishment, as this 
goal has been present in a series of Chilean government with different 
ideologies since the 1960s. Significantly, the military regime that followed 
a right-wing political approach also integrated the problem of poverty into 
its agenda, particularly by creating a safety net directed to protect the 
poor from the economic cycle. The Concertacion Alliance emphasized the 
goal of addressing poverty into its agenda, in line with the broad goal of 
introducing equity enhancing policies to the country. In relation to this 
point, Contreras (interview, December 2006) mentions that, 
 
“in the political arena nobody is willing to abandon the aim 
of fighting poverty, consequently it is easy to obtain the 
votes and the allies required to approve projects of law, 
there is no resistance . . . opposing may be seen as impolite”. 
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7.1.4 A small group of social policy experts 
 
It is noted in the literature that the activity of Chilean social policy experts 
was harmed by the military regime. During the 1970s and 1980s the 
military restricted academic discussion in order to suppress all forms of 
civil debate and deliberation. Immediately after the coup, all universities 
were temporarily closed and occupied by the armed forces, which 
“occupied them as if they were a battle field” (Lladser, 1989:220). 
Rectores Delegados (Assigned Directors), usually military officials 
appointed by the regime, were introduced to manage all Chilean 
universities63. They reduced universities’ personnel; specially academics 
from the left, closed some academic centres, particularly those dedicated 
to social sciences such as sociology, and applied a strict control of 
curricular contents (Lladser, 1989:223).  
 
Despite this adverse scenario, some forms of social policy analysis 
occurred under the regime, mostly inside NGOs that received international 
cooperation and developed small scale social policy initiatives (Egaña, 
1989). The role of institutions related to the Catholic Church was crucial 
during this period. In 1975 the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano (AHC) 
(Human Christian Academy) was founded, as a reaction to the military 
intervention of the prestigious Universidad Catolica de Chile (Catholic 
University of Chile). The AHC produced social sciences studies, 
                                                 
63 By 1973 there existed two public and six private universities in Chile, all publicly 
financed (Lladser, 1989:217). 
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contributing to fill the gap created by the military in the academic sector 
(Lladser, 1989:224).  
 
During the 1980s, some social sciences academic centres, relating mainly 
to international organisations such as the Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) 
and the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) based in 
Santiago, increased their participation in social sciences studies. By the 
mid-1980s, more than twenty different centres were involved in social 
sciences academic activity (Lladser, 1989:254-255). These centres focused 
their investigations and activities on the immediate problems affecting 
particular sectors of society, such as shantytown dwellers, the 
unemployed, women, urban citizens, rural inhabitants, human rights, 
labour unions, ethnic minorities, and so on (Lladser, 1989:234). Not 
surprisingly, these centres lacked coordination and articulation, given the 
context where they emerged. Lladser recognizes that,  
 
“the sprouting of these centres has been anarchical . . . 
sometimes the lack of communication between them has 
produced mutual ignorance of their activities, generating 
duplications of efforts and initiatives” (Lladser, 1989:263). 
 
During the 1990s, academic activity related to social policy expanded. 
Social policy experts were located in academia, government institutions, 
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think tanks, NGOs and international organisations. Contreras (interview, 
December 2006) provides a positive view of their activities in Chile by the 
mid-2000s, by saying that,  
 
“I can see them quite active. I observe many transversal 
seminaries, books with different views being published; I see 
that [poverty] statistics are available and that we all use the 
same data. . . I would say that the [poverty-related] 
academic sector is fairly dynamic”.  
 
Contreras’ opinion confirms the view that social sciences academic activity 
returned to normal under democracy. 
 
As an example of an active NGO that generated significant poverty-related 
analysis during the 1990s, the case of the Fundacion Nacional para la 
Superacion de la Pobreza (FNSP) (National Charity to Overcome Poverty) 
NGO is worth citing. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the origins of the FNSP 
go back to 1994 when president Frei decided to create the Consejo 
Nacional para la Superacion de la Pobreza (CNSP) (National Board to 
Overcome Poverty), a civil society group to assist the president in the 
efforts to overcome poverty. In 1996 the CNSP was dissolved, but their 
members, a prestigious group of civil society representatives, decided to 
continue their activities as an NGO, renaming it as the FNSP. 
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In 1999, the FNSP elaborated a document called Propuestas Para la 
Futura Política Social (Proposals for the Future Social Policy), postulating a 
series of reforms and innovations that covered most social sectors, 
including poverty, health, education and housing (FNSP, 1999). At the 
core of all proposals was the creation of ‘social minimums’, a group of 
basic social benefits that the government should guarantee to all citizens 
to have a worthy life. In the particular area of poverty, the document 
proposed updating the method employed by the government to measure 
poverty. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the FNSP was a respected civil society actor 
in the poverty arena, and that its 1999 proposal was widely known among 
social policy experts, both its representatives as well as its ideas were 
entirely ignored in the Chile Solidario policy making process that occurred 
in 2001 and 2002, as explained in Chapter Five. The opinion of Leonardo 
Moreno, FNSP executive manager between 1999 and 2000, confirms this 
situation (Moreno, interview, December 2006). He stresses the 
preponderance of political variables behind the creation of the Chile 
Solidario programme and the absolute absence of the FNSP in the process. 
 
Another important opinion about the degree of influence that the FNSP 
had in the Chile Solidario policy-making process is provided by Cecilia 
Perez (interview, January 2007). As MIDEPLAN minister during the final 
part of the Chile Solidario policy-making process she enjoyed a privileged 
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position to witness the process. Besides, prior to this post she worked as 
managing director of the FNSP, which makes her an ideal informant 
regarding the degree in which the FNSP may have affected the Chile 
Solidario process. While Moreno’s opinion is highly critical about the 
omission of the FNSP in the process, Perez views are less critical, but still 
confirming the undeniable omission of the FNSP in the Chile Solidario 
policy-making process64.  
 
In Peres’ own words (interview, January 2007), the Chile Solidario policy-
making process,  
 
“[lacked] a previous debate about the programmatic and 
methodological dimensions of the programme, because this 
was an internal process, endogenous to the state . . .  its 
design, the reason why [the programme] was going to have 
a particular form, its particular operating mode, was 
informed later to people”  
 
                                                 
64  At the time of this interview (January 2007) Perez was director of FOSIS, inside 
MIDEPLAN. 
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When referring to the meeting between President Lagos and a group of 
social policy experts (CS-EE4) she added that, 
 
 “this was a sort of checking for the [Chile Solidario] 
programme, a procedure that the President usually 
employed, but it was a totally internal construction, with 
political and financial logic” (Perez, interview, January 2007). 
 
After this recognition, Perez states that some modifications to the original 
Chile Solidario design were added during the implementation phase of the 
process, implying that this allowed introducing elements that were omitted 
during the policy-making process. She mentions that as soon as she 
assumed as MIDEPLAN minister, she tried to influence the programme in 
order to incorporate as much as possible some social policy principles that 
were part of the FNSP agenda.  
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Besides, she explains that presently in his post of head of FOSIS, and as 
responsible for managing the Puente programme which is at the core of 
the Chile Solidario programme,  
 
“we have been trying to gradually incorporate [into the Chile 
Solidario programme] elements that belong to a 
programmatic matrix different from that of the state, such 
as the development of social capital capabilities linked to 
community networks, issues that probably would have 
emerged in a wider [policy-making] debate. . . in fact, 
comparing the original [programme] design to what has 
really happened there exists a tremendous difference” 
(Perez, interview, January 2007). 
 
The opinions of Perez are highly relevant to an understanding of the 
Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making process, at least in three 
respects. First, they indicate that the implementation phase of the process 
allows modifying programmes in order to introduce elements that were 
neglected during the policy-making phase.  
 
Second, her experience as an NGO-related expert posted to a high rank 
inside government, demonstrates that a channel in which the policy-
making process may be more suitable to the introduction of knowledge 
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and research considerations relies on the possibility that non-government 
social policy experts secure top-level posts inside government.   
 
Calderon (interview, September 2003) confirms this view:  
 
“people bring their experiences to the programmes in which 
they participate, their stories are key, if they know the poor 
by the way they smell . . . how things are done depends on 
people and their experiences”. 
 
Finally, Perez’ oppinions highlight that ideas and proposals generated 
outside government are more suitable to be adopted in the medium to 
long run, indicating that a slow introduction of ideas from non-government 
experts into government programmes may exist. 
 
In synthesis, there exists solid evidence that throughout the Chilean 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process that occurred during the 1990s, 
governments were able to ignore the opinions of non-government social 
policy experts, and to exclude the participation of non-government experts 
from the policy-making process, thanks to the policy monopoly that it 
enjoyed in the area of poverty. 
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7.2 THE LACK OF AN INSTITUTIONALIZED LINK BETWEEN 
POLICYMAKERS AND RESEARCHERS 
 
The distribution of power that exists in the poverty field in Chile, where 
the government has been uncontested when creating policies has been 
fundamental to formulating the type of policy-making processes of the 
three programmes studied, particularly regarding the absence of non-
government experts in the process. However, an additional institutional 
consideration may also have been relevant. 
 
Existing literature indicates that the availability of instances to link 
policymakers and researchers appears to be basic for scientific knowledge 
to influence policy. In this regard, the level of trust, legitimacy, openness 
and formalization of networks are seen as important factors that facilitate 
the researchers-policymakers link (Court and Young, 2004:6). 
Furthermore, strong links and feedback between researchers, 
policymakers and those involved in practical application of programmes 
may be particularly fruitful. For example, these authors explain that a 
strong researchers-policymakers link existed in Rwanda when a minimum 
standard policy for humanitarian agencies was created. In this case the 
existence of solid networks between government and researchers resulted 
central for the bridging of research and policy. In particular, a structure 
that institutionalized the link between those who made the research and 
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the policy-makers to whom the findings were directed was created (Court 
and Young, 2004:6).  
  
The oppinions of a number of interviewees support this last point in 
relation to the relevance of having spaces or structures that facilitate the 
connection between researchers and policymakers: 
 
“I think that there is no important academic-political 
discussion, because political parties have no capacity to 
enter this debate, neither universities . . . there are no 
instances, no centres dedicated to these subjects” (Egaña, 
interview, january 2007).  
 
“there exists ‘grey matter’ [inside government] but it is 
atomized and limited by certain fears. If more spaces were 
available for a freer and more open discussion, [policy] 
design would be better . . . [however] this may affect some 
interests, as well as governance and smooth administration . 
. . participation may be viewed as a threat at some levels” 
(Calderon, interview, September 2003). 
 
 363 
“definetly there are no places to debate and explore all these 
subjects . . . I believe there is a disdain for reflexion among 
policy makers, and that there exists very litlle critical 
thought” Montes (interview, July 2003). 
 
 “someone should have a long term view [of social policy], 
and MIDEPLAN failed to achieve this . . . the government is 
not interested . . . and everyone in the government is 
opposed to the creation of a social authority as current 
powers from the social sectors and the Ministry of Finance 
make it unviable” Moreno (interview, December 2006). 
 
“there is litlle space inside the public apparatus to reflect and 
analyse what is being done . . . it is common to proceed 
without considering impact indicators or evaluation” Celedon 
(interview, September 2002). 
 
Hence, rather than point to a lack of interest in the issue, interviewees 
allude to the absence of formal spaces inside government where policies 
can be disscused and debated, which would facilitate the introduction of 
academic and technical views during the policy making process.  
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7.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present chapter has seek to explain the absence of a policy stream in 
the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy making process during the 1990s. 
Evidence was presented to support the idea that this area lacks policy 
contestants and interested pressure groups, such as organized popular 
movements and labour and professional unions, in contrast to what occurs 
in other social policy areas and to the predictions of the Multiple Streams 
Model. These absences reduce the possibilities for a policy stream to exist 
because the government has the power to control the entire policy-making 
process, including the phase when policy alternatives are generated, and 
to restrict the participation of non-government actors and ideas in the 
process. In particular, the Chapter demonstrates that this monopolization 
of the process allowed the government to ignore the unarticulated and 
atomized group of poverty experts that existed in the country during the 
1990s; a result that demonstrates that the sole agency and activities of 
researchers were insufficient to generate a policy stream. Egaña’s 
comment about how the Chile Solidario programme was created illustrates 
this point (interview, January 2007): 
 
“it is not something that was thought of as a design, as in 
the case of health and education programmes where there 
was more design, more disscussion.  Chile Solidario was 
much more related to political urgency”.  
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The Chapter has illustrated that the lack of effective actors in the poverty 
arena resulted from a mix of causes, including the legacies of the military 
regime, the elitist form of democracy that has prevailed in Chile and the 
transitional character of democracy during the 1990s, all features that 
prevented the participation of popular groups in the process. 
 
Besides, it has highlighted that contrary to what happens in other social 
policy sector such as health and education, no labour of professional 
unions linked to the area of poverty existed as poverty-alleviation 
programmes are implemented by autonomous Municipalities at the local 
level, a fact that prevented the type of participation that this kind of 
groups had in the policy-making processes of health and education 
reforms.  
 
Finally, it showed that the poverty arena lacks institutional links to 
facilitate the researchers-policymakers interface, which according to some 
authors and a key interviewee, may have contributed to the absence of a 
policy stream in this area. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
 
 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Three sections are included in this final Chapter. The first one draws upon 
the previous Chapters of this thesis to provide a summary of the main 
theoretical contributions obtained. The second section offers potential 
areas for future research, and the final one suggests a number of policy 
implications that arise from the research findings. 
 
8.1 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The thesis recognizes the relevance of the environment in which the policy 
process occurs, especially in relation to the weight that inherited 
institutions have in conditioning the policy-making process. In the case of 
Chile, the notion of an environment that surrounds and conditions the 
policy process, introduced originally by Easton (1965), is palpable in the 
sense that prevailing government structures incorporate rigidities in the 
process. Ministries and departments inside ministries are highly 
autonomous in being able to develop their duties, particularly when they 
engage in the process of creating a new policy initiative. This scenario 
limits the number of interactions between different actors that may occur 
along the policy-making process, and ultimately diminishes the chances of 
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applying knowledge and experiences from existing programmes when a 
policy innovation is introduced.  
 
The thesis also confirms the complexities existing within the policy process, 
making evident the limitations of the stages approach (Laswell, 1956)  in 
properly understanding this phenomenon. As stated in Chapter Two, 
dividing the policy process into sub-phases has been used to simplify the 
analysis of a complex phenomenon, and from the notion that different 
forces and actors may be present in each stage. While in general terms 
this approach is reasonable, the fact that many deviations exist from a 
clear-cut division of the policy process into sub phases must be 
emphasized.  
 
Particularly, the thesis has demonstrated that two forms of subdividing the 
policy process - into agenda-setting and alternative specification and into 
policy-making and policy-implementation - may be misleading65.   
 
Kingdon’s proposal of separating the policy-making process into agenda-
setting and alternative specification is not sustained by the research.  It 
may be argued that in some of the cases under analysis, the phase of 
alternative specification differed from the agenda setting stage as it 
allowed the participation of a few new actors in addition to the presidents 
and his ministers, such as mid-level officials and government experts. 
                                                 
65 See Chapter Two, Figure 2.1 
 368 
However, this one point is not sufficient to justify the division of the 
policy-making process into sub-phases. On the contrary, the cases 
presented no clear difference between policy actors along the policy-
making process, and the weight of political forces was equally important 
when the agenda was set as when policy alternatives were selected. 
 
The sharp division between policy-making and policy-implementation also 
deserves a closer look when analyzing the policy process in a country like 
Chile66. Notwithstanding the fact that this thesis did not investigate the 
implementation phase of the case studies, the closed nature of the 
process suggests that the implementation phase of the process provides a 
window of opportunity for introducing important changes to the 
programmes. Key informants support this point:  
 
“with [the original] FOSIS now dismembered, it is good to 
know why this was the case, to observe the entire history of 
its evolution” (Molina, interview, June 2003, regarding the 
evolution of FOSIS). 
 
                                                 
66 Section 8.2 in this Chapter proposes the study of the implementation phase of the 
programmes under investigation as a potential area for future research. 
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“the design of the social intervention as it should have been 
from the beginning is occuring right now . . . the 
infrastructure remains the same as in 1997 but the social 
intervention, the complex part of the programme . . . has 
evolved since its original design” (Araos, interview, August 
2002, speaking about the Chile Barrio programme). 
 
 “when the Chile Barrio programme started being 
implemented,  it changed, and the profiles of regional 
directors were key . . . in all programmes, persons who 
implement them are of great importance” (Celedon, 
interview, September 2002).  
 
“the development of social capital  and social nets was never 
considered in the original design, although these elements 
probably would have been considered in a wider debate . . . 
so with time we have been trying to incorporate these 
elements . . . in fact, from the original design to what exists 
today there is a tremendous change” (Perez, interview, 
January 2007, speaking about the Chile Solidario programme) 
 
In this regard, the possibility that the programmes are still in the making 
during their implementation phase, as a number of interviewees indicate, 
may reflect that it was only during this phase of the process that it was 
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possible to incorporate views and opinions that were excluded or absent 
during the policy-making process. This may explain why these three 
programmes have been successful in contributing to poverty alleviation in 
Chile, as positive results have become known only in the long run when 
the shortcomings of a secluded policy-making process may have been 
compensated for by the more open implementation stage. 
 
The thesis shows that among the theoretical frameworks that study the 
policy-making process, those that emphasize competition and advocacy by 
different actors are not supported by the three cases under investigation, 
as poverty-alleviation may be a policy area where the policy-making 
process is monopolized by the government. In particular, Chapter Seven 
provides an explanation of this result by confirming the absence of 
relevant actors that could balance out the powers and privileged position 
of government during the policymaking processes. These missing actors 
include civil society organizations, workers’ unions, bussiness organizations, 
think tanks, and so on. In addition, this result is also explained by the fact 
that the government has enough control of the policy making process to 
be able to ignore the opinions of non-government actors. 
 
The thesis demonstrates the usefulness of the Multiple Streams Model as 
a theoretical framework to shed light onto the way in which the poverty 
alleviation policy-making process evolved in Chile during the 1990s. The 
model proved especially valuable for identifying the particularities of the 
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policy-making process in a country characterized by a presidentialistic 
political system like Chile. In particular, the Multiple Streams Model 
presents the advantage of modelling the policy-making process as a result 
of the influence of three different forces (streams), and a variety of actors 
(policy entrepreneurs) who may be located in different institutions. 
Besides, the model proposes a policy-making dynamic resulting from 
precise events (policy windows) where the three streams merge to 
produce a new policy.  
 
The thesis confirms the relevance and prominence of the politics stream 
during the process. In other words, political events and actors are central 
to explain and understand the poverty alleviation policy-making process. 
In particular, results show that the political leanings of the Concertacion 
Alliance as well as the turn-over of administrations affected the process 
significantly.  
 
The thesis also illustrates the importance of the problems stream during 
the policy-making process. Particularly, it shows that the existence and 
visibility of a problem as well as the interpretation of a situation as a 
problem are important elements of the process. In this regard, a very 
relevant factor for a programme to emerge is the availability of poverty 
statistics. Cases indicate that poverty statistics allow policy makers, public 
oppinion and independent experts to have a clear picture of the problem 
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and its evolution. In turn, this clear picture enables the recognition that 
this phenomenon constitutes a problem requiring government response.  
 
The research also supports the Multiple Streams Model view that feedback 
from existing programmes may bring problems to the attention of policy-
makers. As Chapter Five showed, this was the case during the the Chile 
Barrio and the Chile Solidario processes. A last point related to the 
problems stream corresponds to the Concertacion Alliance’s socio-
economic principles and views. Cases indicate that they contribute to an 
understanding of poverty as a problem requiring prompt action from 
government. 
 
Another theoretical finding related to the Multiple Streams Model 
corresponds to the type of policy entrepreneurs that were present in the 
cases. The cases demonstrated that entrepreneurship in the Chilean social 
policy arena is a rare phenomenon, especially in relation to supporting a 
particular policy alternative when a window of opportunity arrives. The 
closest resemblance to this type of behavior is found in high-ranking 
government officials who participate in the policy process by promoting a 
particular policy approach derived from their privileged position inside 
government and from their proximity to the President. But they are not 
found everywhere, as Kingdon suggests, nor did they employ a varied 
bundle of resources to push for their preferred policy solution. On the 
contrary, policy entrepreneurs in the cases under analysis are mainly top-
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level government officials using their hierarchical position to influence the 
policy-making process. 
  
The thesis identified the kind of policy window that existed in the case 
studies. Fleeting events that fitted the definition of policy windows were 
found, as well as other events that resembled more a policy window of 
significant duration, and which provided an ample lapse of time for the 
government to introduce new policies. It was also significant to find that in 
two of the cases a self imposed deadline to launch a new programme 
existed – the yearly presidential address to the nation – suggesting that 
these events closed one of these long windows of opportunity to introduce 
policy innovations. 
 
The most significant divergence that was found between the cases and 
the Multiple Streams Model corresponds to the absence of a proper policy 
stream in the poverty-related Chilean arena, and the alternative way in 
which solutions to problems are created. While the model predicts that 
three independent streams participate in the policy-making process, the 
cases show that the policy stream is inexistent; a result that modifies the 
dynamic of the process. In this scenario, the existence of a policy 
alternative to address a problem was not an issue, as the only required 
conditions for a policy to emerge were the perception of a problem by the 
government and the adequate political circumstances to facilitate 
addressing this problem. The lack of a policy stream forced government 
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officials to autonomously generate a policy alternative, usually by looking 
for ideas of programmes in the Latin American region. The overwhelming 
weight of political forces in the process tended to limit the timespan 
available to design the programmes, thus limiting the chances of more 
openly discussing alternatives.  In addition, the policy-making process was 
open only to a few top-level government officials, a fact that minimized 
the chances of leaking news of the new programme that was reserved for 
the president to announce to the entire country.  
 
An additional theoretical point the thesis advances is related to the 
irrelevance of Congress in the process. As mentioned previously, recent 
studies of the policy-making process in Latin America, especially those that 
examine the policy-making process of mainly economic polices, focus their 
attention on the legislative phase of the process when the government 
should confront the opposition of legislators to pass its laws. The present 
research has demonstrated that the Chilean government was able to 
bypass Congress to implement a poverty-alleviation programme, as no law 
was pursued in one of the case studies (Chile Barrio). Besides, it was 
shown that when a poverty-related law was sent to congress a benign 
opposition was found, instead of a “veto-player” as some literature 
predicts. As a result, the study of the policy-making process that unfolds 
before the legislative stage arrives appears highly relevant in the case of a 
presidentialistic country like Chile. 
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8.2 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
To contrast the results of the thesis with the policy-making 
process that exists in other social policy areas 
 
Interviewees provided consistent testimonies showing that the policy 
process that occurs in social policy areas outside poverty-alleviation 
present a different policy process: 
 
“I think that there are two examples that remain positive, 
despite all the conflicts that ocurred, and they are the 
educational reform and the penal process reform. In both 
cases there was a great deal of participation from experts 
and non-experts, as well as complaints from the users of 
both systems. Both reforms were aproved during a long 
period of time and not during a single electoral period, and 
when a long-term reform is negotiated in parliament, it is 
not used for electoral ends, which provides a lot of 
opportunities for experts to work in these reforms” (Baranda, 
interview, September 2003). 
 
Hence, a straightforward area for further research refers to expanding the 
scope of the thesis to other policy arenas. This thesis has shown that the 
poverty-alleviation policy-making process that existed in Chile during the 
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1990s had characteristics that are particular to the subject of poverty, and 
to the place and time when these innovations were introduced. 
 
It may be fruitful to investigate whether the findings obtained in the 
present research hold true in policy areas other than poverty, such as 
health, education and housing. Circumstantial evidence obtained in the 
present research indicates that it is likely to find a different type of 
process, mainly in relation to the existence of pressure groups and other 
actors that are able to contest the government’s policy proposals. In this 
sense, it may be interesting to apply a similar methodology as the one 
employed here, to map and explain the policy-making processes in these 
areas. This type of analysis will help confirm the findings obtained here, 
particularly with regards to the importance of different actors interested 
and involved in the policy-making process breaking the policy monopoly 
that the government may enjoy. 
 
The following set of questions may be posed in a cross sector analysis of 
the policy-making process: First, the extent to which problem-related 
elements such as the problem’s trend and intensity, the perception of 
success or failure of the government’s policies in addressing it, and the 
degree of consensus about the need to address the problem, modify the 
policy-making process. Second, the manner in which differences in 
variables related to the politics stream, such as the willingness of 
government to address the problem, alter the process. And third, the 
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degree to which variables related to the policy stream, such as the 
number of academics and institutions involved in policy analysis and the 
level of policy discussion that exists inside and outside government, affect 
the process. 
 
To study the implementation phase of the poverty-alleviation 
programmes under analysis, to map and understand the entire 
policy process of these programmes 
 
Another area for future research involves integrating the implementation 
phase of the policy process into the analysis. This will allow having a full 
picture of the policy process, thus avoiding introducing any artificial 
separation of the process, particularly in cases when policies evolve 
significantly during the implementation phase.  
 
As already mentioned in this Chapter, many interviewees concurred that 
the three programmes under study evolved significantly during the 
implementation stage. 
 
Hence, the analysis of the entire policy making process will provide 
answers to questions such as the degree to which the original design of 
programmes is modified during the implementation phase. Furthermore, if 
this is the case, it will elucidate whether these changes result from 
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technical factors or whether they respond to other forces, such as the 
interests of street level bureaucracies (Lipsky, 1980). 
 
8.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In general terms, the following policy recommendations are intended to 
stimulate the development of a policy stream in the poverty-related policy 
area, thus allowing a greater consideration of experience-based and 
theoretical knowledge in the policy-making process. 
 
To create bodies inside government to discuss policies 
 
The research indicate that the Chilean poverty-alleviation policy-making 
process during the 1990s differed from the predictions of the Multiple 
Streams Model, particularly with regards to the way in which solutions to 
problems were created. While Kingdon’s model considers numerous actors 
that form policy communities, where policy views are contrasted and 
discussed and from which policy proposals emerge, the cases investigated 
suggest that only a few top-level government actors generated policy 
alternatives. These actors had considerable room for manoeuvre in terms 
of the lack of resistance or contestability to their policy proposals. Clearly, 
this lack of policy discussion during the policy-making process may put at 
risk the soundness of policies, or delay the introduction of knowledge and 
experience-based elements into policies. 
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As a result, strengthening the capacity of governments to introduce 
scientific and evidence-based knowledge into policies during the policy-
making process may be vital to the design of policies that generate 
positive results in a reasonable length of time.    
 
To create an office inside government devoted to the analysis of 
government approaches to poverty-alleviation 
 
As explained in the thesis, the idea of having a social authority inside 
government has existed in Chile since 1990, when democracy returned to 
the country. According to advocates of this idea, such an authority might 
facilitate coordination of all the government’s programmes with a poverty-
alleviation character. The thesis also showed that this aim has proved 
difficult to achieve for a variety of reasons, particularly the resistances of 
existing ministries to cede part of their powers and spheres of influence to 
a coordinating agency. 
 
The present policy recommendation is more modest than the idea of 
creating a social authority as it focuses only on having an institutionalised 
body inside government to help coordinate policymakers, researchers and 
implementers involved in the poverty-alleviation field. This type of body 
would contribute to filling the gap existing in the policy-making process of 
the programmes under study by creating a flow-like process of discussion 
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and debate about the most appropriate government strategy for 
addressing poverty, thus increasing the chances of developing a poverty-
related policy stream. 
 
To stimulate the poverty-alleviation debate inside Congress 
 
The Chilean Senate organizes its discussions of projects of law around 
different Comisiones Permanentes (Permanent Discussion Groups) formed 
by five senators with an interest in a particular policy topic. As part of their 
duties, Comisiones Permanentes have a series of meetings with individuals 
involved or interested in the project of law where they are invited to 
express their views. Academics and experts are frequently invited to 
contribute to the discussions. A very similar picture is found in the 
chamber of deputies, where a number of Comisiones Permanentes are 
devoted to the study and discussion of different projects of law. Hence, 
Comisiones Permanentes constitute a formal space inside Congress where 
politicians, researchers and interested groups interact and dialogue during 
the legislative process. 
 
In the social policy field there are Comisiones Permanentes for the health, 
education, social security and housing sectors. It is striking to find that 
among the near forty Comisiones Permanentes that exist inside Congress, 
none is devoted to the area of poverty. This unusual shortcoming may 
prevent the existence of a fluid debate between politicians and academics 
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when poverty-related projects of laws are sent to Congress. Correcting 
this omission may contribute to building a policy stream in the area of 
poverty in Chile which ultimately may help to obtain more effective and 
appropriate poverty-alleviation policies. 
 
To ensure continuous generation of relevant socioeconomic data 
and indicators 
 
The thesis suggested that the availability of socioeconomic indicators and 
statistics was an ingredient that contributed to the creation of the three 
poverty-alleviation programmes under study. In particular, Chapter Six 
showed that poverty data that started to be available in the country 
during the 1980s and continued to be generated during the 1990s, 
informed policymakers about the severity of poverty as well as its 
evolution. In addition, appendix 3 showed that the methodological 
soundness of these statistics contributed to the validation of poverty 
indicators.  
 
In the same vein, it may be argued that having sound socioeconomic data 
and indicators providing regular information about all relevant 
socioeconomics areas may be highly important for the generation of 
adequate programmes to address social problems. Ideally, these data and 
indicators should cover traditional social areas and problems (health, 
education, housing, poverty, etc.) as well as emerging topics. For instance, 
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intra-household violence, crime, drug consumption, neighbourhood 
regeneration, and so on. The comments of Alina Oyarzun, head of the 
Department of Social Statistics of MIDEPLAN (interview, September 2003), 
illustrates  this point: 
 
“[the CASEN survey] continues to be the only source of valid 
information for all [social] ministries; today all ministries 
have the [CASEN] database and can work with it if they 
want . . . [social] ministries may organize to make a survey 
highlighting factors of vulnerability that are not measured 
today and which the CASEN survey does not include . . . 
[and] to produce a new instrument or set of instruments as 
the demands [for socioeconomic statistics] cannot all be 
fulfilled by the CASEN survey alone”. 
 
The use of a validated methodology is equally important to produce these 
indicators, which may occur if academic and international organizations 
participate in the process of designing and generating these statistics.  
 
“The Universidad de Chile has been a key partner in the 
CASEN [process] . . . [alongside] ECLAC in correcting the 
income and poverty estimates. They have also provided an 
external check to ensure that the estimates have not been 
adulterated” (Oyarzun, interview, September 2003). 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Interviewees are listed below according to the fieldwork in which they 
were interviewed. All interviewees authorized their names to be disclosed 
in the thesis. However, in relation to some topics, some of them asked to 
remain anonimous. Hence, in these cases their opinions are assigned to 
an anonimous interviewee.  
 
FIELDWORK 1 
Name Relevant position Date(s) of 
interview(s) 
Araos, Silvia Chile Barrio August, 2002 
Calderón, Carlos Under-Director FOSIS, Under-
director Chile Barrio 
August, 2002 
Cardenas, Jose Analyst, Social Studies 
Department, MIDEPLAN 
August, 2002 
Celedón, Maria 
Angelica 
Head, Unidad de Difusion y 
Fomento, Ministry of Housing 
September, 2002 
Cortes, Consuelo Head, Social Studies 
Department, MIDEPLAN 
August, 2002 
Crispi, Jaime Head, Studies Department, 
DIPRES (Budget Office), 
Ministry of Finance 
September, 2002 
Guzman, 
Guillermo 
Assessor to the Minister, 
Ministry of Housing 
September, 2002 
Marquez, 
Francisca 
Anthropologist, SUR NGO September, 2002 
Mercado, Olga Housing analyst, Social Studies 
Department MIDEPLAN 
August, 2002 
Moreno, 
Leonardo 
Head, Social Division, 
MIDEPLAN 
August, 2002 
Nieto, Maria  de 
la Luz 
Analyst, Housing Policy 
Division, Ministry of Housing 
September, 2002 
Salazar, 
Guillermo 
Assessor to the Minister, 
Ministry of Housing 
September, 2002 
Zuloaga, Maria E. Analyst, Social Division, 
MIDEPLAN 
August, 2002 
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FIELDWORK 2 
Name Relevant position Date(s) of 
interview(s) 
Baranda, Benito Director, Hogar de Cristo 
NGO 
September, 2003 
Calderón, Carlos Under-Director FOSIS, 
Under-director Chile 
Barrio 
September, 2003 
Cardenas, Jose Analyst, Social Studies 
Department, MIDEPLAN 
June 2003 
Espocito, Monica Hogar de Cristo (NGO) September, 2003 
Etchegaray, Alberto Minister, Ministry of 
Housing 
September, 2003 
Feres, Juan Carlos Consultant, ECLAC September, 2003 
Fernandez, Patricio Head, FOSIS August, 2003 
Flaño, Nicolas Head, FOSIS August, 2003 
Garcia, Alvaro Under-minister, 
MIDEPLAN 
July, 2003 
Gatica, Jaime Head, Planning Division, 
MIDEPLAN 
September, 2003 
Irarrazabal Ignacio Independent Consultant September, 2003 
Mercado, Olga Housing analyst, Social 
Studies Department 
MIDEPLAN 
June 2003 
Molina, Sergio Minister, MIDEPLAN June, 2003 
Montes, Carlos Deputy, Socialist party July, 2003 
Oyarzún, Alina Head, Social Statistics 
Department, MIDEPLAN 
September, 2003 
 
 
FIELDWORK 3 
Name Relevant position Date(s) of 
interview(s) 
Contreras, Dante Economist, Universidad 
de Chile 
December, 2006 
Moreno, Leonardo Executive director, FNSP 
NGO 
December, 2006 
Egaña, Rodrigo Head, AGCI January, 2007 
Perez, Cecilia Minister, MIDEPLAN January, 2007 
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APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, a narrative interviewing method was 
applied. This is a semi-structured interview where the interviewer invites 
the interviewee to narrate a particular episode, posing later specific 
questions according to the content and evolution of the narration, 
particularly if some topic of interest was not covered in the narration. After 
asking interviewees to narrate the process, the following set of questions 
and related questions was applied (if necessary) during fieldworks 1 and 2. 
 
Questions applied during fieldwork 1 and 2 
Question 
number 
Initial question Related 
question 
Related 
question 
Related 
question 
1 How was originated 
this programme?  
When this idea 
was initially 
consider?  
  
2 In your opinion, who 
were the most 
important individuals 
involved in the 
creation of this 
programme? 
Why? What was 
their activity 
and position 
by that time? 
What is their 
present 
activity and 
position? 
3 According to your 
view, was any 
institution especially 
relevant in the 
creation of this 
programme? 
Why? In particular, 
did actors 
such as the 
media, 
political 
parties, 
research 
institutions, 
etc. played 
any role? 
 
4 Which events or 
circumstances (past 
or contemporaneous) 
were related to the 
creation of this 
programme?  
Why?   
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Interviews applied during fieldwork three were focused on obtaining 
interviewees’ opinions about specific research findings. As a result, these 
interviews started with an introduction that described the research, 
particularly the cases under study and the main characteristics of the 
Multiple Streams Model. Next, the main research findings were described. 
The following table presents the questions applied after this introduction. 
 
 
Questions applied during fieldwork 3  
Question Initial question Related question Related question 
1 What is your opinion 
about the policy-making 
process of Chilean social 
policies during the 
1990s? 
Regarding the 
community of Chilean 
poverty experts, how 
active do you see this 
community compared to 
what happens in more 
developed countries?  
Do you think that 
in the area of 
poverty the 
government enjoys 
more room for 
manoeuvre than in 
other policy 
arenas? 
2 From your experience, 
would you like to give 
me your general opinion 
about my research 
finding? 
What is your opinion 
about the level of 
participation of non-
government actors in the 
poverty-alleviation 
policy-making process? 
In this respect, do 
you perceive that 
the poverty field is 
different to other 
social policy 
arenas? 
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